



why this zine?

When I started using containers I was SO CONFUSED.



So I decided to learn how they work under the hood!



Now I feel confident that I can solve basically any problem with containers because I understand how they work.

I have that after now line this give world feel like that the

I hope that after reading this zine, you'll feel like that too.




there are only about 10 main ideas! let's go learn them!




table of contents

cgroups	13
network namespaces	18
container IP addresses	1
capabilities	20
configuration options	22
	cgroups namespaces how to make a namespace PID namespaces user namespaces network namespaces container IP addresses capabilities seccomp-BPF configuration options


why containers?








- \$./configure
- \$ make all

ERROR: you have version
2.1.1 and you need
at least 2.2.4









the big idea: include EVERY dependency


containers package EVERY dependency together



to make sure this program will run on your laptop, I'm going to send you every single file you need


a container image is a tarball of a filesystem

Here's what's in a typical Rails app's container:




how images are built

- 0. start with a base OS
- 1. install program + dependencies
- 2. configure it how you want
- 3. make a tarball of the WHOLE FILESYSTEM



running an image

- 1. download the tarball
- 2. unpack it into a directory
- 3. run a program and pretend that directory is its whole filesystem




containers aren't magic


These 15 lines of bash will start a container running the fish shell. Try it! (download this script at bit.ly/containers-arent-magic)


It only runs on Linux because these features are all Linux-only.


```
wget bit.ly/fish-container -O fish.tar
                                           # 1. download the image
mkdir container-root; cd container-root
tar -xf ../fish.tar
                                            # 2. unpack image into a directory
cgroup_id="cgroup_$(shuf -i 1000-2000 -n 1)" # 3. generate random cgroup name
cgcreate -g "cpu,cpuacct,memory:$cgroup_id" # 4. make a cgroup &
cgset -r cpu.shares=512 "$cgroup_id"
                                                 set CPU/memory limits
cgset -r memory.limit_in_bytes=1000000000 \
      "$cgroup_id"
cgexec -g "cpu,cpuacct,memory:$cgroup_id" \ # 5. use the cgroup
    unshare -fmuipn --mount-proc \
                                           # 6. make + use some namespaces
    chroot "$PWD" \
                                            # 7. change root directory
    /bin/sh -c "
        /bin/mount -t proc proc /proc &&
                                            # 8. use the right /proc
        hostname container-fun-times &&
                                            # 9. change the hostname
        /usr/bin/fish"
                                            # 10. finally, start fish!
```


containers = processes











container kernel features

containers use these Linux Kernel features

"container" doesn't have a clear definition, but Docker containers use all of these features.



set a process's root directory to a directory with the contents of the the container image

★ cgroups ★

limit memory/CPU usage for a group of processes





allow processes to have their own:

- → network
- → mounts

- → PIDs
- → users
- → hostname + more

★ capabilities ★

security: give specific permissions




security: prevent dangerous system calls

★ overlay filesystems ★

this is what makes layers work! Sharing layers saves disk space & helps containers start faster

pivot_root



chroot: change a process's root directory

If you chroot to /fake/root, when it opens the file /usr/bin/redis it'll get /fake/root/usr/bin/redis instead. You can "run" a container just by using chroot, like this:

- \$ mkdir redis; cd redis
- \$ tar -xzf redis.tar
- \$ chroot \$PWD /usr/bin/redis
- # done! redis is running!

programs can break out of a chroot all these files are you can unmount whole redis still there! A root filesystem container the old filesystem directory process can access so it's impossible to redis them if it wants. access it. container directoru


Containers use pivot_root instead of chroot.

to have a "container" you need more than pivot_root


pivot_root alone won't let you:

- → set CPU/memory limits
- → hide other running processes
- → use the same port as another process
- → restrict dangerous system calls

layers







a layer is a directory

\$ 1s 8891378eb*
bin/ home/ mnt/ run/ tmp/
boot/ lib/ opt sbin/ usr/
dev/ lib64/ proc/ srv/ var/
etc/ media/ root/ sys/
files in an
 ubuntu:18.04 layer


every layer has an ID

usually the ID is a sha256 hash of the layer's contents

example: 8e99fae2..

if a file is in 2 layers, you'll see the version from the top layer

exact same files on disk!




by default, writes go to a temporary layer



To keep your changes, write to a directory that's mounted from outside the container

overlay filesystems



mount -t overlay has 4 parameters

lowerdir:

list of read-only directories upperdir:

directory where writes should go workdir:

empty directory for internal use target:

the merged result


upperdir: where all writes go

when you create, change, or delete a file, it's recorded in the upperdir.

usually this starts out empty and is deleted when the container exits

lowerdir: the layers. read only.

you can run



here's an example!

\$ mount -t overlay overlay -o
 lowerdir=/lower, upperdir=/upper, workdir=/work /merged
\$ ls /upper

cat.txt dog.txt

\$ ls /lower


dog.txt bird.txt

\$ ls /merged

cat.txt dog.txt bird.txt

the merged version of dog.txt is the one from the upper directory

container registries




a registry is a server that serves images

images have an ID ~ "leff 92"

and sometimes a tag

like "18.04" or "latest"



there are public container registries...

I'm going to use the latest official public Redis image to test my code!

every time we build our web service, we upload a new image to our private registry developer at company

... and private


be careful where your container images come from


I'll just run this image from RANDOM_PERSON


o. ... 2 months later ...


oh no! RANDOM_PERSON is mining bitcoin on my server


cgroups


















namespaces










```
every processes has
     7 namespaces
$ lsns -p 273
         NS TYPE
4026531835
              cgroup
4026531836
              pid
4026531837
              user
4026531838
              uts
4026531839
              ipc
4026531840
              mnt
4026532009
              net
     Tnamespace ID
you can also see a
 process's namespace with:
$ ls -1 /proc/273/ns
```

how to make a namespace






command line tools

- \$ unshare --net COMMAND
 run COMMAND in a
 new network namespace
- \$ sudo 1sns list all namespaces
- \$ nsenter -t PID --all COMMAND
 run COMMAND in the same
 namespaces as PID

namespace system calls

- ★ clone ★
- make a new process
- * unshare *
- make + use a namespace
- * setns *

use an existing namespace






each namespace type has a ♥ man page ♥

- \$ man network_namespaces
- A physical network device can live in exactly one network namespace.

. . .


PID namespaces





PID in host PID in container


23512
23513
4 PID 1 is

12 special









rules for signaling PID 1


from same container:


only works if the process has set a signal handler

from the host:

only SIGKILL and SIGSTOP are ok, or if there's a signal handler

user namespaces







in a user namespace,
UIDs are mapped to
host UIDs

I'm running oh, that's
mapped to
12345

The mapping is in

//proc/self/uid_map


Unmapped Users show Up as "nobody" create user namespace \$ unshare --user bash \$ 1s -1 /usr/bin .. nobody nogroup apropos .. nobody nogroup apt These are "actually" owned by root

but we didn't map any users

how to find out if you have a separate user namespace

between a container process and a host process.

network namespaces





namespaces usually have 2 interfaces (+ sometimes more)


- →the loopback interface (127.0.0.1/8, for connections inside the namespace)
- →another interface (for connections from outside)

every server listens on a port and network interface(s)

0.0.0.0:8080 means "port 8080 on every network interface in my namespace"








other namespaces are

container IP addresses





This is because they're not directly on the public internet

for a packet to get to the right place, it needs a route



inside the same computer, you'll have the right routes

same computer:

\$ curl 172.16.2.3:8080 <html>....

different computer:

\$ curl 172.16.2.3:8080
.... no reply

distributing the right routes is complicated


a new container started, 10.2.73.4 should go to X computer now


wow these things change a lot route


cloud providers have systems to make container IPs work

In AWS this is called an "elastic network interface"

capabilities








CAP_SYS_ADMIN

lets you do a LOT of things. avoid giving this if you can!

CAP_NET_ADMIN

allow changing network settings



\$ getpcaps PID


print capabilities


that PID has

getcap / setcap


system calls: get and set capabilities!

seccomp-bpf










the function decides if that syscall is allowed

example function:

if name in allowed_list {
 return true;
}
return false; this means the
 syscall doesn't
 happen!

Docker blocks dozens of syscalls by default





2 ways to block scary system calls


- 1. limit the container's capabilities
- 2. set a seccomp-bpf whitelist

You should do both!

configuration options








set capabilities

add seccomp-bpf filters




use the host network namespace


is to use a new network namespace!

Othanks for reading O

I did a bunch of the research for this zine by reading the man pages. But, much more importantly, I experimented -- a lot!



So, if you have access to a Linux machine, try things out! Mount an overlay filesystem! Create a namespace! See what happens!



Othis?

more at

* wizardzines.com *