BTFM

Blue Team Field Manual

Alan White

Ben Clark

Version 1, Rel 2

BTFM. Copyright © 2017 by Alan White and Ben Clark

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN-13: 978-1541016361

ISBN-10: 154101636X

Technical Editor: Matt Hulse

Product and company names mentioned herein may be the trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than use a trademark symbol with every occurrence of a trademarked name, the author uses the names only in an editorial fashion, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark.

The information in this book is distributed "as is". While every precaution was taken to ensure the accuracy of the material, the author assumes no responsibility or liability for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein.

PREFACE

BTFM Command-Line Syntax:

Notation

Description

#

Generic Linux/*nux shell prompt, sudo may also be used with $

C:\>

Windows Prompt, may require Administrator CMD prompt

PS C:\>

Windows PowerShell

>

Generic prompt, multi OS

<IP ADDRESS>, <PORT>, <USER>, <PASSWORD>, etc.

Requires user determined input and remove <> brackets

-

Caution use of copy/paste with dash/hyphens.

en/em/dash ,-,-

hyphen -

spaces

Ensure you check spaces and no spaces in commands.

Updates, Edits and Supplement Material:

Ref. http://www.blueteamfieldmanual.com

BTFM is based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework:

Ref. http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0 PREPARATION (Documentation Review)

KEY DOCUMENTS

REVIEW

1 IDENTIFY (Scope)

SCANNING AND VULNERABILITIES

NMAP

NESSUS

OPENVAS

WINDOWS

NETWORK DISCOVERY

DHCP

DNS

HASHING

NETBIOS

USER ACTIVITY

PASSWORDS

MICROSOFT BASELINE SECURITY ANALYZER (MBSA)

ACTIVE DIRECTORY INVENTORY

LINUX

NETWORK DISCOVERY

DHCP

DNS

HASHING

NETBIOS

PASSWORDS

2 PROTECT (Defend)

WINDOWS

DISABLE/STOP SERVICES

HOST SYSTEM FIREWALLS

PASSWORDS

HOST FILE

WHITELIST

APPLICATION RESTRICTIONS

IPSEC

ACTIVE DIRECTORY (AD) - GROUP POLICY OBJECT (GPO)

STAND ALONE SYSTEM - WITHOUT ACTIVE DIRECTORY (AD)

LINUX

DISABLE/STOP SERVICES

HOST SYSTEM FIREWALLS

PASSWORDS

HOST FILE

WHITELIST

IPSEC

3 DETECT (Visibility)

NETWORK MONITORING

TCPDUMP

TSHARK

SNORT

NETWORK CAPTURE (PCAP) TOOLS

EDITCAP

MERGECAP

HONEY TECHNIQUES

WINDOWS

LINUX

NETCAT

PASSIVE DNS MONITORING

LOG AUDITING

WINDOWS

LINUX

4 RESPOND (Analysis)

LIVE TRIAGE - WINDOWS

SYSTEM INFORMATION

USER INFORMATION

NETWORK INFORMATION

SERVICE INFORMATION

POLICY, PATCH AND SETTINGS INFORMATION

AUTORUN AND AUTOLOAD INFORMATION

LOGS

FILES, DRIVES AND SHARES INFORMATION

LIVE TRIAGE - LINUX

SYSTEM INFORMATION

USER INFORMATION

NETWORK INFORMATION

SERVICE INFORMATION

POLICY, PATCH AND SETTINGS INFORMATION

AUTORUN AND AUTOLOAD INFORMATION:

LOGS

FILES, DRIVES AND SHARES INFORMATION

MALWARE ANALYSIS

STATIC ANALYSIS BASICS

IDENTIFY MALWARE

PROCESS EXPLORER

FILE HASH ANALYSIS

HASH QUERY

HARD DRIVE AND MEMORY ACQUISITION

WINDOWS

LINUX

5 RECOVER (Remediate)

PATCHING

WINDOWS

LINUX

BACKUP

WINDOWS

LINUX

KILL MALWARE PROCESS

WINDOWS

LINUX

6 TACTICS (Tips & Tricks)

OS CHEATS

WINDOWS

LINUX

DECODING

HEX CONVERSION

SNORT

SNORT RULES

DOS/DDOS

FINGERPRINT DOS/DDOS

TOOL SUITES

PREBUILT ISO, VIRTUAL MACHINE AND DISTRIBUTIONS

7 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT (Checklist)

INCIDENT RESPONSE CHECKLIST

IDENTIFICATION TASKS

CONTAINMENT TASKS

REMEDIATION TASKS

OTHER / LESSONS LEARNED TASKS

MALWARE ATTRIBUTES CHECKLIST

8 SECURITY INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION (Schema)

VOCABULARY FOR EVENTS RECORDING AND INCIDENT SHARING (VERIS)

GENERAL

ACTOR

ACTION

ASSET

ATTRIBUTE

COURSE OF ACTION

KILL CHAIN MAPPING

GATHER DATA FOR MAPPING KILL CHAIN

PRIORITIZED DEFENDED ASSET LIST (PDAL)

GATHER DATA AND PRIORITIZE ASSETS TO DEFEND

10 INDEX (A-Z)

0 PREPARATION (Documentation Review)

KEY DOCUMENTS

REVIEW

• Organization Chart • Network Diagrams • Data Flow Diagrams • Critical Asset, Data and Services List • Rules of Engagement (ROE) Limitations and Boundaries • Incident Response Plan • Business Continuity Plan • Disaster Recovery Plan • Required Notification Guidance • Actions to Date • Physical Access Requirements • On call/contracted resources • Communication Plan • Authority and Legal Conditions • Threat Intelligence Summary • Meetings and Deliverable Reporting Requirements • Physical Security Plan • Risk Assessment Decision Matrix • Data and Info Disclosure Procedures • Consent to Monitor, Collect and Assess Data • MOA/MOU/NDA Documents and Requirements

1 IDENTIFY (Scope)

SCANNING AND VULNERABILITIES

NMAP

Ping sweep for network:

# nmap -sn -PE <IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

Scan and show open ports:

# nmap --open <IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

Determine open services:

# nmap -sV <IP ADDRESS>

Scan two common TCP ports, HTTP and HTTPS:

# nmap -p 80,443 <IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

Scan common UDP port, DNS:

# nmap -sU -p 53 <IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

Scan UDP and TCP together, be verbose on a single host and include optional skip ping: # nmap -v -Pn -sU -sT -p U:53,111,137,T:21-25,80,139,8080 <IP ADDRESS>

NESSUS

Basic Nessus scan:

# nessus -q -x -T html <NESSUS SERVER IP ADDRESS> <NESSUS SERVER PORT 1241> <ADMIN ACCOUNT> <ADMIN PASSWORD> <FILE WITH TARGETS>.txt <RESULTS FILE NAME>.html # nessus [-vnh] [-c .rcfile] [-V] [-T <format>]

Batch-mode scan:

# nessus -q [-pPS] <HOST> <PORT> <USER NAME> <PASSWORD> <targets-file> <result-file> Report conversion:

# nessus -i in.[nsr|nbe] -o out.[xml|nsr|nbe|html|txt]

OPENVAS

Step 1: Install the server, client and plugin packages: # apt-get install openvas-server openvas-client openvas-plugins-base openvas-plugins-dfsg Step 2: Update the vulnerability database # openvas-nvt-sync

Step 3: Add a user to run the client: # openvas-adduser

Step 4: Login: sysadm Step 5: Authentication (pass/cert) [pass]: [HIT ENTER]

Step 6: Login password: <PASSWORD> You will then be asked to add “User rules”.

Step 7: Allow this user to scan authorized network by typing: accept <YOUR IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

default deny

Step 8: type ctrl-D to exit, and then accept.

Step 9: Start the server: # service openvas-server start

Step 10: Set targets to scan: Create a text file with a list of hosts/networks to scan.

# vi scanme.txt

Step 11: Add one host, network per line: <IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

Step 12: Run scan: # openvas-client -q 127.0.0.1 9390 sysadm nsrc+ws scanme.txt openvas-output-.html -T txt -V -x Step 13: (Optional)run scan with HTML format: # openvas-client -q 127.0.0.1 9390 sysadm nsrc+ws scanme.txt openvas-output.txt -T html -V -x

WINDOWS

NETWORK DISCOVERY

Basic network discovery:

C:\> net view /all

C:\> net view \\<HOST NAME>

Basic ping scan and write output to file:

C:\> for /L %I in (1,1,254) do ping -w 30 -n 1 192.168.1.%I | find "Reply" >> <OUTPUT FILE NAME>.txt

DHCP

Enable DHCP server logging:

C:\> reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\DhcpServer\Parameters /v ActivityLogFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 1

Default Location Windows 2003/2008/2012:

C:\> %windir%\System32\Dhcp

DNS

Default location Windows 2003:

C:\> %SystemRoot%\System32\Dns

Default location Windows 2008:

C:\> %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs\DNS Server.evtx Default location of enhanced DNS Windows 2012 R2:

C:\> %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer%4Analytical.etl Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940779.aspx

Enable DNS Logging:

C:\> DNSCmd <DNS SERVER NAME> /config /logLevel 0x8100F331

Set log location:

C:\> DNSCmd <DNS SERVER NAME> /config /LogFilePath <PATH TO LOG FILE>

Set size of log file:

C:\> DNSCmd <DNS SERVER NAME> /config /logfilemaxsize 0xffffffff

HASHING

File Checksum Integrity Verifier (FCIV):

Ref. http://support2.microsoft.com/kb/841290

Hash a file:

C:\> fciv.exe <FILE TO HASH>

Hash all files on C:\ into a database file:

C:\> fciv.exe c:\ -r -md5 -xml <FILE NAME>.xml List all hashed files:

C:\> fciv.exe -list -sha1 -xml <FILE NAME>.xml Verify previous hashes in db with file system:

C:\> fciv.exe -v -sha1 -xml <FILE NAME>.xml Note: May be possible to create a master db and compare to all systems from a cmd line. Fast baseline and difference.

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn520872.aspx

PS C:\> Get-FileHash <FILE TO HASH> | Format-List PS C:\> Get-FileHash -algorithm md5 <FILE TO HASH> C:\> certutil -hashfile <FILE TO HASH> SHA1

C:\> certutil -hashfile <FILE TO HASH> MD5

NETBIOS

Basic nbtstat scan:

C:\> nbtstat -A <IP ADDRESS>

Cached NetBIOS info on localhost:

C:\> nbtstat -c

Script loop scan:

C:\> for /L %I in (1,1,254) do nbstat -An 192.168.1.%I

USER ACTIVITY

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/psloggedon.aspx

Get users logged on:

C:\> psloggedon \\computername

Script loop scan:

C:\> for /L %i in (1,1,254) do psloggedon \\192.168.1.%i >> C:\users_output.txt

PASSWORDS

Password guessing or checks:

# for /f %i in (<PASSWORD FILE NAME>.txt) do @echo %i & net use \\<TARGET IP ADDRESS> %i /u:<USER NAME> 2>nul && pause # for /f %i in (<USER NAME FILE>.txt) do @(for /f %j in (<PASSWORD FILE NAME>.txt) do @echo %i:%j & @net use \\<TARGET IP ADDRESS> %j /u:%i 2>nul && echo %i:%j >> success.txt && net use \\<IP ADDRESS> /del)

MICROSOFT BASELINE SECURITY ANALYZER (MBSA)

Basic scan of a target IP address:

C:\> mbsacli.exe /target <TARGET IP ADDRESS> /n os+iis+sql+password

Basic scan of a target IP range:

C:\> mbsacli.exe /r <IP ADDRESS RANGE> /n os+iis+sql+password Basic scan of a target domain:

C:\> mbsacli.exe /d <TARGET DOMAIN> /n os+iis+sql+password Basic scan of a target computer names in text file:

C:\> mbsacli.exe /listfile <LISTNAME OF COMPUTER NAMES>.txt /n os+iis+sql+password

ACTIVE DIRECTORY INVENTORY

List all OUs:

C:\> dsquery ou DC=<DOMAIN>,DC=<DOMAIN EXTENSION> List of workstations in the domain:

C:\> netdom query WORKSTATION

List of servers in the domain:

C:\> netdom query SERVER

List of domain controllers:

C:\> netdom query DC

List of organizational units under which the specified user can create a machine object: C:\> netdom query OU

List of primary domain controller:

C:\> netdom query PDC

List the domain trusts:

C:\> netdom query TRUST

Query the domain for the current list of FSMO owners

C:\> netdom query FSMO

List all computers from Active Directory:

C:\> dsquery COMPUTER “OU=servers,DC=<DOMAIN NAME>,DC=<DOMAIN EXTENSION>“ -o rdn -limit 0 > C:\machines.txt List user accounts inactive longer than 3 weeks:

C:\> dsquery user domainroot -inactive 3

Find anything (or user) created on date in UTC using timestamp format YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.sZ: C:\> dsquery * -filter "(whenCreated>=20101022083730.0Z)"

C:\> dsquery * -filter "(&(whenCreated>=20101022083730.0Z)(objectClass=user))"

Alt option:

C:\> ldifde -d ou=<OU NAME>,dc=<DOMAIN NAME>,dc=<DOMAIN EXTENSION> -l whencreated, whenchanged -p onelevel -r "(ObjectCategory=user)" -f <OUTPUT FILENAME> The last logon timestamp format in UTC: YYYYMMDDHHMMSS

Alt option:

C:\> dsquery * dc=<DOMAIN NAME>,dc=<DOMAIN EXTENSION> -filter "(&(objectCategory=Person) (objectClass=User)(whenCreated>=20151001000000.0Z))"

Alt option:

C:\> adfind -csv -b dc=<DOMAIN NAME>,dc=<DOMAIN EXTENSION> -f "(&(objectCategory=Person) (objectClass=User)(whenCreated>=20151001000000.0Z))"

Using PowerShell, dump new Active Directory accounts in last 90 Days: PS C:\> import-module activedirectory

PS C:\> Get-QADUser -CreatedAfter (Get-Date).AddDays(-90) PS C:\> Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties whenCreated | Where-Object {$_.whenCreated -ge ((Get-Date).AddDays(-90)).Date}

LINUX

NETWORK DISCOVERY

Net view scan:

# smbtree -b

# smbtree -D

# smbtree -S

View open SMB shares:

# smbclient -L <HOST NAME>

# smbstatus

Basic ping scan:

# for ip in $(seq 1 254); do ping -c 1 192.168.1.$ip>/dev/null; [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo "192.168.1.$ip UP" || : ; done

DHCP

View DHCP lease logs:

Red Hat 3:

# cat /var/lib/dhcpd/dhcpd.leases

Ubuntu:

# grep -Ei 'dhcp' /var/log/syslog.1

Ubuntu DHCP logs:

# tail -f dhcpd.log

DNS

Start DNS logging:

# rndc querylog

View DNS logs:

# tail -f /var/log/messages | grep named

HASHING

Hash all executable files in these specified locations: # find /<PATHNAME TO ENUMERATE> -type f -exec md5sum {} >> md5sums.txt \; # md5deep -rs / > md5sums.txt

NETBIOS

Basic nbtstat scan:

# nbtscan <IP ADDRESS OR RANGE>

PASSWORDS

Password and username guessing or checks:

# while read line; do username=$line; while read line; do smbclient -L <TARGET IP ADDRESS> -U $username%$line -g -d 0; echo $username:$line; done<<PASSWORDS>.txt; done<<USER NAMES>.txt

2 PROTECT (Defend)

WINDOWS

DISABLE/STOP SERVICES

Get a list of services and disable or stop:

C:\> sc query

C:\> sc config "<SERVICE NAME>" start= disabled C:\> sc stop "<SERVICE NAME>"

C:\> wmic service where name='<SERVICE NAME>' call ChangeStartmode Disabled

HOST SYSTEM FIREWALLS

Show all rules:

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all Set firewall on/off:

C:\> netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state on C:\> netsh advfirewall set currentprofile firewallpolicy blockinboundalways,allowoutbound C:\> netsh advfirewall set publicprofile state on C:\> netsh advfirewall set privateprofile state on C:\> netsh advfirewall set domainprofile state on C:\> netsh advfirewall set allprofile state on C:\> netsh advfirewall set allprofile state off Set firewall rules examples:

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Open Port 80" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=80

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="My Application" dir=in action=allow program="C:\MyApp\MyApp.exe" enable=yes C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="My Application" dir=in action=allow program="C:\MyApp\MyApp.exe" enable=yes remoteip=157.60.0.1,172.16.0.0/16,LocalSubnet profile=domain C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="My Application" dir=in action=allow program="C:\MyApp\MyApp.exe" enable=yes remoteip=157.60.0.1,172.16.0.0/16,LocalSubnet profile=domain C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="My Application" dir=in action=allow program="C:\MyApp\MyApp.exe" enable=yes remoteip=157.60.0.1,172.16.0.0/16,LocalSubnet profile=private C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=rule name program="C:\MyApp\MyApp.exe"

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=rule name protocol=udp localport=500

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="remote desktop" new enable=Yes profile=domain C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="remote desktop" new enable=No profile=public Setup logging location:

C:\> netsh advfirewall set currentprofile logging C:\<LOCATION>\<FILE NAME> Windows firewall log location and settings:

C:\> more %systemroot%\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log C:\> netsh advfirewall set allprofile logging maxfilesize 4096

C:\> netsh advfirewall set allprofile logging droppedconnections enable C:\> netsh advfirewall set allprofile logging allowedconnections enable

Display firewall logs:

PS C:\> Get-Content $env:systemroot\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log

PASSWORDS

Change password:

C:\> net user <USER NAME> * /domain

C:\> net user <USER NAME> <NEW PASSWORD> Change password remotely:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897543

C:\> pspasswd.exe \\<IP ADDRESS or NAME OF REMOTE COMPUTER> -u <REMOTE USER NAME> -p <NEW PASSWORD> Change password remotely:

PS C:\> pspasswd.exe \\<IP ADDRESS or NAME OF REMOTE COMPUTER>

HOST FILE

Flush DNS of malicious domain/IP:

C:\> ipconfig /flushdns

Flush NetBios cache of host/IP:

C:\> nbtstat -R

Check Host file location:

C:\> reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters /f DatabasePath Add new malicious domain to hosts file, and route to localhost: C:\> echo 127.0.0.1 <MALICIOUS DOMAIN> >> C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts

Check if hosts file is working, by sending ping to 127.0.0.1: C:\> ping <MALICIOUS DOMAIN> -n 1

WHITELIST

Use a Proxy Auto Config(PAC) file to create Bad URL or IP List (IE, Firefox, Chrome): function FindProxyForURL(url, host) {

// Send bad DNS name to the proxy if (dnsDomainIs(host, ".badsite.com")) return "PROXY http://127.0.0.1:8080"; // Send bad IPs to the proxy if (isInNet(myIpAddress(), "222.222.222.222", "255.255.255.0")) return "PROXY http://127.0.0.1:8080"; // All other traffic bypass proxy return "DIRECT";

}

APPLICATION RESTRICTIONS

AppLocker - Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 or higher:

Using GUI Wizard configure:

Executable Rules (.exe, .com)

DLL Rules (.dll, .ocx)

Script Rules (.ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, .js)

Windows Install Rules (.msi, .msp, .mst)

Steps to employ AppLocker (GUI is needed for digital signed app restrictions): Step 1: Create a new GPO.

Step 2: Right-click on it to edit, and then navigate through Computer Configuration, Policies, Windows Settings, Security Settings, Application Control Policies and AppLocker.

Click Configure Rule Enforcement.

Step 3:Under Executable Rules, check the Configured box and then make sure Enforce Rules is selected from the drop-down box. Click OK.

Step 4: In the left pane, click Executable Rules.

Step 5: Right-click in the right pane and select Create New Rule.

Step 6: On the Before You Begin screen, click Next.

Step 7: On the Permissions screen, click Next.

Step 8: On the Conditions screen, select the Publisher condition and click Next.

Step 9: Click the Browse button and browse to any executable file on your system. It doesn’t matter which.

Step 10: Drag the slider up to Any Publisher and then click Next.

Step 11: Click Next on the Exceptions screen.

Step 12: Name policy, Example “Only run executables that are signed” and click Create.

Step 13: If this is your first time creating an AppLocker policy, Windows will prompt you to create default rule, click Yes. 

Step 14: Ensure Application Identity Service is Running.

C:\> net start AppIDSvc

C:\> REG add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\AppIDSvc" /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f Step 15: Changes require reboot.

C:\ shutdown.exe /r

C:\ shutdown.exe /r /m \\<IP ADDRESS OR COMPUTER NAME> /f

Add the AppLocker cmdlets into PowerShell:

PS C:\> import-module AppLocker

Gets the file information for all of the executable files and scripts in the directory C:\Windows\System32: PS C:\> Get-AppLockerFileInformation -Directory C:\Windows\System32\ -Recurse -FileType Exe, Script Create an AppLocker Policy that allow rules for all of the executable files in C:\Windows\System32: PS C:\> Get-ChildItem C:\Windows\System32\*.exe | Get-AppLockerFileInformation | New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher, Hash -User Everyone -RuleNamePrefix System32

Sets the local AppLocker policy to the policy specified in C:\Policy.xml: PS C:\> Set-AppLockerPolicy -XMLPolicy C:\Policy.xml Uses the AppLocker policy in C:\Policy.xml to test whether calc.exe and notepad.exe are allowed to run for users who are members of the Everyone group. If you do not specify a group, the Everyone group is used by default: PS C:\> Test-AppLockerPolicy -XMLPolicy C:\Policy.xml -Path C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe, C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe -User Everyone Review how many times a file would have been blocked from running if rules were enforced: PS C:\> Get-AppLockerFileInformation -EventLog -Logname "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker\EXE and DLL" -EventType Audited -Statistics Creates a new AppLocker policy from the audited events in the local Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL event log, applied to <GROUP> and current AppLocker policy will be overwritten: PS C:\> Get-AppLockerFileInformation -EventLog -LogPath "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL" -EventType Audited | New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher,Hash -User domain\<GROUP> -IgnoreMissingFileInformation | Set-AppLockerPolicy -LDAP "LDAP://<DC>.<DOMAIN>.com/CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=<DOMAIN>,DC=com"

Export the local AppLocker policy, comparing User’s explicitly denied access to run, and output text file: PS C:\> Get-AppLockerPolicy -Local | Test-AppLockerPolicy -Path C:\Windows\System32\*.exe -User domain\<USER NAME> -Filter Denied | Format-List -Property Path > C:\DeniedFiles.txt Export the results of the test to a file for analysis: PS C:\> Get-ChildItem <DirectoryPathtoReview> -Filter <FileExtensionFilter> -Recurse | Convert-Path | Test-AppLockerPolicy -XMLPolicy <PathToExportedPolicyFile> -User <domain\username> -Filter <TypeofRuletoFilterFor> | Export-CSV <PathToExportResultsTo.CSV> GridView list of any local rules applicable:

PS C:\> Get-AppLockerPolicy -Local -Xml | Out-GridView

IPSEC

Create a IPSEC Local Security Policy, applied to any connection, any protocol, and using a preshared key: C:\> netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=MyIPsecFilter srcaddr=Any dstaddr=Any protocol=ANY

C:\> netsh ipsec static add filteraction name=MyIPsecAction action=negotiate C:\> netsh ipsec static add policy name=MyIPsecPolicy assign=yes C:\> netsh ipsec static add rule name=MyIPsecRule policy=MyIPsecPolicy filterlist=MyIPsecFilter filteraction=MyIPsecAction conntype=all activate=yes psk=<PASSWORD> Add rule to allow web browsing port 80(HTTP) and 443(HTTPS) over IPSEC: C:\> netsh ipsec static add filteraction name=Allow action=permit C:\> netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=WebFilter srcaddr=Any dstaddr=Any protocol=TCP dstport=80

C:\> netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=WebFilter srcaddr=Any dstaddr=Any protocol=TCP dstport=443

C:\> netsh ipsec static add rule name=WebAllow policy=MyIPsecPolicy filterlist=WebFilter filteraction=Allow conntype=all activate=yes psk=<PASSWORD> Shows the IPSEC Local Security Policy with name “MyIPsecPolicy”: C:\> netsh ipsec static show policy name=MyIPsecPolicy Stop or Unassign a IPSEC Policy:

C:\> netsh ipsec static set policy name=MyIPsecPolicy Create a IPSEC Advance Firewall Rule and Policy and preshared key from and to any connections: C:\> netsh advfirewall consec add rule name=“IPSEC” endpoint1=any endpoint2=any action=requireinrequireout qmsecmethods=default Require IPSEC preshared key on all outgoing requests: C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=“IPSEC_Out” dir=out action=allow enable=yes profile=any localip=any remoteip=any protocol=any interfacetype=any security=authenticate Create a rule for web browsing:

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Allow Outbound Port 80" dir=out localport=80 protocol=TCP action=allow Create a rule for DNS:

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Allow Outbound Port 53" dir=out localport=53 protocol=UDP action=allow Delete ISPEC Rule:

C:\> netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="IPSEC_RULE"

ACTIVE DIRECTORY (AD) - GROUP POLICY OBJECT (GPO)

Get and force new policies:

C:\> gpupdate /force

C:\> gpupdate /sync

Audit Success and Failure for user Bob:

C:\> auditpol /set /user:bob /category:"Detailed Tracking" /include /success:enable /failure:enable Create an Organization Unit to move suspected or infected users and machines: C:\> dsadd ou <QUARANTINE BAD OU>

Move an active directory user object into NEW GROUP:

PS C:\> Move-ADObject 'CN=<USER NAME>,CN=<OLD USER GROUP>,DC=<OLD DOMAIN>,DC=<OLD EXTENSION>' -TargetPath 'OU=<NEW USER GROUP>,DC=<OLD DOMAIN>,DC=<OLD EXTENSION>'

Alt Option:

C:\> dsmove "CN=<USER NAME>,OU=<OLD USER OU>,DC=<OLD DOMAIN>,DC=<OLD EXTENSION>" -newparent OU=<NEW USER GROUP>,DC=<OLD DOMAIN>,DC=<OLD EXTENSION>

STAND ALONE SYSTEM - WITHOUT ACTIVE DIRECTORY (AD)

Disallow running a EXE file:

C:\> reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v DisallowRun /t REG_DWORD /d "00000001" /f C:\> reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun" /v badfile.exe /t REG_SZ /d <BAD FILE NAME>.exe /f

Disable Remote Desktop:

C:\> reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /f /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1

Send NTLMv2 response only/refuse LM and NTLM: (Windows 7 default) C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ /v lmcompatibilitylevel /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f Restrict Anonymous Access:

C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v restrictanonymous /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Disable sticky keys:

C:\> reg add "HKCU\Control Panel\Accessibility\StickyKeys" /v Flags /t REG_SZ /d 506 /f Disable Toggle Keys:

C:\> reg add "HKCU\Control Panel\Accessibility\ToggleKeys" /v Flags /t REG_SZ /d 58 /f Disable Filter Keys:

C:\> reg add "HKCU\Control Panel\Accessibility\Keyboard Response" /v Flags /t REG_SZ /d 122 /f Disable IPV6:

C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\TCPIP6\Parameters /v DisabledComponents /t REG_DWORD /d 255 /f Disable On-screen Keyboard:

C:\> reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI /f /v ShowTabletKeyboard /t REG_DWORD /d 0

Disable Administrative Shares - Workstations:

C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /f /v AutoShareWks /t REG_DWORD /d 0

Disable Administrative Shares - Servers

C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /f /v AutoShareServer /t REG_DWORD /d 0

Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares: C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v restrictanonymoussam /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Remove Creation of Hashes Used to Pass the Hash Attack (Requires password reset and reboot to purge old hashes): C:\> reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /f /v NoLMHash /t REG_DWORD /d 1

To Disable Registry Editor: (High Risk)

C:\> reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v DisableRegistryTools /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Disable IE Password Cache:

C:\> reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v DisablePasswordCaching /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Disable CMD prompt:

C:\> reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System /v DisableCMD /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Disable Admin credentials cache on host when using RDP: C:\> reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f Do not process the run once list:

C:\> reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisableLocalMachineRunOnce /t REG_DWORD /d 1

C:\> reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisableLocalMachineRunOnce /t REG_DWORD /d 1

Require User Access Control (UAC) Permission: C:\> reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Change password at next logon:

PS C:\> Set-ADAccountPassword <USER> -NewPassword $newpwd -Reset -PassThru | Set-ADuser -ChangePasswordAtLogon $True Change password at next logon for OU Group:

PS C:\> Get-ADuser -filter "department -eq '<OU GROUP>' -AND enabled -eq 'True'" | Set-ADuser -ChangePasswordAtLogon $True Enabled Firewall logging:

C:\> netsh firewall set logging droppedpackets connections = enable

LINUX

DISABLE/STOP SERVICES

Services information:

# service --status-all

# ps -ef

# ps -aux

Get a list of upstart jobs:

# initctl list

Example of start, stop, restarting a service in Ubuntu: # /etc/init.d/apache2 start

# /etc/init.d/apache2 restart

# /etc/init.d/apache2 stop (stops only until reboot) # service mysql start

# service mysql restart

# service mysql stop (stops only until reboot) List all Upstart services:

# ls /etc/init/*.conf

Show if a program is managed by upstart and the process ID: # status ssh

If not managed by upstart:

# update-rc.d apache2 disable

# service apache2 stop

Disable service using systemctl:

# systemctl list-units -all --type service

# systemctl disable <SERVICE NAME>

HOST SYSTEM FIREWALLS

Export existing iptables firewall rules:

# iptables-save > firewall.out

Edit firewall rules and chains in firewall.out and save the file: # vi firewall.out

Apply iptables:

# iptables-restore < firewall.out

Example iptables commands (IP, IP Range, Port Blocks): # iptables -A INPUT -s 10.10.10.10 -j DROP

# iptables -A INPUT -s 10.10.10.0/24 -j DROP

# iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport ssh -s 10.10.10.10 -j DROP

# iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport ssh -j DROP

Block all connections:

# iptables-policy INPUT DROP

# iptables-policy OUTPUT DROP

# iptables-policy FORWARD DROP

Log all denied iptables rules:

# iptables -I INPUT 5 -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables denied: " --log-level 7

Save all current iptables rules:

Ubuntu:

# /etc/init.d/iptables save

# /sbin/service iptables save RedHat / CentOS:

# /etc/init.d/iptables save

# /sbin/iptables-save

List all current iptables rules:

# iptables -L

Flush all current iptables rules:

# iptables -F

Start/Stop iptables service:

# service iptables start

# service iptables stop

Start/Stop ufw service:

# ufw enable

# ufw disable

Start/Stop ufw logging:

# ufw logging on

# ufw logging off

Backup all current ufw rules:

# cp /lib/ufw/{user.rules,user6.rules} /<BACKUP LOCATION> # cp /lib/ufw/{user.rules,user6.rules} ./

Example uncomplicated firewall (ufw) Commands (IP, IP range, Port blocks): # ufw status verbose

# ufw delete <RULE #>

# ufw allow for <IP ADDRESS>

# ufw allow all 80/tcp

# ufw allow all ssh

# ufw deny from <BAD IP ADDRESS> proto udp to any port 443

PASSWORDS

Change password:

$ passwd (For current user)

$ passwd bob (For user Bob)

$ sudo su passwd (For root)

HOST FILE

Add new malicious domain to hosts file, and route to localhost: # echo 127.0.0.1 <MALICIOUS DOMAIN> >> /etc/hosts Check if hosts file is working, by sending ping to 127.0.0.1: # ping -c 1 <MALICIOUS DOMAIN>

Ubuntu/Debian DNS cache flush:

# /etc/init.d/dns-clean start

Flush nscd DNS cache four ways:

# /etc/init.d/nscd restart

# service nscd restart

# service nscd reload

# nscd -i hosts

Flush dnsmasq DNS cache:

# /etc/init.d/dnsmasq restart

WHITELIST

Use a Proxy Auto Config(PAC) file to create bad URL or IP List: function FindProxyForURL(url, host) {

// Send bad DNS name to the proxy if (dnsDomainIs(host, ".badsite.com")) return "PROXY http://127.0.0.1:8080"; // Send bad IPs to the proxy if (isInNet(myIpAddress(), "222.222.222.222", "255.255.255.0")) return "PROXY http://127.0.0.1:8080"; // All other traffic bypass proxy return "DIRECT";

}

IPSEC

Allow firewall to pass IPSEC traffic:

# iptables -A INPUT -p esp -j ACCEPT

# iptables -A INPUT -p ah -j ACCEPT

# iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 500 -j ACCEPT

# iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 4500 -j ACCEPT

Pass IPSEC traffic:

Step 1: Install Racoon utility on <HOST1 IP ADDRESS> and <HOST2 IP ADDRESS> to enable IPSEC tunnel in Ubuntu.

# apt-get install racoon

Step 2: Choose direct then edit /etc/ipsec-tools.conf on <HOST1 IP ADDRESS> and <HOST2 IP ADDRESS>.

flush;

spdflush;

spdadd <HOST1 IP ADDRESS> <HOST2 IP ADDRESS> any -P out ipsec esp/transport//require;

spdadd <HOST2 IP ADDRESS> <HOST1 IP ADDRESS> any -P in ipsec esp/transport//require;

Step 3: Edit /etc/racoon/racoon.conf on <HOST1 IP ADDRESS> and <HOST2 IP ADDRESS>.

log notify;

path pre_shared_key "/etc/racoon/psk.txt"; path certificate "/etc/racoon/certs"; remote anonymous {

exchange_mode main,aggressive; proposal {

encryption_algorithm aes_256; hash_algorithm sha256;

authentication_method pre_shared_key; dh_group modp1024;

}

generate_policy off;

}

sainfo anonymous{

pfs_group 2;

encryption_algorithm aes_256; authentication_algorithm hmac_sha256; compression_algorithm deflate; }

Step 4: Add preshared key to both hosts.

On HOST1:

# echo <HOST2 IP ADDRESS> <PRESHARED PASSWORD> >>/etc/racoon/psk.txt On HOST2:

# echo <HOST1 IP ADDRESS> <PRESHARED PASSWORD> >>/etc/racoon/psk.txt Step 5: Restart service on both systems.

# service setkey restart

Check security associations, configuration and polices: # setkey -D

# setkey -DP

3 DETECT (Visibility)

NETWORK MONITORING

TCPDUMP

View ASCII (-A) or HEX (-X) traffic:

# tcpdump -A

# tcpdump -X

View traffic with timestamps and don't convert addresses and be verbose: # tcpdump -tttt -n -vv

Find top talkers after 1000 packets (Potential DDoS): # tcpdump -nn -c 1000 |awk '{print $3}' | cut -d. -f1-4 | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -nr Capture traffic on any interface from a target host and specific port and output to a file: # tcpdump -w <FILENAME>.pcap -i any dst <TARGET IP ADDRESS> and port 80

View traffic only between two hosts:

# tcpdump host 10.0.0.1 && host 10.0.0.2

View all traffic except from a net or a host:

# tcpdump not net 10.10 && not host 192.168.1.2

View host and either of two other hosts:

# tcpdump host 10.10.10.10 && \(10.10.10.20 or 10.10.10.30\) Save pcap file on rotating size:

# tcpdump -n -s65535 -C 1000 -w '%host_%Y-%m-%d_%H:%M:%S.pcap'

Get throughput:

# tcpdump -w - |pv -bert >/dev/null

Grab traffic that contains the word pass:

# tcpdump -n -A -s0 | grep pass

Grab many clear text protocol passwords:

# tcpdump -n -A -s0 port http or port ftp or port smtp or port imap or port pop3 | egrep -i 'pass=|pwd=|log=|login=|user=|username=|pw=|passw=|passwd=|password=|pass:|user:|username:|password:|login:|pass |user ' --color=auto --line-buffered -B20

Save pcap file to a remote host:

# tcpdump -w - | ssh <REMOTE HOST ADDRESS> -p 50005 "cat - > /tmp/remotecapture.pcap"

Filter out ipv6 traffic:

# tcpdump not ip6

Filter out ipv4 traffic:

# tcpdump ip6

Script to capture multiple interface tcpdumps to files rotating every hour: #!/bin/bash

tcpdump -pni any -s65535 -G 3600 -w any%Y-%m-%d_%H:%M:%S.pcap Script to move multiple tcpdump files to alternate location: #!/bin/bash

while true; do

sleep 1;

rsync -azvr -progress <USER NAME>@<IP ADDRESS>:<TRAFFIC DIRECTORY>/. <DESTINATION DIRECTORY/.

done

Look for suspicious and self-signed SSL certificates: # tcpdump -s 1500 -A '(tcp[((tcp[12:1] & 0xf0) >> 2)+5:1] = 0x01) and (tcp[((tcp[12:1] & 0xf0) >> 2):1] = 0x16)'

Get SSL Certificate:

# openssl s_client -connect <URL>:443

# openssl s_client -connect <SITE>:443 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | sed -ne '/-BEGIN CERTIFICATE-/,/-END CERTIFICATE-/p' > <CERT>.pem Examine and verify the certificate and check for Self-Signed: # openssl x509 -text -in <CERT>.pem

# openssl x509 -in <CERT>.pem -noout -issuer -subject -startdate -enddate -fingerprint # openssl verify <CERT>.pem

Extract Certificate Server Name:

# tshark -nr <PCAP FILE NAME> -Y "ssl.handshake.ciphersuites" -Vx| grep "Server Name:" | sort | uniq -c | sort -r Extract Certificate info for analysis:

# ssldump -Nr <FILE NAME>.pcap | awk 'BEGIN {c=0;} { if ($0 ~ /^[ ]+Certificate$/) {c=1; print "========================================";} if ($0 !~ /^ +/ ) {c=0;} if (c==1) print $0; }'

TSHARK

Get list of network interfaces:

> tshark -D

Listen on multiple network interfaces:

> tshark -i eth1 -i eth2 -i eth3

Save to pcap and disable name resolution:

> tshark -nn -w <FILE NAME>.pcap

Get absolute date and time stamp:

> tshark -t a

Get arp or icmp traffic:

> tshark arp or icmp

Not ARP and not UDP:

> tshark not arp and not (udp.port == 53)

Capture traffic between to [hosts] and/or [nets]:

> tshark “host <HOST 1> && host <HOST 2>“

> tshark -n "net <NET 1> && net <NET 2>“

Filter just host and IPs (or not your IP):

> tshark -r <FILE NAME>.pcap -q -z hosts,ipv4

> tshark not host <YOUR IP ADDRESS>

Replay a pcap file:

> tshark -r <FILE NAME>.pcap

Replay a pcap and just grab hosts and IPs:

> tshark -r <FILE NAME>.pcap -q -z hosts Setup a capture session(duration=60sec):

> tshark -n -a files:10 -a filesize:100 -a duration:60 -w <FILE NAME>.pcap Grab src/dst IPs only:

> tshark -n -e ip.src -e ip.dst -T fields -E separator=, -R ip Grab IP of src DNS and DNS query:

> tshark -n -e ip.src -e dns.qry.name -E separator=';' -T fields port 53

Grab HTTP URL host and request:

> tshark -R http.request -T fields -E separator=';' -e http.host -e http.request.uri Grab just HTTP host requests:

> tshark -n -R http.request -T fields -e http.host Grab top talkers by IP dst:

> tshark -n -c 150 | awk '{print $4}' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -nr

Grab top stats of protocols:

> tshark -q -z io,phs -r <FILE NAME>.pcap > tshark -r <PCAP FILE>.cap -R http.request -T fields -e http.host -e http.request.uri |sed -e ‘s/?.*$//’ | sed -e ‘s#^(.*)t(.*)$#http://12#’ | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head > tshark -n -c 100 -e ip.src -R "dns.flags.response eq 1" -T fields port 53

> tshark -n -e http.request.uri -R http.request -T fields | grep exe > tshark -n -c 1000 -e http.host -R http.request -T fields port 80 | sort | uniq -c | sort -r

SNORT

Run test on snort config file:

# snort -T -c /<PATH TO SNORT>/snort/snort.conf Use snort(v=verbose,d=dump packet payload):

# snort -dv -r <LOG FILE NAME>.log

Replay a log file and match icmp traffic:

# snort -dvr packet.log icmp

Logs in ASCII:

# snort -K ascii -l <LOG DIRECTORY>

Logs in binary:

# snort -l <LOG DIRECTORY>

Send events to console:

# snort -q -A console -i eth0 -c /etc/snort/snort.conf # snort -c snort.conf -l /tmp/so/console -A console Create a single snort rule and save:

# echo alert any any <SNORT RULE> > one.rule Test single rule:

# snort -T -c one.rule

Run single rule and output to console and logs dir:

# mkdir ./logs

# snort -vd -c one.rule -r <PCAP FILE NAME>.pcap -A console -l logs

NETWORK CAPTURE (PCAP) TOOLS

EDITCAP

Use to edit a pcap file (split into 1000 packets):

> editcap -F pcap -c 1000 orignal.pcap out_split.pcap Use to edit a pcap file (split into 1 hour each packets): > editcap -F pcap -t+3600 orignal.pcap out_split.pcap

MERGECAP

Use to merge multiple pcap files:

> mergecap -w merged_cap.pcap cap1.pcap cap2.pcap cap3.pcap

HONEY TECHNIQUES

WINDOWS

Honey Ports Windows:

Ref. https://code.google.com/archive/p/honeyports/

Step 1: Create new TCP Firewall Block rule on anything connecting on port 3333: C:\> echo @echo off for /L %%i in (1,1,1) do @for /f "tokens=3" %%j in ('netstat -nao ^| find ^":3333^"') do@for /f "tokens=1 delims=:" %%k in ("%%j") do netsh advfirewall firewall add rulename="HONEY TOKEN RULE" dir=in remoteip=%%k localport=any protocol=TCP action=block >> <BATCH FILE NAME>.bat Step 2: Run Batch Script C:\> <BATCH FILE NAME>.bat

Windows Honey Ports PowerShell Script:

Ref. https://github.com/Pwdrkeg/honeyport/blob/master/honeyport.ps1

Step 1: Download PowerShell Script C:\> "%ProgramFiles%\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" https://github.com/Pwdrkeg/honeyport/blob/master/honeyport.ps1

Step 2: Run PowerShell Script C:\> honeyport.ps1

Honey Hashes for Windows (Also for Detecting Mimikatz Use): Ref. https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Detecting+Mimikatz+Use+On+Your+Network/19311/

Step 1: Create Fake Honey Hash. Note enter a fake password and keep command prompts open to keep password in memory C:\> runas /user:yourdomain.com\fakeadministratoraccount /netonly cmd.exe Step 2: Query for Remote Access Attempts C:\> wevtutil qe System /q:"*[System [(EventID=20274)]]" /f:text /rd:true /c:1 /r:remotecomputername Step 3: Query for Failed Login Attempts C:\> wevtutil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4624 or EventID=4625)]]" /f:text /rd:true /c:5 /r:remotecomputername Step 4: (Optional) Run queries in infinite loop with 30s pause C:\> for /L %i in (1,0,2) do (Insert Step 2) & (Insert Step 3) & timeout 30

LINUX

Honey Ports Linux:

Ref. http://securityweekly.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/howtogetabetterpentest.pdf Step 1: Run a while loop to create TCP Firewall rules to block any hosts connecting on port 2222

# while [ 1 ] ; echo "started" ; do IP=`nc -v -l -p 2222 2>&1 1> /dev/null | grep from | cut -d[ -f 3 | cut -d] -f 1`; iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -s ${IP} -j DROP ; done Linux Honey Ports Python Script:

Ref. https://github.com/gchetrick/honeyports/blob/master/honeyports-0.5.py Step 1: Download Python Script # wget https://github.com/gchetrick/honeyports/blob/master/honeyports-0.5.py

Step 2: Run Python Script # python honeyports-0.5.py -p <CHOOSE AN OPEN PORT> -h <HOST IP ADDRESS> Detect rogue scanning with Labrea Tarpit:

# apt-get install labrea

# labrea -z -s -o -b -v -i eth0 2>&1| tee -a log.txt

NETCAT

Use netcat to listen for scanning threats:

> nc -v -k -l 80

> nc -v -k -l 443

> nc -v -k -l 3389

PASSIVE DNS MONITORING

Use dnstop to monitor DNS requests at any sniffer location: # apt-get update

# apt-get install dnstop

# dnstop -l 3 <INTERFACE NAME>

Step 1: Hit 2 key to show query names Use dnstop to monitor DNS requests from a pcap file:

# dnstop -l 3 <PCAP FILE NAME> | <OUTPUT FILE NAME>.txt

LOG AUDITING

WINDOWS

Increase Log size to support increased auditing:

C:\> reg add HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\Application /v MaxSize /t REG_DWORD /d 0x19000

C:\> reg add HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\Security /v MaxSize /t REG_DWORD /d 0x64000

C:\> reg add HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\System /v MaxSize /t REG_DWORD /d 0x19000

Check settings of Security log:

C:\> wevtutil gl Security

Check settings of audit policies:

C:\> auditpol /get /category:*

Set Log Auditing on for Success and/or Failure on All Categories: C:\> auditpol /set /category:* /success:enable /failure:enable Set Log Auditing on for Success and/or Failure on Subcategories: C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Detailed File Share" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"File System" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Security System Extension" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"System Integrity" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Security State Change" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other System Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"System Integrity" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logoff" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Account Lockout" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Logon/Logoff Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Network Policy Server" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Registry" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"SAM" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Certification Services" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Application Generated" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Handle Manipulation" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"File Share" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Filtering Platform Packet Drop" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Filtering Platform Connection" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Object Access Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Detailed File Share" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Sensitive Privilege Use" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Non Sensitive Privilege Use" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Privilege Use Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Process Termination" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"DPAPI Activity" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"RPC Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Process Creation" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Audit Policy Change" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Authentication Policy Change" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Authorization Policy Change" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Filtering Platform Policy Change" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Policy Change Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"User Account Management" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Computer Account Management" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Security Group Management" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Distribution Group Management" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Application Group Management" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Account Management Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Changes" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Replication" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Detailed Directory Service Replication" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Access" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Account Logon Events" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Kerberos Authentication Service" /success:enable /failure:enable C:\> auditpol /set /subcategory:"Credential Validation" /success:enable /failure:enable Check for list of available logs, size, retention limit: PS C:\> Get-EventLog -list

Partial list of Key Security Log Auditing events to monitor: PS C:\> Get-EventLog -newest 5 -logname application | Format-List Show log from remote system:

PS C:\> Show-EventLog -computername <SERVER NAME> Get a specific list of events based on Event ID:

PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security | ? { $_.EventId -eq 4800}

PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; ID=4774}

Account Logon - Audit Credential Validation Last 14 Days: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4768,4771,4772,4769,4770,4649,4778,4779,4800,4801,4802,4803,5378,5632,5633 -after ((get-date).addDays(-14)) Account - Logon/Logoff:

PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4625,4634,4647,4624,4625,4648,4675,6272,6273,6274,6275,6276,6277,6278,6279,6280,4649,4778,4779,4800,4801,4802,4803,5378,5632,5633,4964 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) Account Management - Audit Application Group Management: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4783,4784,4785,4786,4787,4788,4789,4790,4741,4742,4743,4744,4745,4746,4747,4748,4749,4750,4751,4752,4753,4759,4760,4761,4762,4782,4793,4727,4728,4729,4730,4731,4732,4733,4734,4735,4737,4754,4755,4756,4757,4758,4764,4720,4722,4723,4724,4725,4726,4738,4740,4765,4766,4767,4780,4781,4794,5376,5377 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) Detailed Tracking - Audit DPAPI Activity, Process Termination, RPC Events: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4692,4693,4694,4695,4689,5712 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) Domain Service Access - Audit Directory Service Access: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4662,5136,5137,5138,5139,5141 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) Object Access - Audit File Share, File System, SAM, Registry, Certifications: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4671,4691,4698,4699,4700,4701,4702,5148,5149,5888,5889,5890,4657,5039,4659,4660,4661,4663,4656,4658,4690,4874,4875,4880,4881,4882,4884,4885,4888,4890,4891,4892,4895,4896,4898,5145,5140,5142,5143,5144,5168,5140,5142,5143,5144,5168,5140,5142,5143,5144,5168,4664,4985,5152,5153,5031,5140,5150,5151,5154,5155,5156,5157,5158,5159 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1))

Policy Change - Audit Policy Change, Microsoft Protection Service, Windows Filtering Platform: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4715,4719,4817,4902,4904,4905,4906,4907,4908,4912,4713,4716,4717,4718,4739,4864,4865,4866,4867,4704,4705,4706,4707,4714,4944,4945,4946,4947,4948,4949,4950,4951,4952,4953,4954,4956,4957,4958,5046,5047,5048,5449,5450,4670 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) Privilege Use - Audit Non-Sensitive/Sensitive Privilege Use: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 4672,4673,4674 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) System - Audit Security State Change, Security System Extension, System Integrity, System Events: PS C:\> Get-EventLog Security 5024,5025,5027,5028,5029,5030,5032,5033,5034,5035,5037,5058,5059,6400,6401,6402,6403,6404,6405,6406,6407,4608,4609 ,4616, 4621, 4610, 4611, 4614, 4622,4697,4612,4615,4618,4816,5038,5056,5057,5060,5061,5062,6281 -after ((get-date).addDays(-1)) Add Microsoft IIS cmdlet:

PS C:\> Add-PSSnapin WebAdministration

PS C:\> Import-Module WebAdministration

Get IIS Website info:

PS C:\> Get-IISSite

Get IIS Log Path Location:

PS C:\> (Get-WebConfigurationProperty '/system.applicationHost/sites/siteDefaults' -Name 'logfile.directory').Value Set variable for IIS Log Path (default path):

PS C:\> $LogDirPath = "C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC1"

Get IIS HTTP log file list from Last 7 days:

PS C:\> Get-ChildItem -Path C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\w3svc1 -recurse | Where-Object {$_.lastwritetime -lt (get-date).addDays(-7)}

View IIS Logs (Using $LogDirPath variable set above): PS C:\> Get-Content $LogDirPath\*.log |%{$_ -replace '#Fields: ', ''} |?{$_ -notmatch '^#'} | ConvertFrom-Csv -Delimiter ' '

View IIS Logs:

PS C:\> Get-Content <IIS LOG FILE NAME>.log |%{$_ -replace '#Fields: ', ''} |?{$_ -notmatch '^#'} | ConvertFrom-Csv -Delimiter ' '

Find in IIS logs IP address 192.168.*.* pattern:

PS C:\> Select-String -Path $LogDirPath\*.log -Pattern ‘192.168.*.*’

Find in IIS logs common SQL injection patterns:

PS C:\> Select-String -Path $LogDirPath\*.log ‘(@@version)|(sqlmap)|(Connect\(\))|(cast\()|(char\()|(bchar\()|(sys databases)|(\(select)|(convert\()|(Connect\()|(count\()|(sys objects)’

LINUX

Authentication logs in Ubuntu:

# tail /var/log/auth.log

# grep -i "fail" /var/log/auth.log

User login logs in Ubuntu:

# tail /var/

Look at samba activity:

# grep -i samba /var/log/syslog

Look at cron activity:

# grep -i cron /var/log/syslog

Look at sudo activity:

# grep -i sudo /var/log/auth.log

Look in Apache Logs for 404 errors:

# grep 404 <LOG FILE NAME> | grep -v -E "favicon.ico|robots.txt"

Look at Apache Logs for files requested:

# head access_log | awk '{print $7}'

Monitor for new created files every 5min:

# watch -n 300 -d ls -lR /<WEB DIRECTORY> Look where traffic is coming from:

# cat <LOG FILE NAME> | fgrep -v <YOUR DOMAIN> | cut -d\" -f4 | grep -v ^-

Monitor for TCP connections every 5 seconds:

# netstat -ac 5 | grep tcp

Install audit framework and review syscalls/events:

# apt-get install auditd

# auditctl -a exit,always -S execve

# ausearch -m execve

Get audit report summary:

# aureport

4 RESPOND (Analysis)

LIVE TRIAGE - WINDOWS

SYSTEM INFORMATION

C:\> echo %DATE% %TIME%

C:\> hostname

C:\> systeminfo

C:\> systeminfo | findstr /B /C:”OS Name” /C:”OS Version”

C:\> wmic csproduct get name

C:\> wmic bios get serialnumber

C:\> wmic computersystem list brief

C:\> wmic product get name,version

C:\> echo %PATH%

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/psinfo.aspx

C:\> psinfo -accepteula -s -h -d

USER INFORMATION

C:\> whoami

C:\> net users

C:\> net localgroup administrators

C:\> net group administrators

C:\> wmic rdtoggle list

C:\> wmic useraccount list

C:\> wmic group list

C:\> wmic netlogin get name,lastlogon,badpasswordcount C:\> wmic netclient list brief

C:\> doskey /history > history.txt

NETWORK INFORMATION

C:\> netstat -e

C:\> netstat -naob

C:\> netstat -nr

C:\> netstat -vb

C:\> nbtstat -S

C:\> route print

C:\> arp -a

C:\> ipconfig /displaydns

C:\> netsh winhttp show proxy

C:\> ipconfig /allcompartments /all

C:\> netsh wlan show interfaces

C:\> netsh wlan show all

C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\WinHttpSettings”

C:\> type %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\drivers\etc\hosts C:\> wmic nicconfig get descriptions,IPaddress,MACaddress C:\> wmic netuse get name,username,connectiontype,localname

SERVICE INFORMATION

C:\> at

C:\> tasklist

C:\> tasklist /svc

C:\> tasklist /svc /fi "imagename eq svchost.exe"

C:\> tasklist /svc /fi "pid eq <PID>"

C:\> schtasks

C:\> net start

C:\> sc query

C:\> wmic service list brief | findstr "Running"

C:\> wmic service list config

C:\> wmic process list brief

C:\> wmic process list status

C:\> wmic process list memory

C:\> wmic job list brief

PS C:\> Get-Service | Where-Object { $_.Status -eq "running" }

List of all processes and then all loaded modules:

PS C:\> Get-Process |select modules|Foreach-Object{$_.modules}

POLICY, PATCH AND SETTINGS INFORMATION

C:\> set

C:\> gpresult /r

C:\> gpresult /z > <OUTPUT FILE NAME>.txt C:\> gpresult /H report.html /F

C:\> wmic qfe

List GPO software installed:

C:\> reg query “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Group Policy\AppMgmt”

AUTORUN AND AUTOLOAD INFORMATION

Startup information:

C:\> wmic startup list full

C:\> wmic ntdomain list brief View directory contents of startup folder:

C:\> dir "%SystemDrive%\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

C:\> dir "%SystemDrive%\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

C:\> dir %userprofile%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\> %ProgramFiles%\Startup\

C:\> dir C:\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\startup C:\> dir “C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”

C:\> dir “C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

C:\> dir "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

C:\> dir "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

C:\> dir "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"

C:\> type C:\Windows\winstart.bat

C:\> type %windir%\wininit.ini

C:\> type %windir%\win.ini

View autoruns, hide Microsoft files:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902.aspx

C:\> autorunsc.exe -accepteula -m

C:\> type C:\Autoexec.bat

Show all autorun files, export to csv and check with VirusTotal: C:\> autorunsc.exe -accepteula -a -c -i -e -f -l -m -v HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT:

C:\> reg query HKCR\Comfile\Shell\Open\Command C:\> reg query HKCR\Batfile\Shell\Open\Command C:\> reg query HKCR\htafile\Shell\Open\Command C:\> reg query HKCR\Exefile\Shell\Open\Command C:\> reg query HKCR\Exefiles\Shell\Open\Command C:\> reg query HKCR\piffile\shell\open\command HKEY_CURRENT_USERS:

C:\> reg query “HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop”

C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Windows\Run C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Windows\Scripts C:\> reg query “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows” /f run C:\> reg query “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows” /f load C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\LastVisitedMRU

C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\OpenSaveMRU

C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\LastVisitedPidlMRU

C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\OpenSavePidlMRU /s C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU

C:\> reg query “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders”

C:\> reg query “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders”

C:\> reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\RegEdit /v LastKey C:\> reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs"

C:\> reg query “HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Control Panel\Desktop”

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE:

C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components” /s C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\User Shell Folders”

C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\Shell Folders”

C:\> reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellExecuteHooks C:\> reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects" /s C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\shellServiceObjectDelayLoad C:\> reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks" /s C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows”

C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows” /f AppInit_DLLs C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon” /f Shell C:\> reg query “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon” /f Userinit C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\batfile\shell\open\command C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\comfile\shell\open\command C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\exefile\shell\open\command C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htafile\Shell\Open\Command C:\> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\piffile\shell\open\command C:\> reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects" /s C:\> reg query “HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager”

C:\> reg query “HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs”

C:\> reg query “HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs”

LOGS

Copy event logs:

C:\> wevtutil epl Security C:\<BACK UP PATH>\mylogs.evtx C:\> wevtutil epl System C:\<BACK UP PATH>\mylogs.evtx C:\> wevtutil epl Application C:\<BACK UP PATH>\mylogs.evtx

Get list of logs remotely:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/psloglist.aspx

C:\> psloglist \\<REMOTE COMPUTER> -accepteula -h 12 -x Clear all logs and start a baseline log to monitor:

PS C:\> wevtutil el | Foreach-Object {wevtutil cl "$_"}

List log filenames and path location:

C:\> wmic nteventlog get path,filename,writeable Take pre-breach log export:

PS C:\> wevtutil el | ForEach-Object{Get-EventLog -Log “$_” | Export-Csv -Path C:\<BASELINE LOG>.csv -Append}

Take post breach log export:

PS C:\> wevtutil el | ForEach-Object{Get-EventLog -Log “$_” | Export-Csv -Path C:\<POST BASELINE LOG>.csv -Append}

Compare two files baseline and post breach logs:

PS C:\> Compare-Object -ReferenceObject $(Get-Content “C:\<PATH TO FILE>\<ORIGINAL BASELINE LOGS>.txt”) -DifferenceObject $(Get-Content “C:\<PATH TO FILE>\<POST BASELINE LOGS>.txt”) >> <DIFFERENCES LOG>.txt

FILES, DRIVES AND SHARES INFORMATION

C:\> net use \\<TARGET IP ADDRESS>

C:\> net share

C:\> net session

C:\> wmic volume list brief

C:\> wmic logicaldisk get description,filesystem,name,size C:\> wmic share get name,path

C:\> wmic diskdrive get interfacetype,mediatype,model PS:\> Get-ItemProperty -Path ’HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\*\*’ | Select FriendlyName,ContainerID,HardwareID

Find multiple file types or a file:

C:\> dir /A /S /T:A *.exe *.dll *.bat *.ps1 *.zip C:\> dir /A /S /T:A <BAD FILE NAME>.exe Find executable (.exe) files newer than Jan 1, 2017:

C:\> forfiles /p C:\ /M *.exe /S /D +1/1/2017 /C "cmd /c echo @fdate @ftime @path"

Find multiple files types using loop:

C:\> for %G in (.exe, .dll, .bat, .ps) do forfiles -p "C:" -m *%G -s -d +1/1/2017 -c "cmd /c echo @fdate @ftime @path"

Search for files newer than date:

C:\> forfiles /P C:\ /S /D +1/01/2017 /C "cmd /c echo @path @fdate"

Find large files: (example <20 MB)

C:\> forfiles /S /M * /C "cmd /c if @fsize GEQ 2097152 echo @path @fsize"

Find files with Alternate Data Streams:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/streams.aspx

C:\> streams -s <FILE OR DIRECTORY>

C:\> dir /r <FILE OR DIRECTORY>

Find files with bad signature into csv:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897441.aspx

C:\> sigcheck -c -h -s -u -nobanner <FILE OR DIRECTORY> > <OUTPUT FILENAME>.csv Find and show only unsigned files with bad signature in C: C:\> sigcheck -e -u -vr -s C:\

List loaded unsigned DLLs:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896656.aspx

C:\> listdlls.exe -u

C:\> listdlls.exe -u <PROCESS NAME OR PID> Run Malware scan (Windows Defender) offline:

Ref. http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/what-is-windows-defender-offline C:\> MpCmdRun.exe -SignatureUpdate

C:\> MpCmdRun.exe -Scan

Install, monitor and log system activity to the Windows event log including md5 hashing of processes created and monitoring of network connections 64bit: Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/sysmon

C:\> sysmon64.exe –i -accepteula –h md5 –n Unistall Sysmon:

C:\> sysmon64.exe –u

View Sysmon log details:

PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -Path C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx | Format-List *

LIVE TRIAGE - LINUX

SYSTEM INFORMATION

# uname -a

# uptime

# timedatectl

# mount

# echo $PATH

USER INFORMATION

View logged in users:

# w

Show if a user has ever logged in remotely:

# lastlog

# last

View failed logins:

# faillog -a

View local user accounts:

# cat /etc/passwd

# cat /etc/shadow

View local groups:

# cat /etc/group

View sudo access:

# cat /etc/sudoers

View accounts with UID 0:

# awk -F: '($3 == "0") {print}' /etc/passwd # egrep ‘:0+’ /etc/passwd

View root authorized SSH key authentications:

# cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys

List of files opened by user:

# lsof -u <USER NAME>

View the root user bash history:

# cat /root/.bash_history

NETWORK INFORMATION

View network interfaces:

# ifconfig

View network connections:

# netstat -antup

# netstat -plantux

View listening ports:

# netstat -nap

View routes:

# route

View arp table:

# arp -a

List of processes listening on ports:

# lsof -i

SERVICE INFORMATION

View processes:

# ps -aux

List of load modules:

# lsmod

List of open files:

# lsof

List of open files, using the network:

# lsof -nPi | cut -f 1 -d " "| uniq | tail -n +2

List of open files on specific process:

# lsof -c <SERVICE NAME>

Get all open files of a specific process ID:

# lsof -p <PID>

List of unlinked processes running:

# lsof +L1

Get path of suspicious process PID:

# ls -al /proc/<PID>/exe

Save file for further malware binary analysis:

# cp /proc/<PID>/exe >/<SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME TO SAVE>.elf Monitor logs in real-time:

# less +F /var/log/messages

List services:

# chkconfig --list

POLICY, PATCH AND SETTINGS INFORMATION

View pam.d files:

# cat /etc/pam.d/common*

AUTORUN AND AUTOLOAD INFORMATION:

List cron jobs:

# crontab -l

List cron jobs by root and other UID 0 accounts:

# crontab -u root -l

Review for unusual cron jobs:

# cat /etc/crontab

# ls /etc/cron.*

LOGS

View root user command history:

# cat /root/.*history

View last logins:

# last

FILES, DRIVES AND SHARES INFORMATION

View disk space:

# df -ah

View directory listing for /etc/init.d:

# ls -la /etc/init.d

Get more info for a file:

# stat -x <FILE NAME>

Identify file type:

# file <FILE NAME>

Look for immutable files:

# lsattr -R / | grep "\-i-"

View directory listing for /root:

# ls -la /root

Look for files recently modified in current directory: # ls -alt | head

Look for world writable files:

# find / -xdev -type d \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) -print Look for recent created files, in this case newer than Jan 02, 2017: # find / -newermt 2017-01-02q

Look for files with no user owner:

# find / -nouser

List all files and attributes:

# find / -printf "%m;%Ax;%AT;%Tx;%TT;%Cx;%CT;%U;%G;%s;%p\n"

List for large files over 100MB:

# find / -size +100000k -print Look at files in directory by most recent timestamp:(Could be tampered) # ls -alt /<DIRECTORY>| head

Get full file information:

# stat /<FILE PATH>/<SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> Review file type:

# file /<FILE PATH>/<SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> Check for rootkits or signs of compromise:

Run unix-privsec-check tool:

# wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pentestmonkey/unix-privesc-check/1_x/unix-privesc-check # ./unix-privesc-check > output.txt

Run chkrootkit:

# apt-get install chkrootkit

# chkrootkit

Run rkhunter:

# apt-get install rkhunter

# rkhunter --update

# rkhunter -check

Run tiger:

# apt-get install tiger

# tiger

# less /var/log/tiger/security.report.*

Run lynis:

# apt-get install lynis

# lynis audit system

# more /var/logs/lynis.log

Run Linux Malware Detect (LMD):

# wget http://www.rfxn.com/downloads/maldetect-current.tar.gz # tar xfz maldetect-current.tar.gz

# cd maldetect-*

# ./install.sh

Get LMD updates:

# maldet -u

Run LMD scan on directory:

# maldet -a /<DIRECTORY>

MALWARE ANALYSIS

STATIC ANALYSIS BASICS

Mount live Sysinternals tools drive:

\\live.sysinternals.com\tools

Signature check of DLL, EXE files:

Ref. http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897441.aspx

C:\> sigcheck.exe -u -e C:\<DIRECTORY> Send to VirusTotal:

C:\> sigcheck.exe -vt <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> Windows PE Analysis:

View Hex and ASCI of PE(EXE or any file), with optional -n first 500 bytes: # hexdump -C -n 500 <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> # od -x <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME>

# xxd <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME>

In Windows using debug tool (works for .java files too): C:\> debug <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME>

> -d (just type d and get a page at a time of hex) > -q (quit debugger)

Windows PE analysis:

PE File Compile Date/Time perl script below (Windows PE only script).

Ref. https://www.perl.org/get.html

Ref. http://www.perlmonks.org/bare/?node_id=484287

C:\> perl.exe <SCRIPT NAME>.pl <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> #! perl -slw

use strict;

open EXE, '<:raw', $ARGV[0] or die "$ARGV[0] : $!"; my $dos = do{ local $/ = \65536; <EXE> }; die "$ARGV[0] is not a .exe or .dll (sig='${ \substr $dos, 0, 2 }')" unless substr( $dos, 0, 2 ) eq 'MZ'; my $coffoff = 8+ unpack 'x60 V', $dos;

read( EXE, $dos, $coffoff - 65536 + 4, 65536 ) or die $! if $coffoff > 65536; my $ts = unpack "x$coffoff V", $dos; print "$ARGV[0] : ", defined $ts

? ( scalar( localtime $ts) || "has unfathomable timestamp value $ts" ) : 'has no timestamp';

__END__

View strings within PE and optional string length -n option: Using strings in Linux:

# strings -n 10 <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME>

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/strings.aspx

Using strings in Windows:

C:\> strings <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME>

Find Malware in memory dump using Volatility and Windows7SPFix64 profile: Ref. https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility

# python vol.py -f <MEMORY DUMP FILE NAME>.raw –profile=Win7SPFix64 malfind -D /<OUTPUT DUMP DIRECTORY> Find Malware with PID in memory dump using Volatility: # python vol.py -f <MEMORY DUMP FILE NAME>.raw –profile=Win7SPFix64 malfind -p <PID #> -D /<OUTPUT DUMP DIRECTORY>

Find suspicious processes using Volatility:

# python vol.py -f <MEMORY DUMP FILE NAME>.raw –profile=Win7SPFix64 pslist # python vol.py -f <MEMORY DUMP FILE NAME>.raw –profile=Win7SPFix64 pstree Find suspicious DLLs using Volatility:

# python vol.py -f <MEMORY DUMP FILE NAME>.raw –profile=Win7SPFix64 dlllist # python vol.py -f <MEMORY DUMP FILE NAME>.raw –profile=Win7SPFix64 dlldump -D /<OUTPUT DUMP DIRECTORY> Malware analysis parsing Tool:

Ref. https://github.com/Defense-Cyber-Crime-Center/DC3-MWCP

Install dc3-mwcp tool:

# setup.py install

Use dc3-mwcp tool to parse suspicious file:

# mwcp-tool.py -p <SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> Install Rekall tool:

Ref. https://github.com/google/rekall

# pip install rekall

# rekal --help

Run Rekall against a memory file and extract process list, dlllist, executable dump: # rekal -f <MEMORY FILE>.aff imageinfo

# rekal -f <MEMORY FILE>.dd pslist

# rekal -f <MEMORY FILE>.img pslist --pid <PID> # rekal -f <MEMORY FILE>.dd dlllist

# rekal -f <MEMORY FILE> pedump

IDENTIFY MALWARE

PROCESS EXPLORER

Ref. https://youtu.be/80vfTA9LrBM

Step 1: Look at running processes by running Process Explorer (GUI) and identify potential indicators of compromise:

Items with no icon

Items with no description or company name

Unsigned Microsoft images (First add Verified Signer column under View tab->Select Columns, then go to Options tab and choose Verify Image Signatures)

Check all running process hashes in Virus Total (Go to Options tab and select Check VirusTotal.com)

Suspicious files are in Windows directories or user profile

Purple items that are packed or compressed

Items with open TCP/IP endpoints

Step 2: Signature File Check: (See Sigcheck)

Step 3: Strings Check:

Right click on suspicious process in Process Explorer and on pop up window choose Strings tab and review for suspicious URLs. Repeat for Image and Memory radio buttons.

Look for strange URLs in strings

Step 4: DLL View:

Pop open with Ctrl+D

Look for suspicious DLLs or services

Look for no description or no company name

Look at VirusTotal Results column

Step 5: Stop and Remove Malware:

Right click and select Suspend for any identified suspicious processes

Right click and select Terminate Previous Suspended processes

Step 6: Clean up where malicious files Auto start on reboot.

Launch Autoruns

Under Options, Check the boxes Verify Code Signatures and Hide Microsoft entries

Look for suspicious process file from earlier steps on the everything tab and uncheck. Safer to uncheck than delete, in case of error.

Press F5, to refresh Autoruns, and confirm malicious file has not recreated the malicious entry into the previous unchecked auto start location.

Step 7: Process Monitor Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/processmonitor.aspx

If malicious activity is still persistent, run Process Monitor.

Look for newly started process that start soon after terminated from previous steps.

Step 8: Repeat as needed to find all malicious files and process and/or combine with other tools and suites.

FILE HASH ANALYSIS

HASH QUERY

VirusTotal online API query:

Ref. https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/public-api/ (Prerequisite: Need a VT API Key) Send a suspicious hash to VirusTotal using cURL:

# curl -v --request POST --url 'https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/report' -d apikey=<VT API KEY> -d 'resource=<SUSPICIOUS FILE HASH>'

Send a suspicious file to VirusTotal using cURL:

# curl -v -F 'file=/<PATH TO FILE>/<SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME>' -F apikey=<VT API KEY> https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/scan Team Cymru API:

Ref. https://hash.cymru.com, http://totalhash.com

Team Cymru malware hash lookup using whois: (Note: Output is timestamp of last seen and detection rate) # whois -h hash.cymru.com <SUSPICIOUS FILE HASH>

HARD DRIVE AND MEMORY ACQUISITION

WINDOWS

Create memory dump remotely:

Ref. http://kromer.pl/malware-analysis/memory-forensics-using-volatility-toolkit-to-extract-malware-samples-from-memory-dump/

Ref. http://sourceforge.net/projects/mdd/

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/psexec.aspx

C:\> psexec.exe \\<HOST NAME OR IP ADDRESS> -u <DOMAIN>\<PRIVILEGED ACCOUNT> -p <PASSWORD> -c mdd_1.3.exe --o C:\memory.dmp Ref. https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility

Extract EXE/DLL from memory dump:

C:\> volatility dlldump -f memory.dmp -D dumps/

C:\> volatility procmemdump -f memory.dmp -D dumps/

Create hard drive image using dc3dd of C:\:

Ref. https://sourceforge.net/projects/dc3dd/files/dc3dd/7.2%20-%20Windows/

C:\> dc3dd.exe if=\\.\c: of=d:\<ATTACHED OR TARGET DRIVE>\<IMAGE NAME>.dd hash=md5 log=d:\<MOUNTED LOCATION>\<LOG NAME>.log

LINUX

Create memory dump:

# dd if=/dev/fmem of=/tmp/<MEMORY FILE NAME>.dd Create memory dump using LiME:

Ref. https://github.com/504ensicslabs/lime

# wget https://github.com/504ensicsLabs/LiME/archive/master.zip # unzip master.zip

# cd LiME-master/src

# make

# cp lime-*.ko /media/=/media/ExternalUSBDriveName/

# insmod lime-3.13.0-79-generic.ko "path=/media/ExternalUSBDriveName/<MEMORY DUMP>.lime format=raw"

Make copy of suspicious process using process ID:

# cp /proc/<SUSPICIOUS PROCESS ID>/exe /<NEW SAVED LOCATION> Grab memory core dump of suspicious process:

# gcore <PID>

Strings on gcore file:

# strings gcore.*

Create a hard drive/partition copy with log and hash options: # dd if=<INPUT DEVICE> of=<IMAGE FILE NAME> # dc3dd if=/dev/<TARGET DRIVE EXAMPLE SDA OR SDA1> of=/dev/<MOUNTED LOCATION>\<FILE NAME>.img hash=md5 log=/<MOUNTED LOCATION>/<LOG NAME>.log Create a remote hard drive/partition over SSH:

# dd if=/dev/<INPUT DEVICE> | ssh <USER NAME>@<DESTINATION IP ADDRESS> “dd of=<DESTINATION PATH>“

Send hard drive image zipped over netcat:

Sending host:

# bzip2 -c /dev/<INPUT DEVICE> | nc <DESTINATION IP ADDRESS> <PICK A PORT> Receiving host:

# nc -p <PICK SAME PORT> -l |bzip2 -d | dd of=/dev/sdb Send hard drive image over netcat:

Sending host:

# dd if=/dev/<INPUT DEVICE> bs=16M | nc <PORT> Receiving host with Pipe Viewer meter:

# nc -p <SAME PORT> -l -vv | pv -r | dd of=/dev/<INPUT DEVICE> bs=16M

5 RECOVER (Remediate)

PATCHING

WINDOWS

Single Hotfix update for Windows 7 or higher:

C:\> wusa.exe C:\<PATH TO HOTFIX>\Windows6.0-KB934307-x86.msu Set of single hotfix updates for pre-Windows 7 by running a batch script: @echo off

setlocal

set PATHTOFIXES=E:\hotfix

%PATHTOFIXES%\Q123456_w2k_sp4_x86.exe /Z /M

%PATHTOFIXES%\Q123321_w2k_sp4_x86.exe /Z /M

%PATHTOFIXES%\Q123789_w2k_sp4_x86.exe /Z /M

To check and update Windows 7 or higher:

C:\> wuauclt.exe /detectnow /updatenow

LINUX

Ubuntu:

Fetch list of available updates:

# apt-get update

Strictly upgrade the current packages:

# apt-get upgrade

Install updates (new ones):

# apt-get dist-upgrade

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1,3,4:

# up2date

To update non-interactively:

# up2date-nox --update

To install a specific package:

# up2date <PACKAGE NAME>

To update a specific package:

# up2date -u <PACKAGE NAME>

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5:

# pup

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6:

# yum update

To list a specific installed package:

# yum list installed <PACKAGE NAME>

To install a specific package:

# yum install <PACKAGE NAME>

To update a specific package:

# yum update <PACKAGE NAME>

Kali:

# apt-get update && apt-get upgrade

BACKUP

WINDOWS

Backup GPO Audit Policy to backup file:

C:\> auditpol /backup /file:C\auditpolicy.csv Restore GPO Audit Policy from backup file:

C:\> auditpol /restore /file:C:\auditpolicy.csv Backup All GPOs in domain and save to Path:

PS C:\> Backup-Gpo -All -Path \\<SERVER>\<PATH TO BACKUPS> Restore All GPOs in domain and from backup Path:

PS C:\> Restore-GPO -All -Domain <INSERT DOMAIN NAME> -Path \\<SERVER>\<PATH TO BACKUPS> Start Volume Shadow Service:

C:\> net start VSS

List all shadow files and storage:

C:\> vssadmin List ShadowStorage

List all shadow files:

C:\> vssadmin List Shadows

Browse Shadow Copy for files/folders:

C:\> mklink /d c:\<CREATE FOLDER>\<PROVIDE FOLDER NAME BUT DO NOT CREATE> \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\

Revert back to a selected shadow file on Windows Server and Windows 8: C:\> vssadmin revert shadow /shadow={<SHADOW COPY ID>} /ForceDismount

List a files previous versions history using volrest.exe: Ref. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=17657

C:\> "\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools\volrest.exe" "\\localhost\c$\<PATH TO FILE>\<FILE NAME>"

Revert back to a selected previous file version or @GMT file name for specific previous version using volrest.exe: C:\> subst Z: \\localhost\c$\$\<PATH TO FILE> C:\> “\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools\volrest.exe" "\\localhost\c$\<PATH TO FILE>\<CURRENT FILE NAME OR @GMT FILE NAME FROM LIST COMMAND ABOVE>" /R:Z:\

C:\> subst Z: /D

Revert back a directory and subdirectory files previous version using volrest.exe: C:\> "\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools\volrest.exe" \\localhost\c$\<PATH TO FOLDER\*.* /S /r:\\localhost\c$\<PATH TO FOLDER>\

Revert back to a selected shadow file on Windows Server and Windows 7 and 10 using wmic: C:\> wmic shadowcopy call create Volume='C:\'

Create a shadow copy of volume C on Windows 7 and 10 using PowerShell: PS C:\> (gwmi -list win32_shadowcopy).Create('C:\','ClientAccessible') Create a shadow copy of volume C on Windows Server 2003 and 2008: C:\> vssadmin create shadow /for=c:

Create restore point on Windows:

C:\> wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\default Path SystemRestore Call CreateRestorePoint "%DATE%", 100, 7

Start system restore points on Windows XP:

C:\> sc config srservice start= disabled

C:\> reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v DisableSR /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f C:\> net stop srservice

Stop system restore points on Windows XP:

C:\> sc config srservice start= Auto

C:\> net start srservice

C:\> reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v DisableSR /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f List of restore points:

PS C:\> Get-ComputerRestorePoint

Restore from a specific restore point:

PS C:\> Restore-Computer -RestorePoint <RESTORE POINT #> -Confirm

LINUX

Reset root password in single user mode:

Step 1: Reboot system.

# reboot -f Step 2: Press ESC at GRUB screen.

Step 3: Select default entry and then ‘e’ for edit.

Step 4: Scroll down until, you see a line that starts with linux, linux16 or linuxefi.

Step 5: At end of that line leave a space and add without quote ‘rw init=/bin/bash’

Step 6: Press Ctrl-X to reboot.

Step 7: After reboot, should be in single user mode and root, change password.

# passwd

Step 8: Reboot system.

# reboot -f Reinstall a package:

# apt-get install --reinstall <COMPROMISED PACKAGE NAME> Reinstall all packages:

# apt-get install --reinstall $(dpkg --get-selections |grep -v deinstall)

KILL MALWARE PROCESS

WINDOWS

Malware Removal:

Ref. http://www.gmer.net/

C:\> gmer.exe (GUI)

Kill running malicious file:

C:\> gmer.exe -killfile

C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\<MALICIOUS FILENAME>.exe Kill running process using wmic:

C:\> wmic process <PID> delete

C:\> wmic process where name=”<FILENAME.exe>” delete Kill running malicious file in PowerShell:

PS C:\> Stop-Process -Name <PROCESS NAME> PS C:\> Stop-Process -ID <PID> -Force

LINUX

Stop a malware process or processes:

# kill <MALICIOUS PID>

# killall -9 -I <PROCESS NAME>

Change the malware process from execution and move:

# chmod -x /usr/sbin/<SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> # mkdir /home/quarantine/

# mv /usr/sbin/<SUSPICIOUS FILE NAME> /home/quarantine/

6 TACTICS (Tips & Tricks)

OS CHEATS

WINDOWS

Pipe output to clipboard:

C:\> some_command.exe | clip

Output clip to file: (Requires PowerShell 5)

PS C:\> Get-Clipboard > clip.txt

Add time stamps into log file:

C:\> echo %DATE% %TIME% >> <TXT LOG>.txt Add/Modify registry value remotely:

C:\> reg add \\<REMOTE COMPUTER NAME>\HKLM\Software\<REG KEY INFO> Get registry value remotely:

C:\> reg query \\<REMOTE COMPUTER NAME>\HKLM\Software\<REG KEY INFO> Test to see if Registry Path exists:

PS C:\> Test-Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\<HIVE>"

Copy files remotely:

C:\> robocopy C:\<SOURCE SHARED FOLDER> \\<DESTINATION COMPUTER>\<DESTINATION FOLDER> /E

Check to see if certain file extensions are in a directory: PS C:\> Test-Path C:\Scripts\Archive\* -include *.ps1, *.vbs Show contents of a file:

C:\> type <FILE NAME>

Combine contents of multiple files:

C:\> type <FILE NAME 1> <FILE NAME 2> <FILE NAME 3> > <NEW FILE NAME>

Desktops, allows multiple Desktop Screens:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/cc817881

Run live option:

C:\> "%ProgramFiles%\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe "https://live.sysinternals.com/desktops.exe Remote mounting, Read and Read/Write:

C:\> net share MyShare_R=c:\<READ ONLY FOLDER> /GRANT:EVERYONE,READ

C:\> net share MyShare_RW=c:\<READ/WRITE FOLDER> /GRANT:EVERYONE,FULL

Remote task execution using PSEXEC:

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/psexec.aspx

C:\> psexec.exe \\<TARGET IP ADDRESS> -u <USER NAME> -p <PASSWORD> /c C:\<PROGRAM>.exe C:\> psexec @C:\<TARGET FILE LIST>.txt -u <ADMIN LEVEL USER NAME> -p <PASSWORD> C:\<PROGRAM>.exe >> C:\<OUTPUT FILE NAME>.txt C:\> psexec.exe @C:\<TARGET FILE LIST>.csv -u <DOMAIN NAME>\<USER NAME> -p <PASSWORD> /c C:\<PROGRAM>.exe Remote task execution and send output to share:

C:\> wmic /node:ComputerName process call create “cmd.exe /c netstat -an > \\<REMOTE SHARE>\<OUTPUT FILE NAME>.txt”

Compare two files for changes:

PS C:\> Compare-Object (Get-Content .<LOG FILE NAME 1>.log) -DifferenceObject (Get-Content .<LOG FILE NAME 2>.log) Remote task execution using PowerShell:

PS C:\> Invoke-Command -<COMPUTER NAME> {<PS COMMAND>}

PowerShell Command Help:

PS C:\> Get-Help <PS COMMAND> -full

LINUX

Analyze traffic remotely over ssh:

# ssh root@<REMOTE IP ADDRESS OF HOST TO SNIFF> tcpdump -i any -U -s 0 -w - 'not port 22'

Manually add note/data to syslog:

# logger “Something important to note in Log”

# dmesg | grep <COMMENT>

Simple read only mounting:

# mount -o ro /dev/<YOUR FOLDER OR DRIVE> /mnt Mounting remotely over SSH:

# apt-get install sshfs

# adduser <USER NAME> fuse

Log out and log back in.

mkdir ~/<WHERE TO MOUNT LOCALLY>

# sshfs <REMOTE USER NAME>@<REMOTE HOST>:/<REMOTE PATH> ~/<WHERE TO MOUNT LOCALLY> Creating a SMB share in Linux:

# useradd -m <NEW USER>

# passwd <NEW USER>

# smbpasswd -a <NEW USER>

# echo [Share] >> /etc/samba/smb.conf

# echo /<PATH OF FOLDER TO SHARE> >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # echo available = yes >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # echo valid users = <NEW USER> >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # echo read only = no >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # echo browsable = yes >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # echo public = yes >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # echo writable = yes >> /etc/samba/smb.conf # service smbd restart

Visit share from remote system:

> smb:\\<IP ADDRESS OF LINUX SMB SHARE> Copy files to remote system:

> scp <FILE NAME> <USER NAME>@<DESTINATION IP ADDRESS>:/<REMOTE FOLDER> Mount a SMB share to remote system:

# mount -t smbfs -o username=<USER NAME> //<SERVER NAME OR IP ADDRESS>/<SHARE NAME> /mnt/<MOUNT POINT>/

Monitor if a website or file is still accessible:

# while :; do curl -sSr http://<URL> | head -n 1; sleep 60; done Use Screen to manage multiple shell sessions, list sessions, create new shell and switchto other shells: # screen

# screen -ls

Hit Ctrl-a then c

Hit Ctrl-a then n

Re-attach a screen:

# screen -x

Start a servicethat will keep running after logout and return back to prompt: #nohup ./<COMMAND> > <OUTPUT TO A FILE> & Check list of nohup running jobs:

# jobs -l

Kill a nohup job:

# kill %<JOB NUMBER> Check which command is being used and list all locations: # which <COMMAND NAME>

# which -a <COMMAND NAME>

DECODING

HEX CONVERSION

Convert from hex to decimal in Windows:

C:\> set /a 0xff

255

PS C:\> 0xff

255

Other Basic Math in Windows:

C:\> set /a 1+2

3

C:\> set /a 3*(9/4)

6

C:\> set /a (2*5)/2

5

C:\> set /a "32>>3"

4

Decode Base64 text in a file:

C:\> certutil -decode <BASE64 ENCODED FILE NAME> <DECODED FILE NAME> Decode XOR and search for HTTP:

Ref. https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/xorsearch/

C:\> xorsearch.exe -i -s <INPUT FILE NAME> http Convert from hex to decimal in Linux:

# echo “0xff”|wcalc -d

= 255

Convert from decimal to hex in Linux:

$ echo “255”|wcalc -h

= 0xff

Decode HTML Strings:

PS C:\> Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Web

PS C:\> [System.Uri]::UnescapeDataString("HTTP%3a%2f%2fHello%20World.com") HTTP://Hello World.com

SNORT

SNORT RULES

Snort Rules to detect Meterpreter traffic:

Ref. https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/06/16/metasploit-meterpreter-reverse-https-snort-rule/

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 6.0\; Windows NT 5.1)|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618000; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 6.1\; Windows NT)|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618001; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 7.0\; Windows NT 6.0)|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618002; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 7.0\; Windows NT 6.0\; Trident/4.0\; SIMBAR={7DB0F6DE-8DE7-4841-9084-28FA914B0F2E}\; SLCC1\; .N|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618003; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; Metasploit RSPEC)|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618004; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/5.0 (Windows\; U\; Windows NT 5.1\; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.221.6 Safari/525.13|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618005; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/5.0 (compatible\; Googlebot/2.1\; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618006; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Metasploit User Agent String"; flow:to_server,established; content:"User-Agent|3a| Mozilla/5.0 (compatible\; MSIE 10.0\; Windows NT 6.1\; Trident/6.0)|0d 0a|"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/; sid:1618007; rev:1;) Snort Rules to detect PSEXEC traffic:

Ref. https://github.com/John-Lin/docker-snort/blob/master/snortrules-snapshot-2972/rules/policy-other.rules alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET [139,445] (msg:"POLICY-OTHER use of psexec remote administration tool"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|FF|SMB|A2|"; depth:5; offset:4; content:"|5C 00|p|00|s|00|e|00|x|00|e|00|c|00|s|00|v|00|c"; nocase; metadata:service netbios-ssn; reference:url,technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx; classtype:policy-violation; sid:24008; rev:1;) alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET [139,445] (msg:"POLICY-OTHER use of psexec remote administration tool SMBv2"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|FE|SMB"; depth:8; nocase; content:"|05 00|"; within:2; distance:8; content:"P|00|S|00|E|00|X|00|E|00|S|00|V|00|C|00|"; fast_pattern:only; metadata:service netbios-ssn; reference:url,technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx[1]; classtype:policy-violation; sid:30281; rev:1;)

DOS/DDOS

FINGERPRINT DOS/DDOS

Fingerprinting the type of DoS/DDoS:

Ref. https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/PCAP-Files-Are-Great-Arn-t-They--/

Volumetric: Bandwidth consumption Example, sustaining sending 1Gb of traffic to 10Mb connection

Ref. http://freecode.com/projects/iftop

# iftop -n

Protocol: Use of specific protocol Example, SYN Flood, ICMP Flood, UDP flood

# tshark -r <FILE NAME>.pcap -q -z io,phs # tshark -c 1000 -q -z io,phs

# tcpdump -tnr $FILE |awk -F '.' '{print $1"."$2"."$3"."$4}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail # tcpdump -qnn "tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-syn) != 0"

# netstat -s

Example, isolate one protocol and or remove other protocols

# tcpdump -nn not arp and not icmp and not udp # tcpdump -nn tcp

Resource: State and connection exhaustion Example, Firewall can handle 10,000 simultaneous connections, and attacker sends 20,000

# netstat -n | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head

Application: Layer 7 attacks Example, HTTP GET flood, for a large image file.

# tshark -c 10000 -T fields -e http.host | sort | uniq -c | sort -r | head -n 10

# tshark -r capture6 -T fields -e http.request.full\_uri | sort | uniq -c | sort -r | head -n 10c # tcpdump -n 'tcp[32:4] = 0x47455420'| cut -f 7- -d ":"

Example, look for excessive file requests, GIF, ZIP, JPEG, PDF, PNG.

# tshark -Y "http contains "ff:d8"" || "http contains "GIF89a"” || "http contains "\x50\x4B\x03\x04"" || "http contains\xff\xd8" " || “http contains "%PDF"" || “http contains "\x89\x50\x4E\x47""

Example, Look for web application ‘user-agent’ pattern of abuse.

# tcpdump -c 1000 -Ann | grep -Ei 'user-agent' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -10

Example, show HTTP Header of requested resources.

# tcpdump -i en0 -A -s 500 | grep -i refer

Sniff HTTP Headers for signs of repeat abuse:

# tcpdump -s 1024 -l -A dst <EXAMPLE.COM> Poison: Layer 2 attacks Example, ARP poison, race condition DNS, DHCP

# tcpdump 'arp or icmp'

# tcpdump -tnr <SAMPLE TRAFFIC FILE>.pcap ARP |awk -F '.' '{print $1"."$2"."$3"."$4}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail # tshark -r <SAMPLE TRAFFIC FILE>.pcap -q -z io,phs| grep arp.duplicate-address-detected

TOOL SUITES

PREBUILT ISO, VIRTUAL MACHINE AND DISTRIBUTIONS

KALI - Open Source Pentesting Distribution

Ref. https://www.kali.org

SIFT - SANS Investigative Forensics Toolkit

Ref. http://sift.readthedocs.org/

REMNUX - A Linux Toolkit for Reverse-Engineering and Analyzing Malware Ref. https://remnux.org

OPEN VAS - Open Source vulnerability scanner and manager Ref. http://www.openvas.org

MOLOCH - Large scale IPv4 packet capturing (PCAP), indexing and database system Ref. https://github.com/aol/moloch/wiki

SECURITY ONION - Linux distro for intrusion detection, network security monitoring, and log management Ref. https://security-onion-solutions.github.io/security-onion/

NAGIOS - Network Monitoring, Alerting, Response, and Reporting Tool Ref. https://www.nagios.org

OSSEC - Scalable, multi-platform, open source Host-based Intrusion Detection System Ref. http://ossec.github.io

SAMURAI WTF - Pre-configured web pen-testing environment Ref. http://samurai.inguardians.com

RTIR - Request Tracker for Incident Response

Ref. https://www.bestpractical.com/rtir/

HONEYDRIVE - Pre-configured honeypot software packages Ref. http://sourceforge.net/projects/honeydrive/

The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit - helps prevent vulnerabilities in software from being successfully exploited Ref. https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544

ATTACK SURFACE ANALYZER BY MICROSOFT - Baseline Tool

Ref. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/confirmation.aspx?id=24487

WINDOWS TO GO - USB Portable Windows 8

Ref. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh831833.aspx

WINFE - Windows Forensic Environment on CD/USB

Ref. http://winfe.wordpress.com/

DCEPT - Deploying and detecting use of Active Directory honeytokens Ref. https://www.secureworks.com/blog/dcept

TAILS - The Amnesic Incognito Live System

Ref. https://tails.boum.org

GRR - Google Rapid Respponse framework focused on remote live forensics Ref. https://github.com/google/grr

7 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT (Checklist)

INCIDENT RESPONSE CHECKLIST

Note: This section is intended to be an incident response guide. Some tasks may not be relevant, required or appropriate. Please consider your environment before implementing each step or other steps as needed.

IDENTIFICATION TASKS

Acquire a copy of Malicious file(s) for analysis?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Malicious effects on systems list. Acquire an itemized list of all known changes on computer systems, files, settings, registry, services add/modified/deleted or stop/started.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Which A/V or malware tools can detect and remove malicious threat?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Where does malware/attacker exit the network?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Malicious internal/external sites/connections still active?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Malware listening on any ports?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Malware method of original infection, and/or weakness?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Packet capture of Malware trying to infect others?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Any packet capture of malware trying to communicate out of network and ID method of ports, IPs, DNS, etc?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Malware pose threat to any sensitive data (Files, credentials, Intellectual Property, PII, etc?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

What are the DNS entries on an infected system?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Is it possible to detect the first infected system(s)?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Has the first systems hard drive been preserved?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Do any scripts need to be ran on live infected systems?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Is there a desktop management tool? If so, what reports are available to inventory all systems and statuses?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

List of all infected systems?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Identify any patching missing with current and/or previous vulnerability scan.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Look for systems that have stopped reporting into Malware servers for updates, or which ones have stopped going to AV vendors for updates.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Look for systems that have stopped going to Update server or directly to Microsoft for updates.

CONTAINMENT TASKS

How many systems are still unknown, clear, suspicious, or infected?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Networking device(s) changes. (Switches, Routers, Firewalls, IPS, NAC, Wi-Fi, etc.).

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Active Directory OU isolation of suspected systems.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Active Directory - User account restrictions and resets.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Active Directory policies to prohibit threats from running and/or access.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Firewall blocks.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

DNS blocks (null route malware site(s)).

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Web filtering blocks.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

REMEDIATION TASKS

Administrative AD Password Changes.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Local Administrative Password Changes.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

User AD Password Changes.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Local User Password Changes.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Service Account Password Changes.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Push Antivirus updates for detected malware.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Try multiple antivirus tools.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

What Active Directory GPO policies are set (Logs, Restrictions, etc.)?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

What is the network architecture and how would Malware traverse?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Are there additional IDS/IPS segments that need coverage to prevent/detect outbreak?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

3rd Party Applications missing patches (Adobe, Java, etc.)?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Monitor client email for vendor or other business continuity items of interest.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Monitor RDP sessions on external accessible RDP client system.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Are there any applications in use that are facilitating the attack? If so, are there alternatives?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Is there a baseline system to review for changes?

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Monitor user name variations.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Managing and monitoring tasks.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review border router logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review VPN (remote access) logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Citrix / VMWare or similar logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review accounting server(s) logs and trends of users.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review AD server logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review Anti-Virus (Malicious Code Services) logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review email abuse notifications and logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review DNS logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review account and policy abuse logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Review host firewall logs.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

OTHER / LESSONS LEARNED TASKS

Rebuild all systems in life cycle rebuild plan.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Synchronize time services across of systems.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Create incident data repository.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Consider host based IPS.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

Consider Network Access Control (NAC).

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

3rd Party internal/external security and perimeter security tools and assessment services.

Priority: H/M/L

Effort: H/M/L

Open/Closed

MALWARE ATTRIBUTES CHECKLIST

Malware Presence on the System:

Runs in memory only.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Runs out of registry.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Artifacts on disk.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Disk file presence hidden, stored in unallocated, free/slack space or encrypted.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Has no icon.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Has no description or company name.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Unsigned Microsoft images.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Are packed and likely encrypted.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Suspicious DLLs or services.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Backups and swaps itself in and out in place of real file.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Stays alive working in file pairs.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Found in embedded devices, industrial controls and IOT.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Malware Activities

Downloads new code/functionality.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Leverages pivot system(s) and network path(s) to exit the victim network including VPN/Dial-Up, HTTP/HTTPS, and other standard or non-standard services and ports.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to leverage mobile devices and other removable media.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to detect and utilize authenticated web proxies.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Morphs on victim client system.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Contains red herring (misleading/distracting) features depending on the environment it detects.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to traverse all known operating systems.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to move into embedded devices.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Malware Capabilities

Ability to conduct most Windows based Active Directory commands.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to upload and download files/payloads.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Can use built-in services or purpose built malware for needed services.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Has several persistent features, making the malware highly resilient to A/V defenses.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to brute force.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to DoS/DDoS tools.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to steal and/or pass the hash.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ability to conduct credential harvesting.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Privilege escalation capability.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Ransomware or like capability.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Self-Destruct mode, including destructive methods.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Anti memory forensics.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Is sandbox aware and virtual machine aware.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Apply software patch to prevent other malware infection

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

C2 techniques: DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, stegonagraphy, cloud, TOR, online code, etc.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

One time install/detonation

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Communicates in no predictable patterns including short and long-term sleep techniques.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Makes use of compromised CA, in order to hide communications.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Time zone and IP Geo aware.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

Makes use of well-established commercial compromised web sites for C2, i.e. Dropbox, Gmail, etc.

Yes|No|Unknown|N/A

8 SECURITY INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION (Schema)

VOCABULARY FOR EVENTS RECORDING AND INCIDENT SHARING (VERIS)

GENERAL

Ref. http://veriscommunity.net/

Use this template to identify threats uniformly:

incident_id

#

security_incident

Confirmed, Suspected, False positive, Near miss, No

confidence

High, Medium, Low, None

victim.employee_count

#

timeline.unit

Unknown, NA, Seconds, Minutes, Hours, Days, Weeks, Months, Years, Never

impact.overall_rating

Unknown, Insignificant, Distracting, Painful, Damaging, Catastrophic

impact.loss.variety

Asset and fraud, Brand damage, Business disruption, Operating costs, Legal and regulatory, Competitive advantage, Response and recovery

impact.loss.rating

Unknown, Major, Moderate, Minor, None

discovery_method

Unknown, Ext - actor disclosure, Ext - fraud detection, Ext - monitoring service, Ext - customer, Ext - unrelated party, Ext - audit, Ext - unknown, Int - antivirus, Int - incident response, Int - financial audit, Int - fraud detection, Int - HIDS, Int - IT audit, Int - log review, Int - NIDS, Ext - law enforcement, Int - security alarm, Int - reported by user, Int - unknown, Other

targeted

Unknown, Opportunistic, Targeted, NA

cost_corrective_action

Unknown, Simple and cheap, Difficult and expensive, Something in-between

country

Unknown, Two Letter, Other

iso_currency_code

AED, AFN, ALL, AMD, ANG, AOA, ARS, AUD, AWG, AZN, BAM, BBD, BDT, BGN, BHD, BIF, BMD, BND, BOB, BRL, BSD, BTN, BWP, BYR, BZD, CAD, CDF, CHF, CLP, CNY, COP, CRC, CUC, CUP, CVE, CZK, DJF, DKK, DOP, DZD, EGP, ERN, ETB, EUR, FJD, FKP, GBP, GEL, GGP, GHS, GIP, GMD, GNF, GTQ, GYD, HKD, HNL, HRK, HTG, HUF, IDR, ILS, IMP, INR, IQD, IRR, ISK, JEP, JMD, JOD, JPY, KES, KGS, KHR, KMF, KPW, KRW, KWD, KYD, KZT, LAK, LBP, LKR, LRD, LSL, LTL, LVL, LYD, MAD, MDL, MGA, MKD, MMK, MNT, MOP, MRO, MUR, MVR, MWK, MXN, MYR, MZN, NAD, NGN, NIO, NOK, NPR, NZD, OMR, PAB, PEN, PGK, PHP, PKR, PLN, PYG, QAR, RON, RSD, RUB, RWF, SAR, SBD, SCR, SDG, SEK, SGD, SHP, SLL, SOS, SPL, SRD, STD, SVC, SYP, SZL, THB, TJS, TMT, TND, TOP, TRY, TTD, TVD, TWD, TZS, UAH, UGX, USD, UYU, UZS, VEF, VND, VUV, WST, XAF, XCD, XDR, XOF, XPF, YER, ZAR, ZMK, ZWD

ACTOR

actor.x.motive

Unknown, NA, Espionage, Fear, Financial, Fun, Grudge, Ideology, Convenience, Other

actor.external.variety

Unknown, Activist, Auditor, Competitor, Customer, Force majeure, Former employee, Nation-state, Organized crime, Acquaintance, State-affiliated, Terrorist, Unaffiliated, Other

actor.internal.variety

Unknown, Auditor, Call center, Cashier, End-user, Executive, Finance, Helpdesk, Human resources, Maintenance, Manager, Guard, Developer, System admin, Other

ACTION

action.malware.variety

Unknown, Adware, Backdoor, Brute force, Capture app data, Capture stored data, Client-side attack, Click fraud, C2, Destroy data, Disable controls, DoS, Downloader, Exploit vuln, Export data, Packet sniffer, Password dumper, Ram scraper, Ransomware, Rootkit, Scan network, Spam, Spyware/Keylogger, SQL injection, Adminware, Worm, Other

action.malware.vector

Unknown, Direct install, Download by malware, Email autoexecute, Email link, Email attachment, Instant messaging, Network propagation, Remote injection, Removable media, Web drive-by, Web download, Other

action.hacking.variety

Unknown, Abuse of functionality, Brute force, Buffer overflow, Cache poisoning, Session prediction, CSRF, XSS, Cryptanalysis, DoS, Footprinting, Forced browsing, Format string attack, Fuzz testing, HTTP request smuggling, HTTP request splitting, HTTP response smuggling, HTTP Response Splitting, Integer overflows, LDAP injection, Mail command injection, MitM, Null byte injection, Offline cracking, OS commanding, Path traversal, RFI, Reverse engineering, Routing detour, Session fixation, Session replay, Soap array abuse, Special element injection, SQLi, SSI injection, URL redirector abuse, Use of backdoor or C2, Use of stolen creds, XML attribute blowup, XML entity expansion, XML external entities, XML injection, XPath injection, XQuery injection, Virtual machine escape, Other

action.hacking.vector

Unknown, 3rd party desktop, Backdoor or C2, Desktop sharing, Physical access, Command shell, Partner, VPN, Web application, Other

action.social.variety

Unknown, Baiting, Bribery, Elicitation, Extortion, Forgery, Influence, Scam, Phishing, Pretexting, Propaganda, Spam, Other

action.social.vector

Unknown, Documents, Email, In-person, IM, Phone, Removable media, SMS, Social media, Software, Website, Other

action.social.target

Unknown, Auditor, Call center, Cashier, Customer, End-user, Executive, Finance, Former employee, Helpdesk, Human resources, Maintenance, Manager, Partner, Guard, Developer, System admin, Other

action.misuse.variety

Unknown, Knowledge abuse, Privilege abuse, Embezzlement, Data mishandling, Email misuse, Net misuse, Illicit content, Unapproved workaround, Unapproved hardware, Unapproved software, Other

action.misuse.vector

Unknown, Physical access, LAN access, Remote access, Non-corporate, Other

action.physical.variety

Unknown, Assault, Sabotage, Snooping, Surveillance, Tampering, Theft, Wiretapping, Connection, Other

action.physical.location

Unknown, Partner facility, Partner vehicle, Personal residence, Personal vehicle, Public facility, Public vehicle, Victim secure area, Victim work area, Victim public area, Victim grounds, Other

action.physical.vector

Unknown, Privileged access, Visitor privileges, Bypassed controls, Disabled controls, Uncontrolled location, Other

action.error.variety

Unknown, Classification error, Data entry error, Disposal error, Gaffe, Loss, Maintenance error, Misconfiguration, Misdelivery, Misinformation, Omission, Physical accidents, Capacity shortage, Programming error, Publishing error, Malfunction, Other

action.error.vector

Unknown, Random error, Carelessness, Inadequate personnel, Inadequate processes, Inadequate technology, Other

action.environmental.variety

Unknown, Deterioration, Earthquake, EMI, ESD, Temperature, Fire, Flood, Hazmat, Humidity, Hurricane, Ice, Landslide, Lightning, Meteorite, Particulates, Pathogen, Power failure, Tornado, Tsunami, Vermin, Volcano, Leak, Wind, Other

ASSET

asset.variety

Unknown, S - Authentication, S - Backup, S - Database, S - DHCP, S - Directory, S - DCS, S - DNS, S - File, S - Log, S - Mail, S - Mainframe, S - Payment switch, S - POS controller, S - Print, S - Proxy, S - Remote access, S - SCADA, S - Web application, S - Code repository, S - VM host, S - Other N - Access reader, N - Camera, N - Firewall, N - HSM, N - IDS, N - Broadband, N - PBX, N - Private WAN, N - PLC, N - Public WAN, N - RTU, N - Router or switch, N - SAN, N - Telephone, N - VoIP adapter, N - LAN, N - WLAN, N - Other U - Auth token, U - Desktop, U - Laptop, U - Media, U - Mobile phone, U - Peripheral, U - POS terminal, U - Tablet, U - Telephone, U - VoIP phone, U - Other T - ATM, T - PED pad, T - Gas terminal, T - Kiosk, T - Other M - Tapes, M - Disk media, M - Documents, M - Flash drive, M - Disk drive, M - Smart card, M - Payment card, M - Other P - System admin, P - Auditor, P - Call center, P - Cashier, P - Customer, P - Developer, P - End-user, P - Executive, P - Finance, P - Former employee, P - Guard, P - Helpdesk, P - Human resources, P - Maintenance, P - Manager, P - Partner, P - Other

asset.accessibility

Unknown, External, Internal, Isolated, NA

asset.ownership

Unknown, Victim, Employee, Partner, Customer, NA

asset.management

Unknown, Internal, External, NA

asset.hosting

Unknown, Internal, External shared, External dedicated, External, NA

asset.cloud

Unknown, Hypervisor, Partner application, Hosting governance, Customer attack, Hosting

ATTRIBUTE

attribute.confidentiality.data_disclosure

Unknown, Yes, Potentially, No

attribute.confidentiality.data.variety

Unknown, Credentials, Bank, Classified, Copyrighted, Medical, Payment, Personal, Internal, System, Secrets, Other

attribute.confidentiality.state

Unknown, Stored, Stored encrypted, Stored unencrypted, Transmitted, Transmitted encrypted, Transmitted unencrypted, Processed

attribute.integrity.variety

Unknown, Created account, Hardware tampering, Alter behavior, Fraudulent transaction, Log tampering, Misappropriation, Misrepresentation, Modify configuration, Modify privileges, Modify data, Software installation, Other

attribute.availability.variety

Unknown, Destruction, Loss, Interruption, Degradation, Acceleration, Obscuration, Other

COURSE OF ACTION

Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™) (Adapted) Ref. https://stixproject.github.io

coa.type

Blocking, Redirecting, Hardening, Patching, Rebuilding, Monitoring, Other

coa.impact

Insignificant, Distracting, Painful, Damaging, Catastrophic, Unknown

coa.efficacy

Not Effective, Somewhat Effective, Mostly Effective, Completely Effective, NA

coa.stage

Prepare, Remedy, Response, Recovered

coa.hosting

Unknown, Internal, External shared, External dedicated, External, NA

coa.objective

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

KILL CHAIN MAPPING

GATHER DATA FOR MAPPING KILL CHAIN

Ref. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf

Phase

Identified evidence, artifact, info, or intel

Course of Action

Active Reconnaissance

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

Weaponization and Customization

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

Delivery

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

Exploitation

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

Installation

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

Command & Control (C2)

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

Action on Objectives

Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy

PRIORITIZED DEFENDED ASSET LIST (PDAL)

GATHER DATA AND PRIORITIZE ASSETS TO DEFEND

Asset:

Location:

Criticality:

Description:

Vulnerability:

Purpose:

Recoverability:

Time Prioritized:

Ranking:

Priority:

I

Asset:

Location:

Criticality:

Description:

Vulnerability:

Purpose:

Recoverability:

Time Prioritized:

Ranking:

Priority:

II

Asset:

Location:

Criticality:

Description:

Vulnerability:

Purpose:

Recoverability:

Time Prioritized:

Ranking:

Priority:

III

SCRATCH PAD

SCRATCH PAD

10 INDEX (A-Z)

A

Active Directory 16, 17, 28

AdFind 17

Alternate Data Streams 66

Apache 54

AppLocker 24

auditd 55

Auditpol 28, 48, 49, 50, 85

C

Certutil 95

Cron 54, 69

cURL 78

D

dc3dd 79, 80

dd 79

Decoding 95

DHCP 13, 18

DNS 13, 18, 23, 35

DNSCmd 14

dnstop 47

dsadd 29

dsmove 29

dsquery 16

E

editcap 44

F

File Checksum Integrity Verifier (FCIV) 14

forfiles 66

G

GMER 89

gpresult 59

gpupdate 28

Group Policy Object 28

H

Hashing 14, 19

hexdump 73

I

iftop 100

initctl 32

IPSEC 27, 36

iptables 32, 33, 36

IPv6 30

L

labrea 47

ldifde 17

LiME 80

Linux Firewall 32

Linux Scripting 18, 19, 40, 46, 94

Linux Services 32

ListDLLs 66

M

Mergecap 44

Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) 15

Microsoft IIS 53

Mimikatz 45

Mklink 85

mount 94

N

nbtscan 19

nbtstat 15

Nessus 11

net user 23

net view 13

NetBIOS 15

Netcat 47

netdom 16

Netsh 21, 22, 27, 28, 58

Nmap 11

O

OpenSSL 40

OpenVAS 12

P

passwd 34

PowerShell 17, 25, 26, 51, 53, 65, 86, 92, 96

Proxy Auto Config (PAC) 24, 35

ps 32

PsExec 79, 92

PsInfo 57

PsLoggedOn 15

PsLogList 65

pspasswd 23

R

Racoon 36

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) 29

Robocopy 91

runas 46

S

SC 21, 87

scp 94

Sigcheck 66, 73

smbclient 18

smbtree 18

Snort 43, 97, 98

SSH 67, 93

ssldump 41

Sticky Keys 29

T

tcpdump 39, 40, 100, 101

Team Cymru 78

TShark 41, 42, 100, 101

U

ufw 34

unix-privsec-check 71

upstart 32

User Access Control (UAC) 31

V

VirusTotal 78

Volatility 74, 79

Volrest 86

Vssadmin 85, 86

W

Wevtutil 46, 48, 64, 65

Wget 46

Windows Autorun 59

Windows Defender 66

Windows Event Log 51, 52

Windows Firewall 21, 28, 31

Windows Registry 29, 30, 31, 48, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64

Windows Scripting 13, 15, 45, 65

wmic 21, 57, 58

wusa 83

X

xorsearch 95